

KOINONIA

The Princeton Theological Seminary Graduate Forum

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
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


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EDITORIAL

In this life we have no direct and unmediated experience of the Divine. As human beings we are dependent upon sense-experience for knowledge, and even the formation of language is an effort to express the content of our senses. Given this, how can we know a Being who transcends sense-experience? How can the words of *any* human language be applicable to the Divine Being?

During the period of modernity the natural sciences were elevated to a position of epistemic privilege while theology was marginalized to the realm of the private and personal. In response to the challenge of Enlightenment rationality many theologians resorted to some form of fideism, in which their talk about God was never subjected to external criticism, thereby transforming theology into *idioglossia*—a secret or private language between a few people. The modernist challenge to theology is encapsulated in the closing words of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” However, as theologians and scholars of religion we cannot remain silent. As theology converses with competing narratives—especially with secularized scientific culture—it needs to demonstrate its ability to present an intelligible position in a radically pluralist context.

For *KOINONIA Journal*, interdisciplinarity is not just a catch-phrase, it is our mission statement. The joy of publishing our annual open issue comes from reading the breadth of disciplines and topics submitted for publication. Unlike our Fall Forum issues, in which a single topic is explored from a diversity of perspectives, open issues resemble a patch-work quilt . . . with some issues coming together better than others. Yet, it is always the hope of the editorial board that the end result contributes positively to the interdisciplinary conversation that is the academic study of religion.

The essays in this issue, my first as Executive Editor, explore topics as disparate as the use of religious language in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Buber, to the twelfth century Gospel homilies of Hildegard of Bingen. What ties them together is a commitment to reaffirming God’s truth without abandoning the public voice of confessional theology; a commitment to criticize our traditions while standing firmly within them. These essays are offered as critical reflection on the believing community’s faith and praxis, respecting the theologian’s accountability to his or her community, yet striving to make confessional claims intelligible on the basis of external and shared rational criteria.

Thomas D. Carroll, in his essay “Is Understanding Across Worldviews Possible? A Look at Buber and Wittgenstein on Religious Language and the Role of

Trust,” engages the very challenges to theology I have been attempting to describe. Comparing and contrasting the philosophical work of Buber and Wittgenstein on religious language, Carroll argues that both thinkers posit trust and risk as integral components of religious language. Applying these insights to the problem of cross-cultural communication, the author suggests that both Buber and Wittgenstein promote dialogue as a means for promoting “an appreciation for our commonality” and a “shared picture of life.” Carroll concludes by saying that as long as the channels of communication remain open between competing traditions the possibility exists that trust can be built and criteria be established for resolving conflict.

The second essay, by Jaehyun Kim, entitled “Hildegard of Bingen’s Gospel Homilies and Her Exegesis of Mark 16.1-7” offers a brief portrait of Hildegard as an apocalyptic and mystical preacher in the tradition of Bernard of Clairvaux, her contemporary and spiritual mentor. These homilies reveal a prophetic side to this medieval mystic, demonstrating how her concerns extend far beyond personal spiritual transformation and growth to encompass the moral reform of the twelfth century Church. Jaehyun argues that Hildegard’s homilies, and not her better known treatises, are her true masterpieces and deserve greater study for what they can contribute to biblical exegesis, what they reveal about the role of women in the High Middle Ages, and for the prophetic insight they can contribute to twentieth-century spirituality.

Contemporary spirituality is the focus of my contribution to this issue, “Becoming a Church *for* the Poor: Toward a Reformed Spirituality of Liberation.” I bring the theology of Karl Barth—perhaps the twentieth century’s most influential Reformed theologian—into conversation with Latin American liberation theology in order to challenge the privatization of faith prevalent within so much of North American Protestantism. Karl Barth is an attractive conversation partner for liberation theology because of a shared concern for society’s weakest members. Recovering this aspect of Barth’s theology can lead to the development of a Reformed spirituality of liberation, but first the Reformed tradition must seek genuine discourse with previously silenced or marginalized theological perspectives.

The final essay, “Synkrenesis as Following in Faith: Interpretation for a Kerygmatic Homiletic,” by Timothy Matthew Slemmons continues our engagement with interdisciplinary discourse by looking at both *intratextuality* and *intertextuality* in biblical hermeneutics. In this challenging essay Slemmons argues for restricting the practice of *intertextuality* to the canon, and even suggests a fideistic turn in the service of kerygmatic preaching. This essay serves as

a reminder that at its core theological discourse is “about something”; more to the point, it is about a very specific someone—Jesus Christ, the Living Word of God.

Perhaps the only fitting response to Wittgenstein’s challenge to theology are the closing words to Martin Buber’s *I and Thou*: “The existence of mutuality between God and (hu)man cannot be proved Yet (s)he who dares to speak of it, bears witness, and calls to witness him to whom (s)he speaks—whether that witness is now or in the future.” Hopefully, *KOINONIA* will remain a forum not just for academic discourse in the field of religion, but also a place for bearing witness to the Living God.

In closing I want to say thanks to our authors, to our book reviewers, to the editorial board, and to our new production editor, Mereides Delgado, for making possible the publication of this issue. May the next two years prove a fruitful venture!

RUBÉN ROSARIO RODRÍGUEZ
EXECUTIVE EDITOR



Is Understanding Across Worldviews Possible? A Look at Buber and Wittgenstein on Religious Language and the Role of Trust

THOMAS D. CARROLL

WITH INCREASING CONTACT AMONG WORLD CULTURES, AND THEREFORE ALSO between world religions and secular worldviews, the issue of what it is to understand utterances with religious content has taken on a new urgency. Discovering to what extent people with quite different backgrounds can understand one another is important not just as an intellectual question, but also as an urgent practical question in an increasingly complex social world.

While very different in style and thought, Martin Buber and Ludwig Wittgenstein were both concerned with religious language and symbolism. In particular, both recognize that a certain *distance* lies between religious and non-religious ways of life.¹ Since Wittgenstein and Buber both write on the notion of distance (with differing vocabulary), a comparison ought to shed light mutually upon implications of each other's views. In light of this comparison, I argue that the dilemma of religious language being either incommensurable² with other forms of life or being readily understandable across forms of life ought instead to be appreciated in light of the role of trust in linguistic commu-

¹Religious and secular ways of thinking can be understood as different in so far as religious thinking adheres to its respective doctrine and secular thinking maintains the primacy of free rational inquiry. However, for the purposes of this article, what is important is just that there are differences between worldviews, not that those differences manifest themselves as a secular/religious divide. The secular/religious distinction is just an aid for gaining insight into what is at stake in cross-cultural dialogue.

²I use the word "incommensurable" here to mean that two or more meanings cannot be compared or evaluated together.

nication. A significant part of the problem of understanding across worldviews will then be whether it is worth the risk required to encounter Buber's "You" or, in Wittgenstein's terminology, to appreciate the picture behind the language game out of which religious language emerges.

WITTGENSTEIN ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

It is deeply unfortunate that Wittgenstein did not publish more in his lifetime. His great insights into language and philosophy have encouraged many to seek for further insights and details in his unpublished works. "If only Wittgenstein had written on this or that . . ." In this spirit, I have found myself reading the "Lectures on Religious Belief," a short collection of notes taken by students during a few lectures given on the subject. How reliable are they? Since Wittgenstein himself did not publish on this topic, can we take them at face value? In the absence of any other sources, we must risk relying on them. Wittgenstein did not write much directly on the matter. But we do know that the subject matter of religious belief concerned him deeply. What it is to be a believer in a religion was an idea that fascinated Wittgenstein.

In the "Lectures on Religious Belief," Wittgenstein gives several conversational examples that suggest that he takes religious language to be incommensurable with secular language, that is, that religious forms of life are opaque³ from the perspective of those who practice secular forms of life. Wittgenstein says,

Suppose someone believed in the Last Judgment, and I don't, does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always." / Suppose I say that the body will rot, and another says "No. Particles will rejoin in a thousand years, and there will be a Resurrection of you." / If some said: "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?" I'd say: "No." "Do you contradict the man?" I'd say: "No" (Wittgenstein 1966:53).

How are we to understand 'saying the opposite' and 'contradiction'? Perhaps they really convey the same idea in this context. After all, when one contradicts

³I use this philosophically loaded word straightforwardly—as in a surface one cannot see through.

what another says, one does so by asserting the opposite of what was said.⁴ So what does this mean for understanding this passage from the lectures? In these examples of believing in the Last Judgment or in a Resurrection, Wittgenstein maintains that not believing something that another believes is not to believe the opposite. Not believing P is not the same thing as believing \sim P, and believing P is again not equivalent to not believing \sim P. In fact, with respect to a given epistemic agent 'S', and statement 'P' ('There will be a Last Judgment'), there are four rather than two epistemic possibilities:

- (1) S believes P,
- (2) S believes \sim P,
- (3) S does not believe P, and
- (4) S does not believe \sim P.

To contradict someone who believes in a Last Judgment, one would need to assert that there will be no Last Judgment: a possibility Wittgenstein finds "crazy" (Wittgenstein 1966:55). By drawing out four possibilities rather than two, I am emphasizing Wittgenstein's distinction between believing the opposite and not believing the same thing. To assert the opposite of what another says requires a similar frame of reference, which can be thought of as participation in the same language game. This is what Wittgenstein is talking about when he says of his inability to contradict one who has religious belief: "I think differently, in a different way. I say different things to myself. I have different pictures" (Wittgenstein 1966:55). To have different pictures is to see the world in a different manner than those who use yet other pictures.

On this interpretation of Wittgenstein, it is possible to contradict someone only if both participate in the same language game or use the same picture. If one is not participating in the language game, then one stands afar and can merely assert that one does not believe P or that one does not believe \sim P. But in both cases, one stands back—away from the linguistic community in which the statement of belief is made. This difference between standing within a language game and standing outside it is crucial for understanding Wittgenstein's remarks on religious belief. In order to contradict someone, one needs to be a part of the same linguistic community. Membership in a community is an antecedent condition of disagreement. Not being able to contradict someone else indicates that one stands back from the linguistic community in question.

⁴A contradiction is the assertion of something and its opposite *together*. In this sense, *to contradict* another is to assert the opposite of what the other person asserts.

The distinction drawn in the lectures is essentially the same distinction Wittgenstein draws between 'intellectual distance' and 'disagreement' in *On Certainty*. Wittgenstein writes:

Suppose some adult has told a child that he had been on the moon. The child tells me the story, and I say it was only a joke, the man hadn't been on the moon; no one has ever been on the moon; the moon is a long way off and it is impossible to climb up there or fly there.—If now the child insists, saying perhaps there is a way of getting there which I don't know, etc. what reply could I make to him? What reply could I make to the adults of a tribe who believe that people sometimes go to the moon (perhaps this is how they interpret their dreams), and who indeed grant that there are no ordinary means of climbing up to it or flying there?—But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously (Wittgenstein 1969:§106).

This example of the child and the tribe illustrates this feature of Wittgenstein's thought on language and pictures quite well. Technological advances in rocket science aside (Wittgenstein wrote *On Certainty* between 1949 and his death in 1951), this child is being trained in the pictures of Western scientific worldviews. Moreover, the child trusts her or his teachers. The child's trust is implicit. On the other hand, it seems quite apparent that the tribe in question uses a picture that is quite different from that of modern scientific culture. Neither the members of the tribe nor the members of modern scientific culture have reason to trust one another *across* communities with the abandon that the child shows—a trust children must show in order to learn how to survive as social animals. Trust is an antecedent condition of training in this way of life. Wittgenstein continues:

"But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity?" "How could he live without an atmosphere?" and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know *how* one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything."

We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this (Wittgenstein 1969:§108).

In the case of disagreement, there is common ground: a shared frame of reference or picture. But in the case of intellectual distance, it is hard to see the reasonableness of the speakers in question, and what common ground exists is no longer obvious.

Wittgenstein's notion of intellectual distance expresses an important insight about misunderstandings between worldviews. However, does it also imply that in order to understand the beliefs of a community one must be a part of that community? Does it mean that religious beliefs are fundamentally unintelligible to those without them in Wittgenstein's thought? If so, then understanding across worldviews involving religious beliefs would be impossible. Such understanding depends upon how easily (or not) one may gain access to a language game. Moreover, in real life, there are no discrete language games. The term is best considered a conceptual tool to bring to mind certain features of language, such as the meanings of words and the public role of such meanings. We should recall that for Wittgenstein, the meanings of words, including religious language, are essentially social and public. So, the meanings of words will be as transparent or opaque as the people who use them. On the topic of meaning, Wittgenstein says:

In one sense, I understand all he says—the English words “God”, “separate”, etc. I understand. I could say: “I don't believe in this,” and this would be true, meaning I haven't got these thoughts or anything that hangs together with them. But not that I could contradict the thing. / You might say: “Well, if you can't contradict him, that means you don't understand him. If you did understand him, then you might.” That again is Greek to me. My normal technique of language leaves me. I don't know whether to say they understand one another or not” (Wittgenstein 1966:55).

This passage emphasizes the larger context in which religious beliefs are manifest—the picture (or pictures) one uses in life. Beliefs of a religious nature manifest themselves within the larger context of a religious life lived in a religious community. One may isolate the words ‘There will be a Last Judgment,’ and understand them, but one may fail to understand what they mean for those liv-

ing in the community from which the expression emerges. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein cannot tell us what more he might like to about the nature of such misunderstanding. The moment a person attempts to explain what she means by the expression of a religious belief, that person is including the audience in her linguistic community. It may very well be that description of religious belief is so difficult (and therefore that public understanding across religions or between religious and secular communities is difficult) because of the scope of what one is attempting to describe. In trying to put words to a religious life (words that had not already been put to it), one tries to bridge two ways of living in the world.⁵

The relation of trust to the distinction between disagreement and intellectual distance is also important for understanding Wittgenstein's remarks on differences among forms of life. As we have seen, disagreement requires a shared frame of reference (both people must participate in the same language game). There is therefore a presupposition of trust (whether that trust is well-placed or not) when people cooperate in an activity. Where there is intellectual distance between forms of life, trust is lacking. It may be that there is no trust (or perhaps little or limited trust) because there has not been much contact between these two linguistic communities. Such people may be relatively alien to one another. However, it may also be that there is no or limited trust because of some shared history. Maybe at one point these people shared a community but a tragedy befell them, and now they are alienated from one another. Such a case would be a lack of trust with reason.

Hilary Putnam maintains that the question of whether there is anything incommensurable about religious belief is a matter that is pre- or non-philosophical, meaning that it cannot be settled by philosophizing. Rather, this sort of issue may be settled only with fear and trembling. One can respect the alterity of a people's religious beliefs and practices without asserting that, in principle, their beliefs are incommensurate with one's own. Moreover, from what standpoint could one *know* such a thing? This non-philosophical element Putnam points to can be viewed as the extent to which one has reason to trust the community of language users from which the utterances with religious content emerge.

Additionally, what it is to understand religious language is complicated further by the kataphatic/apophatic distinction with respect to mystical lan-

⁵On the risks and virtues of such bridge building, see Nadav Caine (1993).

guage.⁶ In many theological and religious traditions, this distinction is apparent. When one seeks to understand a deity in a given religious tradition, does one accept a kataphatic conception, an apophatic conception, or both? It can be very difficult to find one's footing with mystical language, and yet, understanding mystical language is, in principle, no different from understanding the linguistic symbolism of the public or exoteric religious traditions out of which mystical practices emerge, insofar as a novice is initiated into a community of mystics. This initiation establishes the sense of relationship and therefore trust required to educate the novice about the symbol system in a manner that the novice can understand. The kataphatic/apophatic distinction complicates the topic of what it is to understand religious language, but it does not rule out understanding.

BUBER ON THE TWO BASIC WORDS: I-YOU AND I-IT

It is appropriate to use Buber and Wittgenstein to illuminate one another because for both the pictures people use in getting about in life are revealed through language. For Buber, there are just two pictures by which a person may see the world. These two pictures are reflected through his idea of the two basic words or word pairs: I-You and I-It. Buber writes, "Basic words do not state something that might exist outside them; by being spoken they establish a mode of existence" (Buber 1970:53). These two word pairs are symbolic of the modes in which a person exists in the world and in relationships.

My purpose in this section is to draw some insights from Buber's thought for the philosophical analysis of religious language. I acknowledge the criticism of Buber's appropriation of Hasidism,⁷ and this criticism ought to influence one's reading of *I and Thou*. Nevertheless, there are insights to be gained from Buber's work. At the very least, he highlights desiderata for a philosophy of religious language to explain.

⁶By kataphatic, I mean a kind of descriptive religious symbolism that affirms some predicate of its object (e.g., God). By apophatic, I mean another kind of religious symbolism that 'unsays,' 'empties,' or negates what is said in kataphatic discourse.

⁷See Steven T. Katz (1983) and Jerome Gellman (2000) on this point. Katz's philosophical criticisms and Gellman's historical criticisms are rather strong, thus placing the onus upon the one who defends the intellectual worth of Buber's

As Walter Kaufmann notes in the prologue to his translation of *I and Thou*, the dichotomy between the two basic word pairs oversimplifies the manifold nature of humanity's possible modes of existing in the world. Imitating the opening style of Buber's text, Kaufmann writes, "Man's world is manifold, and his attitudes are manifold. What is manifold is often frightening because it is not neat and simple. Men prefer to forget how many possibilities are open to them. / They like to be told there are two worlds and two ways" (Buber 1970:9). As will be seen below, although Buber does present the reader with two ways of engaging the world, by no means does he consider this distinction to be simple. The distinction should be approached as two tendencies within humanity rather than two discrete paths. The obvious distinction between Buber's two ways of engaging the world is that in the first, the I relates to a You, another subject. In the second, the I relates to an It, an object (and specifically, an object that is not at the same time a subject). These word pairs describe not simply individual relationships, but an entire manner of engaging the world and the things (including people) with which a person may come into contact. To stave off Kaufmann's criticism, one could note that as pure states Buber's categories do not exist: few if any of us ever engage the world or other people by means of just I-You or I-It paradigms, but by means of some mixture of the two. Nevertheless, in painting a picture of a strict dichotomy, Buber emphasizes the distance that lies between I-You and I-It modes of existence.

Buber also emphasizes the distance that lies between these two modes of engaging the world by distinguishing between experience and encounter. Buber writes, "Those who experience do not participate in the world. For the experience is 'in them' and not between them and the world. / The world does not participate in experience. It allows itself to be experienced, but it is not concerned, for it contributes nothing, and nothing happens to it" (Buber 1970:56). In talking about the location of the experience, Buber is emphasizing that in

thought. Rather than defend his project, I argue that *despite* the weaknesses and outright problems in his thought, some of his ideas are genuine contributions to the philosophy of religion. In particular, the intimacy implied in the I-You mode of relating is a good complement to the tendency to objectify religious belief in Religious Studies. Perhaps one may think of Buber's idea as an analogue to the idea of *qualia* in the philosophy of mind. Both ideas provide reasons for being skeptical of reductionist arguments about their subject matter. When one is studying religions, one is studying ways of living. Something important may be inadvertently left out of the study if one does not appreciate the *presence* such ways of life have for their adherents.

the I-It mode of existing, everything happens in the subject. On the other hand, in the I-You mode of existing, what happens lies between I and You. Buber writes, "The human being to whom I say You I do not experience. But I stand in relation to him, in the sacred basic word. Only when I step out of this do I experience him again. Experience is remoteness from You" (Buber 1970:59-60).

Buber distinguishes among three spheres in which I-You relations manifest themselves: in relation to nature, to other people, and to 'spiritual beings'.⁸ Writing of the risk that the artist must be willing to take in order to let the artwork develop through him or her, Buber writes:

The deed involves a sacrifice and a risk. The sacrifice: infinite possibility is surrendered on the altar of the form; all that but a moment ago floated playfully through one's perspective has to be exterminated; none of it may penetrate into the work; the exclusiveness of such a confrontation demands this. The risk: the basic word can only be spoken with one's whole being; whoever commits himself may not hold back part of himself; and the work does not permit me, as a tree or a man might, to seek relaxation in the It-world; it is imperious; if I do not serve it properly, it breaks, or it breaks me (Buber 1970:60-1).

Though written about aesthetic activity, there is much in this passage that may help in understanding what Buber has in mind with respect to I-You relationships. The idea of 'risk' is the key. In an I-It experience, the subject brings everything to the event and takes what he or she wants from the event. The risk in relationships is the risk that one will be affected by the other. One may change as a result of the relationship. The relationship itself has an existence that is ontologically prior to the individuals of whom it is composed. This is what Buber means when he says,

In the history of the primitive mind the fundamental difference between the two basic words appears in this: even in the original relational event,

⁸I will not address these three spheres of I-You relations separately. Insofar as they reflect how comprehensive I-You relating with the world is, the trichotomy is relevant to this topic. Beyond that insight, further discussion of these spheres would take us off the topic at hand. Thus, for the purposes of this article, I will oversimplify this distinction and treat the three spheres of I-You relations as manifestations of the same kind of relationship.

the primitive man speaks the basic word I-You in a natural, as it were still unformed manner, not yet having recognized himself as an I; but the basic word I-It is made possible only by this recognition, by the detachment of the I (Buber 1970:73).

Buber's discussion of what he terms 'primitive' peoples, while not to be taken seriously anthropologically, reveals what he thinks about the primacy of relationships (I-You) and the secondary nature of experiences (I-It). In Buber's thinking, relationality is primary and most natural. It is the mode of existence into which we are born. The experiencing capacity of humanity does not express itself until the I has detached itself from the world.

Buber's discussion of knowledge also reveals that although the relating aspect of our nature may be prior, the experiencing aspect is now indispensable for our way of living in societies. The capacity to be knowing creatures is something that has evolved in us. Buber describes the knowing subject as follows:

Knowledge: as he beholds what confronts him, its being is disclosed to the knower. What he beheld as present he will have to comprehend as an object, compare with objects, assign a place in an order of objects, and describe and analyze objectively; only as an It can it be absorbed into the store of knowledge. But in the act of beholding it was no thing among things, no event among events; it was present exclusively. It is not the law that is afterward derived from the appearance but in the appearance itself that the being communicates itself (Buber 1970:90).

The distinction between I-You and I-It has great import for the nature of knowing. In Buber's thinking, that which is most real is the relationship. But in order to live in a complex society, perhaps even in order to use language at all, we must treat the world and other people as Its. Buber writes of this:

Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood again and again. In the language of objects: every thing in the world can—either before or after it becomes a thing—appear to some I as its You. But the language of objects catches only one corner of actual life (Buber 1970:69).

While it is quite clear that Buber champions the I-You mode of existence, he does not think this is a state that can be maintained for long. In fact, it may be

only in fleeting moments that people see the world, or one another, as Yous. But these moments can be transforming. However, there is no question that according to Buber's thinking the I-You mode of existence is the state of relating that is most natural for human beings. The state of experiencing (the I-It mode of engaging the world) is a recent occurrence on the world stage. Buber helps us to see the particular predicament of modernity: in order to live in our increasingly complex societies, people must see themselves as conscious Is (and occasionally as Its); however, insofar as we do so, we alienate ourselves from our original natures. If in each of us there is supposed to be a mixture of tendencies toward I-It and I-You, how does the shifting from the priority of the one over the other operate?

Early in his book, Buber writes that when the You encounters us, the encounter is "by grace" (Buber 1970:62). The religious connotations ought not to be lost on us. Buber intends for the reader to consider every You as a manifestation of, or a signpost for, the Eternal You.⁹ Abstraction from relationships, which is the essence of knowledge on this view, cannot grasp as an It the very relationship from which the I abstracts. Parts may be grasped, but the whole can only be contemplated.

In a passage that ought to grasp the attention of readers of Wittgenstein, Buber writes,

All this has its place in the It-world and does not take us one step—does not take the decisive step—out of it. Going forth is unteachable in the sense of prescriptions. It can only be indicated—by drawing a circle that excludes everything else. Then the one thing needful becomes visible: the total acceptance of the present. / To be sure, this acceptance involves a heavier risk and a more fundamental return, the further man has lost his way in separation. What has to be given up is not the I, as most mystics suppose: that I is indispensable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes an I and You. What has to be given up is not the I but that false drive for self-affirmation which impels man to flee from the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredictable, dangerous world of relation into the having of things (Buber 1970:126).

⁹This may be a place where Buber misappropriates the Hasidic tradition to support his theology. Gellman notes that Buber leans heavily upon his I-You mode of relating to explain the Kabbalistic legend of the holy sparks (Gellman 2000:21). Again, while I do not defend Buber's discussion of Hasidism, I think his idea of the I-You mode of relating is interesting enough on its own to merit continued attention.

This passage brings to mind Wittgenstein's distinction in the *Tractatus* between saying and showing. There is something nonverbal about the confrontation between the You and an I. It is important to note the apophatic dynamic in the I-You mode of relating. Whatever is happening in the encounter, its existence is somehow beyond whatever descriptions may be available, descriptions that could be cast only by means of It-language.

No straightforward identification should be drawn between the apophatic/kataphatic distinction and Buber's I-You/I-It distinction. Clearly, his thought was influenced by types of Jewish mysticism. However, that does not warrant assimilating Buber's distinction to the apophatic/kataphatic distinction. As William E. Kaufman argues, Buber's stance towards mysticism was complicated. Kaufman writes, "Buber not only rejected the monistic mystic's negation of the distinction between man and God; he also repudiated his negation of the world" (Kaufman 1978:179). Buber's appreciation of divine encounters did not yield a radically apophatic sensibility towards the use of language. Rather, Buber thought it was crucial to maintain the idea of the personhood of I and You. Kaufman writes:

Here is the key to Buber's mature approach to mysticism. If it is defined as a union with, or a total absorption of, the self in the Absolute, in which the world and the Personhood of God are negated, Buber did reject such a monistic view. But if mysticism is defined theistically as an immediate direct encounter with God, in which reality is heightened and not negated, Buber's mature position is still mysticism (Kaufman 1978:180).

While the I-You mode of engaging reality is not radically apophatic, Buber's thought is not devoid of apophatic moods. For Buber, It-language about God is problematic when it is *purely* descriptive of God and fails to connect or relate the individual to God. About talk of God, Buber writes, "there never has been nor can be any such talk that is not erroneous" (Buber 1970:124). The realization that one should not lean too heavily upon descriptions of God but instead recognize God as a You, as the Eternal You, is central to understanding Buber's view of religious language.

I and Thou, despite its timeless subject matter, was written to address a specific problem: the spiritual crisis of modernity. We can think of this crisis as the tendency to engage the world solely in terms of I-It experiences. Buber writes, "Nothing can doom man but the belief in doom, for this prevents the move-

ment of return” (Buber 1970:107). The sense of doom comes from loneliness and alienation, from the sense of distance from others. As Kaufmann notes in his prologue, this idea of ‘return’ is crucial for understanding *I and Thou* and its relationship to Jewish theology. Playing off the metaphor of distance, Buber’s idea of return is a return from despair and isolation. Buber highlights the return from the despair of solitude to the redemptive power of trusting relationships. A religious reading of the movement from I-It to I-You modes of engaging the world reveals that returning manifests in the history of humanity. Buber writes:

For the two basic metacosmic movements of the world—its expansion into its own being and returning to association [with God]—attain their supreme human form, the true spirit form of their struggle and conciliation, their mixture and separation, in the history of man’s relation to God. It is in the return that the word is born on earth; in spreading out it enters the chrysalis of religion; in a new return it is reborn with new wings (Buber 1970:165).

Moreover, at the end of *I and Thou*, Buber characterizes this history of abstraction and return as a spiral with each ring pulling farther away, outward: “Doom becomes more oppressive in every new eon, and the return more explosive” (Buber 1970:168). The particular crisis of our era is that we live in a highly sophisticated society. Our ability to abstract from the world is great, but our ability to encounter the world and other people dialogically has become feeble. It can seem that a great gulf lies between these two modes of engaging the world. Buber’s great deed is to instruct us that the alienation felt in our time is not unique. Rather, it is part of a pattern throughout history, and, insofar as one wishes to ameliorate that alienation, Buber’s instruction is worth heeding.

WITTGENSTEIN AND BUBER ON RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AND INTELLECTUAL DISTANCE

Wittgenstein approaches expressions of religious belief from the standpoint of an outsider.¹⁰ For Wittgenstein and those like him, expressions of religious

¹⁰Wittgenstein held religions in high esteem, perhaps due to the conceptual and practical resources religions have for seeing and interacting with other people and

belief have an odd character. That is, religious people use words he would not use to describe things he would not think to describe. But is this a point Wittgenstein is making only about religious/secular divisions? I do not think so. It is a point about the use of pictures. People engage the world by means of pictures. Pictures function as media between people and the world, and pictures frame how the world is experienced and understood.¹¹ Just as intellectual distance exists between the religious and non-religious thinker, so also distance may exist between religious thinkers of different religions.

If we are to compare the thought of Buber and Wittgenstein, we must recognize that both secular and religious people can lay claim to the basic word pairs I-You and I-It. Both religious and secular forms of life can be punctuated by apophatic sensibilities. The drive to treat something or someone as an object, just as the tendency sometimes to see the other as an end in itself are not limited only to religious viewpoints. As Buber notes, this tendency is a human trait (a trait he couches, however, in a religious anthropology). Also, Michael A. Sells demonstrates that the particular linguistic moves made in apophatic discourse may be applied to subject matter other than just divinity, such as gender. Buber seems to be aware of this nuance. His application of the I-You mode of relating to human, aesthetic, and divine encounters reveals a rich sensitivity to the general applicability of apophatic discourse while maintaining that all I-You encounters have an element of the divine encounter in them.

The polarity between I-You and I-It modes of existence is echoed in Wittgenstein's lectures when he says of a person who believes in the Last Judgment, "he has what you might call an unshakeable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for in all his life, [*sic*]" and later in the same lecture, "What we call believing in a Judgment Day or not believing in a Judgment Day—The expression of belief may play an absolutely minor role" (Wittgenstein 1966:54-5). Here, I follow

the world as Yous. Perhaps he would have liked access to such resources for seeing things as they really are (*i.e.*, seeing things as ends in themselves). Perhaps he just could not find the right link between his picture and the pictures of religious communities.

¹¹Just how much the picture determines the understanding of the structure of the world is not a matter which will be addressed in this paper. But this is a very important issue, and a thorough analysis of how forms of life affect how the world is engaged and understood (and thus form the data which confirm or disconfirm the picture itself) would be required.

Putnam's interpretation that it is important to recognize that the expressions of belief take place within the context of a religious life: one guided by a picture. The linguistic expressions of faith emerge out of a way of life. When Wittgenstein expresses his inability to understand religious utterances as believers apparently understand them, perhaps he is expressing his inability to understand a way of life: the way of life that would illuminate the utterance in question.

As noted above, Wittgenstein's distinction between disagreement and intellectual distance can be used to understand inter-religious dialogue. We can imagine various religious communities using different pictures to structure their religious practices. The distance between the pictures used manifests itself in the expressions of belief members of the communities produce, not to mention in the reasons followers give for various actions. It is easy to imagine people from one tradition making statements like Wittgenstein's to the effect that one simply wouldn't choose to describe things the way people from another religious community do. While it is perhaps overstating things to say that it is "crazy" to think that one might contradict another who utters religious language different from the language one would choose to use, one sees the point Wittgenstein is making. Wittgenstein observed that it is important that people be *close* to the language they use.¹² One can find oneself in 'muddles' if one uses words which do not fit one's life. If the words a person uses emerge out of one's own authentic activity, then the words will be one's own. So, does this mean that one cannot be close to both religious and secular ways of thinking? Is thought expressed in terms of the picture portrayed by religious language incommensurable with thinking directed by a differing picture? Ultimately, the answer is no, but an argument will be required to justify such a position.

The trick with this question, and indeed the core of the issue of the intelligibility of religious language, is that utterances of religious belief are made in languages that are by their very nature public, that is in language not exclusive to the religious picture expressed by those beliefs. Someone who professes a belief in the Last Judgment may say so in English using words with which I am very familiar. How can I not understand what such a person says? Wittgenstein's comments suggest that I cannot understand what such a person says unless I too am a part of the specific linguistic community expressing these religious beliefs and therefore using the same picture. Devising a model of the picture

¹²Wittgenstein famously writes, "philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday" (Wittgenstein 1953:§38).

will not do. In so far as a model is applied intentionally, it will not sink deep enough into one's behavior and values to render life the way it would seem to one who lives by that picture. But this does not mean that an understanding of the meanings of a religion's symbols is ultimately incommensurable with secular thinking or with religious symbols from other traditions.

Wittgenstein's discussion of being unable to contradict a religious person suggests that a deep gulf can lie between those who live according to one picture and those who live according to another picture. The tension in this interpretation of Wittgenstein's thought arises from the fact that being able to contradict someone does not admit of degrees. Either I can contradict someone, or I cannot. There is no middle ground. Perhaps it is this either/or character of the possibility of contradiction that has encouraged some to interpret Wittgenstein's comments on religious belief as being fideistic. However, the metaphor of distance does admit of degrees. I can be outside of some region, but still be much closer to it than some other place. How near to a linguistic community must I be to be able to agree or disagree? Clearly, simply speaking the same language is not adequately close. Recall that the idea of a language game for Wittgenstein is a *tool* to better understand how language works. But in our modern world especially, linguistic communities generally do not persist without contact with people from other communities. Also, people generally are parts of many linguistic communities (family, city, work, religious community, and so on). Many of us are in daily contact with people who use differing pictures in guiding their lives.

But just having contact is also not enough to establish understanding between communities. One may construct a model of others' pictures, and while not definitive of what life looks like to those who use the picture, such a model may prove useful for approximating the beliefs, values, and practices of others, which is important for the smooth functioning of society. With respect to the tension in this interpretation of Wittgenstein, one can imagine a sorites-like paradox emerging.¹³ Since the metaphor of distance admits of degrees, but

¹³The sorites paradox emerges when the principle of bivalence is applied to vague predicates. For example, concerning X number of grains of sand, if the principle of bivalence holds, then it must be either true or false that the amount of sand is a heap. When dealing with very large or small quantities of sand, this is fairly straightforward. However, borderline cases emerge where it is not at all obvious that the amount of sand being judged is or is not a heap. How many grains of sand must be added together before the amount is a heap?

being able to contradict someone does not, there exists here the potential for paradox. Is there a definitive distance within which an individual is close enough to a religious community to understand and, therefore, to be able to agree or disagree with their expressions of belief? Religions generally have initiation rituals that are meant to decide the issue. In participating in such a ritual, one becomes a member of that community and thereby adopts that religion's picture.

However, as both Wittgenstein and Buber have noted, there can be a significant contrast between the expressions of belief and the actual behavior of religious people. The sense of attachment to or dependency upon the religious picture which guides one can grow weak, or one may feel distant from the ideals of one's picture. Belief in a Last Judgment might seem alien to some Christians some of the time, but this does not necessarily mean that such a belief stops regulating their lives. The point here is that sometimes religious language is not transparent even to the devout themselves. Following Buber, I tend to think that religious language becomes illuminated when one sees how it *connects* the believer to others—other people, the world, divine reality, and so on. In seeing the relationship through the language, the intended meaning of the religious language comes through. How does this happen?¹⁴ Sometimes it is spontaneous. Other times it may be through dialogue with other people in one's religious community (e.g. a rabbi may explain a bible story in a way that displays the relationship between people and God). Buber says that this illumination is always an experience of grace: the You "cannot be found by seeking The You encounters me" (Buber 1970:62). In both these situations (that of the neophyte being initiated into a religious community and of the confused adherent who is educated in the faith by another), the sense of membership in the community is essential. Roles, and therefore relationships of trust, have been established.

What is the proper response to awareness that one has seen the relationality in something (perhaps an artwork), someone, or someone's religious expressions? What is the proper response to a confrontation with an other? Buber notes that fear is one response. Perhaps such fear comes from an awareness of

¹⁴Sells suggests that apophatic discourse is performative. He writes, "The goal is to identify the distinctive semantic event within the language of unsaying, what I will be calling the 'meaning event.' Meaning event indicates that moment when the meaning has become identical or fused with the act of predication The meaning event is the semantic analogue to the experience of mystical union. It does not describe or refer to mystical union but effects a semantic union that recreates or imitates the mystical union" (Sells 1994:9).

difference. There is an awareness that as much as one understands the other, there is yet more that lies beyond one's grasp. I can look at a painting by Jackson Pollock and see something of the man who created it. But I may also be struck by how different his sense of life was from my own. This example is intentional. Perhaps understanding religious language is like appreciating art (in so far as both express I-You relationships in varying degrees). Does anyone appreciate the artwork better than the artist? If so, how?

I think Wittgenstein felt very distant from expressions of religious faith, although he could see some of the beauty that lies in such forms of life.¹⁵ He did not feel close enough to any religious tradition to be able to contradict the expressions of such believers. Are his statements about the incommensurability of expressions emerging from differing pictures applicable universally? I do not think so. To borrow an insight from Buber, it looks as if this sense of distance is indicative of the alienation of our era, although this alienation is, to a lesser degree, an inherent part of human nature. However, Wittgenstein's observations have merit. His appreciation and respect for differences, especially differences in the appropriate use of language, are useful. Indeed, Wittgenstein's appreciation of the difference between disagreement and intellectual distance is very helpful in approaching the problem of bridging seemingly conflicting cultures or manners of thinking.

There are some points of contrast in the comparison between Wittgenstein's talk of pictures and the disagreement/intellectual distance distinction, on the one hand, and Buber's I-You/I-It distinction, on the other. For example, Buber was a religious or normative thinker and Wittgenstein was a secular thinker.¹⁶ Buber is making a case for ways of thinking of human flourishing that come from the Jewish religious tradition. For Buber, humanity's relationality is the primary characteristic of our nature. Buber is explicitly *reminding* the reader about this idea. Wittgenstein presupposes a secular worldview without normatively prioritizing it. Wittgenstein is not arguing for or suggesting that a certain manner of living promotes human flourishing (beyond the idea that clearing up philosophical muddles allows people to return to a more natural way of thinking).

¹⁵Malcolm's recounting of Wittgenstein's friendship with Drury should be evidence enough for this. See especially (Malcolm 1990:10-4).

¹⁶This is an important distinction in Religious Studies. Whether the writer has a stake in the outcome of the study may have a considerable effect on the content

Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to think that pictures function as media between people and the world. This is not to suggest that Wittgenstein's pictures are strictly verbal in content. Rather, for Wittgenstein, pictures are more like networks of beliefs, values, and practices, taken more or less as wholes—that which guides and regulates a form of life. Nevertheless, one could use one picture just as well as another to guide a way of living. Wittgenstein does not claim that there is any primary picture to which humanity is predisposed (contra Buber's I-You mode of existing). More than this, for Buber, any way of living where ideas stand between oneself and another is indicative of the I-It mode of existence. Buber writes, "The relation to the You is unmediated. Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You" (Buber 1970:62). I do not think that Wittgenstein's pictures are strictly speaking 'conceptual', but surely, in order for them to be complex enough to regulate human behavior, which has grown increasingly complex along with linguistic complexity, pictures must have some conceptual content. This article does not solve this conflict, but merely cautions that the comparison between Wittgenstein and Buber should not be oversimplified.

Lastly, trust is a key idea for Buber just as it is for Wittgenstein. Trust is required to embrace the You in other people, art, nature, and ultimately God. Trust is also required to be a part of a linguistic community. One way of appreciating the differences between Wittgenstein and Buber is in terms of the different ways they think about trust. Buber thinks that it is in our nature to trust. It is later in our development and evolution that we learn not to trust. For Wittgenstein, trust is presupposed in the everyday workings of language. However, insofar as distance exists between different forms of life, trust also can be quite elusive. Wittgenstein was philosophizing in the modern world, and, unlike Buber, he was not trying to bridge modern ways of seeing and experiencing the world with ancient ways.

What can this discussion bring to the question of the possibility of understanding across worldviews? One may wonder how a discussion of religious language relates to improving cross-cultural understanding. To such question-

of the study (consider Buber's treatment of incompatible mystical traditions in *I and Thou*). A non-normative thinker is interested in simply describing matters as they are. Note that this distinction between normative (Theology) and non-normative study (Religious Studies) presupposes a fact/value dichotomy (a philosophical position which is controversial).

ers, I would reply that a large part of cross-cultural dialogue is inter-religious dialogue. Religious language, in pointing to that which is sacred for a way of life, is of great importance in understanding the people from other cultures with which one comes into contact. Wittgenstein presents his readers with enormously helpful tools for appreciating the diversity of uses of language in the world. In particular, his discussions of the nature of disagreement and intellectual distance are helpful for gaining a realistic picture of the challenges and obstacles that may be present in *any* sort of communication. From Buber's thought, we see the existential importance of understanding. It is not simply a matter of intellectual curiosity that people objectify one another sometimes and yet transcend such categories on other occasions. Rather, for Buber, such transcendence is essential to human flourishing. Thus, two related concepts are crucial for understanding Buber and Wittgenstein on religious language: trust and risk.

When trust is natural and when it requires warrant are matters that are very important for understanding religious language. For Buber, dialogue is a prerequisite for trust. Wittgenstein shows us that a shared way of life both requires trust and becomes itself a reason for trusting. What we can draw from them together is that cross-cultural understanding requires an appreciation for our commonality, both where there is trust and where trust is lacking. We can also learn from Buber and Wittgenstein that dialogue is a means for promoting such a shared picture of life.

However, it is important to keep in mind that distrust is often warranted as well. For example, distrust can arise when people are required to use language they are not close to. Dialogue capable of promoting trust is impossible if it is mandated in terms of an alien world picture. For instance, oppressed peoples often are required to use the idioms of their oppressors, a requirement with potentially devastating effects when applied to religious language. In such circumstances, distrust and alienation from one's 'discussion partners' may be justified insofar as those with whom one is in contact are untrustworthy. Stanley Cavell frames this in terms of consent. He writes,

To speak for oneself politically is to speak for the others with whom you consent to association, and it is to consent to be spoken for by them—not as a parent speaks for you, i.e., instead of you, but as someone in mutuality speaks for you, i.e., speaks your mind (Cavell 1970:27).

A just multiculturalism, an inter-religious dialogue that does not do violence to its participants, requires warranted trust.

In an I-It experience, the subject brings everything to the event, and takes what he or she wants from the event. But relationships (in Buber's I-You sense) involve risk: the risk that one may be changed in virtue of the encounter. Such an awareness of trust and risk is of great value in reflecting on cross-cultural dialogue. Does this mean that cross-cultural understanding is always possible? Certainly not, but it does mean that unless one can elicit outright contradictions, so long as the dialogue persists, there remains the possibility that trust may be built and that others' symbols for the sacred may not always strike one as alien.

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Hildegard of Bingen's Gospel Homilies and Her Exegesis of Mark 16.1-7¹

JAEHYUN KIM

PROLOGUE

AS GILES CONSTABLE OBSERVED IN *THE REFORMATION OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY*, a tremendous renewal of religious and secular life and institutions took place from the late eleventh century to 1160 (Constable 1996:4-7). Among the many attempts at renewal around this time, we may note the resurgence of ecclesiastical reform movement, the burgeoning of the school and monastery, the expansion of cities and literacy, the rise of popular religious movements and resultant tensions, and the gradual development of the inquisitorial process and the definition of groups for persecution. Through the Gregorian reform movement and the so-called renaissance of the twelfth century, many Christians again strongly pursued a purer expression of religious life and the ideal of personal perfection. The life and writings of the Cistercian abbot, St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), highlight such a new trend. Although most of the brilliant and dominant religious figures in this age were male, a few women writers and visionaries joined in this new trend. Of these women, Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) was the most outstanding.

Hildegard was born at Böckelheim, Germany in 1098. Severely afflicted with fragile health as a child, Hildegard was placed at the age of eight under the care of her aunt, Jutta, who lived as a recluse on the Disenberg and eventually formed a community of nuns. Hildegard joined this group, becoming superior of the community after the death of Jutta in 1136. Hildegard moved her community

¹ A draft of this paper was read at the 34th International Medieval Congress, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1999. I appreciate Dr. Beverly M. Kienzle at Harvard University for her careful reading and comment.

to Rupertsburg, near Bingen on the Rhine in 1147 or 1148, establishing yet another convent at Eibingen around the year 1165. Widely known for mystic visions and prophecies, her writings and prophecy were approved in 1148 by the archbishop of Mainz and Pope Eugenius III with the recommendation of St. Bernard of Clairvaux. While living in a turbulent age, Hildegard used her talents for obtaining true justice and peace of the church and Christians. Traveling many places, Hildegard corresponded extensively with four popes, two emperors, and many famous clergy. Her outspoken sermons and writings attracted the religious fancy of many Christians, while bringing her both acclaim and disparagement. She died on the Rupertsberg near Bingen in 1179 (Gottfried & Theoderic 1980:34-100; Newman 1989:1-34).

Hildegard's writing was remarkable in its fecundity and range. Her three major treatises, *Scivias*, *Liber vitae meritorum*, and *Liber divinorum operum*, disclose the depth and breadth of her theological and literary genius (Fuhrkotter 1978; Hart & Bishop 1990; Carlevaris 1995; Hozeski; Derolez & Dronke 1996; Fox 1978). Hildegard's *Vita* shows not only the breadth of her knowledge and influence, which was still very rare in medieval Christendom, but her religious fervor in the twelfth-century renaissance (Gottfried & Theoderic 1980). Hildegard's numerous original writings in Latin have been edited and published, including studies of her life and music. The extensive bibliography in Barbara Newman's *Sister of Wisdom* reflects the recent variety of Hildegard studies (Newman 1997:281-298). As Peter Dronke says, in the Middle Ages only Avicenna (980-1037) was comparable to Hildegard in terms of the breadth of writings in cosmology, ethics, medicine and mystical poetry (Dronke 1984:144).

HILDEGARD AS A PREACHER

Hildegard's remarkable apocalyptic visionary writings and poems oftentimes, and ironically, cause many people to overlook the fact that she was a good preacher and writer of homiletics. Compared to her very well-known major writings, Hildegard's homiletic works and her role as a very influential preacher have been almost ignored, or only mentioned in a very peripheral way. In spite of Barbara Newman's assertion that "Hildegard's homilies were the most widely influential of all her writing for the next three centuries following her death," the study of Hildegard's homiletic works seems to have just begun (Newman 1997:xx).

Here I will briefly portray an aspect of Hildegard as an influential preacher, taking this as foreground for an analysis of her homilies. Like St. Bernard of Clairvaux, her contemporary and spiritual mentor, Hildegard was also an apocalyptic and mystical preacher (Pernoud 1998:126-60). The authority of her prophecy and vision made her extensive preaching-mission trips against the Cathars successful (Kienzle 1996:43-56).

Hildegard undertook four preaching trips mainly against the Cathars: the first between 1158 and 1161, the second in 1160 in the Trier cathedral, the third between 1161 and 1163 in the Cologne cathedral, the fourth after her severe illness between 1167 and 1170 (Kienzle 1996:50). With monastic communities as her primary audience, Hildegard preached not only the necessity of the repression of heretics but also monastic and clerical reform. Theodoric, the biographer of Hildegard, identifies twenty-one places where Hildegard preached in this period (Flanagan 1989:172-3).

Most sermons of Hildegard reveal that her primary concern was with the corruption of the clergy and the disastrous harm done by the heretics. Hildegard may have been conscious of the serious effect of the schism of 1159-1177. She also may have consented to the reform movement initiated by St. Bernard of Clairvaux. Quite interestingly, her sermons strongly demand reform both within and without. The Cologne sermon, an example of Hildegard's anti-Cathar preaching, illustrates how and within what context she preached against these heretics ("Hildegard to the Shepherd of the Church" in Baird & Ehrman 1994:54-65; Kienzle 1996:50-2; Pernoud 1998:147-60). Here she depicts the devil plotting against the clergy and planning to send his emissaries to destroy the clergy and the church. In her preaching, the Cathars appear as "scorpions in their morals and snakes in their works" (Ehrman 1994:58). Throughout her preaching, the heretics are often compared to scorpions and snakes. They are also frequently demonized, and must be destroyed as a prerequisite for the re-establishment of order. However, their external appearance seems extremely peaceful and composed, bearing black robes and being tonsured just like some other friars. They do not seem to love money. They frequently emphasize abstinence. Hildegard, nevertheless, preaches that they have devils within working secretly. Such a devil deceives the heretics to seduce women and weak believers into evil and heresy. They don't have any faith, but are caught by the devil. Hildegard's description and understanding of the devil and the heretics are based largely on her own perception of the nature and external appearance of the Cathars. Such an understanding of the devil and the heretics, moreover, directly related to her apocalyptic eschatology, the impending end of the her-

etics, and God's intervention of judgment. Hildegard clearly links the identity of the deceivers to the precursors of those who will come at the end of time. She convincingly preaches that the heretics should meet a violent end: "After their perverse worship of Baal and their other depraved works are made known, princes and other great men will rush upon them, and kill them like rabid wolves, wherever they can be found" (Ehrman 1994:60).

HILDEGARD'S COSMIC SALVATION DRAMA OF MARK 16.1-7

Hildegard's gift as a preacher can be seen from her homiletic work entitled *Expositiones evangeliorum* (Pitra 1882:245-327). A new Latin edition and an English translation of her homilies, *Incipiunt Expositiones: Quorundam Evangeliorum, Quas Divina Inspirante Gratia Hildegardis Exposuit*, is being prepared, but little profound and systematic study of her homilies has been done (Dronke 1992; Kienzle 1999, 2001).² Hildegard's *Expositiones* consists of 58 homilies which were intended for 27 different liturgical feasts. Dronke gives an insight about the issue of the number of Hildegard's homilies and codicological debate of them (Dronke 1992:381-2). The *Expositiones* seems to belong "among the many expositions (*cum quibusdam aliis expositiones*)" which Hildegard mentions in the prologue of *Liber vitae meritorum* (Pitra 1882:7).³ This provides a decisive clue for dating some of Hildegard's homilies. According to B. Kienzle's inter-textual analysis, the *Expositiones* was written between 1157 and 1177 (Kienzle 1999).

The *Expositiones* is valuable for several reasons. First of all, the *Expositiones* provide the best source for understanding the nature of her theology and biblical interpretation within the broader history of medieval exegesis. The fact that biblical interpretation was central in most theological works of the Middle Ages buttresses this assumption. Moreover, all of the genuine and original characteristics scattered throughout Hildegard's corpus converge in the *Expositiones*: her prophetic visions, various concepts of *viriditas* and *redemptor*, cosmology, female physicality, and musical quality. Hildegard's free-floating exegetical

² Hereafter, I name this book as *Expositiones*.

³ "... visio subtilitates diversarum naturarum creaturarum, ac responsa et admonitiones tam minorum quam majorum plurimarum personarum, et symphoniam armoniae celestium revelationum, ignotamque linguam et litteras, cum quibusdam aliis expositionibus ..." (Pitra 1882: 7).

method explicitly portrays how medieval methods of four-fold biblical interpretation are comprehensively connected in the *Expositiones* with her own originality and genuineness. Finally, her homilies also allude to how women read and understood the world and human beings through female perspectives. At the same time, her homilies suggest how a woman understood the religion and society of twelfth-century medieval Christendom.

In this sense, Hildegard's Easter homilies XIII.I and XIII.II allow us to taste the flavor of Hildegard's reading of the Bible. Hildegard's homilies XIII.I and XIII.II are based on Mark 16.1-7, which primarily tells of Jesus' resurrection. These two versions of Hildegard's homily XIII basically narrate the history of salvation, the redemption story of humankind. Both versions contain similar themes: the human attempt to be saved, failure, redemption through God's help, the sacrificial role of Jesus, and the great commandment, which we often encounter in medieval theology (McGrath 1994:14-23).

Salvation is a central theme for Hildegard (Hart & Bishop 1990). However, both homilies approach the quest for salvation from quite different angles. While the first version pursues a cosmological and macrocosmic interpretation of redemption, the second seeks a microcosmic, or psychological interpretation. Such a double-layered interpretation of redemption is quite common in Hildegard's *Expositiones*. *Expositiones* XXIV on the Parable of the Prodigal Son demonstrates this well: the first reading shows the cosmic drama of an individual soul who falls away from God, slips into vices, returns to God, and participates in the heavenly banquet; the second version tells the redemptive history of humanity by contrasting human vices, will, and desire with the angel's jealousy. Taking into account the profundity of Hildegard's reading and interpretation, it seems important to remember the fact that, as P. Dronke aptly points out, neither a cosmological nor a psychological reading of this gospel appears to have been fully developed before Hildegard (Dronke 1984:389).

In Homily XIII.I, we see the obvious macrocosmic reading of the redemption history of the Bible. At first glance, Hildegard seems to follow the simple cycle of the traditional salvation history, from the fall of Adam and Eve to the last judgment. However, Hildegard far surpasses the traditional interpretation and reinterprets it with what Dronke calls Hildegard's own "mastery of metaphor" (Dronke 1984:382). The three women, who symbolize the Old Testament, the human nature of the savior, and an exhalation of the Holy Spirit, come to see God with signs (*signa*) and virtues (*virtutes*) that originate from the Old Testament. They come to God to mortify themselves by using their good works.

Although they use the Old Testament, which directs the carnal bond, and the New Testament by exhorting the Holy Spirit, they can do nothing until they receive God's help. They cannot remove the stone (*lapidem*), which means the burden of the flesh. Only through right faith in God's help do they remove the burden of the flesh, enter into the tomb, and see the angel inside. In this process, Hildegard's consistent emphasis lies on the necessity of faith in God's help.

The three women hear from the angel about the sacrificial death of Jesus, and the report that Jesus carried away human feebleness. Finally, they hear from the angel, not from Jesus himself, the great commandment to preach the Gospel by helping, inspiring, and showing a good example. The earlier good works (*in bonis operibus*), which fail to seek God, contrast with a good example (*bona exempla*).

In Homily XIII.II, the interpretation of salvation becomes very much personalized and internalized. The internal struggle of will, desire, and character is reflected in the human microcosm. God's grace and the change of human will and desire gain importance. The three women, who symbolize knowledge, rationality, and the tasting (*gustus*) of angels and humans, come to see God with the personified virtues that release (*dimittunt*) their own will. They hurry to the tomb before their corporeal desires arise. Even though they bring knowledge, rationality, and the tasting of angels and humans, nevertheless, they can neither remove the stone, nor enter into good desire. They recognize the weight of sin and its harshness. Therefore, they realize the limits of knowledge, rationality, and tasting. Here Hildegard psychologically amplifies the inner struggle of the human mind. In front of the stone they meet God's grace, not the sacrifice of Jesus. God's grace dissolves human harshness and transforms the human desire into good desire, and that finally into the heavenly desire. Here human desire and will become purified into heavenly desire by making a sharp contrast between the cosmic order and the human microcosm. God's grace crystallizes the human psyche. Only through God's grace can they enter into the tomb and witness the man who has heavenly desire and newness. The angel's last exhortation is also applied very personally. The angel gives personal exhortation, not the great command, to follow in Jesus' footsteps and his example.

Hildegard's narration of redemption hardly touches literal or historical issues. In other words, she did not give any historical or literal interpretation of the text, but rushes directly into allegorical interpretation. Even typology, which also is a traditional exegetical tool, is overshadowed by allegory. Each word and phrase points to something else beyond the literal meaning in Hildegard's creative hands. In XIII.I, the three women represent primary characters of the

triune God. Her allegorical interpretation is strikingly sewn up with the cosmic events. In this sense, we can call the first interpretation a macrocosmic allegory. Homily XIII.II becomes very much internalized. We can discover a microcosm composed of various human characters in Hildegard's allegorical interpretation of the text. The three women allegorize fundamental human senses. The stone again symbolizes sin, namely the burden of the flesh. Also the angel represents the ideal of believers.

Moral interpretation constitutes another important feature in Hildegard's homiletic works. Hildegard uses this term, morality, rather as a psychological term than as a denotation of moral behavior. Chastity is the central feature that shapes Hildegard's morality. Chastity has played the most important role for the spirituality of medieval Christians. We can see very clearly how chastity works out in Hildegard's Easter homilies. In the first homily, the enemy of God, which is represented by the stone, shall be arrogant in chastity and continence. Chastity soon becomes equated with right faith. Mortification of the burden of the flesh through entering the tomb is to become chaste and to remain so. The meaning of chastity is highlighted in the word of the young man (*juvenem*). The young man in the tomb, the mediator between God and man, is strong in virginity and continence. The young man also clothes himself in the brightness of virginity.

Morality (*moralitas*) in a rather psychological sense becomes much stronger in the second Easter homily. Here Hildegard focuses her depiction on the interiority of morality. Morality takes the forms of "desire and will of individuals" (Dronke 1984: 387). How we can connect this with Hildegard's further individual freedom is very important. This question is directly linked to Hildegard's understanding human optimism and human freedom which is sometimes seen in her other texts. The three women buy gifts of virtues in chastity to suppress their own corporeal desires. Various human attempts fail to acquire the good desire, which stays inside the tomb. Only by the help of God's grace can they see the good and heavenly desire, and can they also do good works through good desire. The emphasis on God's help in establishing morality is an interesting counterpart to the Cathar idea of morality. Again, human morality must be externalized through human activity. The angel himself appears as chastity itself. The young man also symbolizes a model of victory over demons.

Creative unification of opposing tendencies is another characteristic in Hildegard's biblical interpretation. We can witness very strong binary aspects in Hildegard's homilies. In the first homily, good works of the Old Testament contrast with God's help. The stone contrasts human works with right faith. The

human who is arrogant in chastity and continence is compared to the human who is strong in virginity and in continence. The angel in brightness of virginity contrasts clearly with the human in fragility of the flesh and in poverty.

In the second homily, we see the stronger tension between three internal human characters (knowledge, rationality, and tasting) and God's grace. God's grace itself contrasts with harshness (*duritas*) of the human desire. The stone again becomes the criterion to divide two wholly different worlds: the corporeal desire vs. the good and heavenly desire. Only after dissolving the flesh harshness of humanity can the three women see newness and the other life inside the tomb.

Hildegard's opposing tendency seems inherent in all of her homilies. The use of the language *viriditas* and *ariditas* clearly exemplifies this tendency. In the *Expositiones* XXIV, *Dominica prima Adventus*, in particular, Hildegard develops the imageries of *viriditas* and *ariditas*. Even if we suspect a neo-platonic dualistic cosmology in Hildegard's writings, however, her dualistic tendency does not fall into the extremely dualistic interpretation of the Bible held by the Cathars in her day (Wakefield & Evans 1991: 516, 523, 560-561; Biller 1997: 81-107). The extreme dualism between the material world and the spiritual world was one of the major characteristics of the twelfth-century Cathars. We can see Hildegard's strong anti-Cathar attitude through her sermons, especially *Symphonia*, which was another of Hildegard's works contemporaneous with her homilies. It shows how she strives for the ultimate harmony among her world's components (Newman 1998).

Unlike the Cathars, Hildegard does not reject the material world. Hildegard was not iconoclastic either. She does not completely despise the old law and human knowledge. Hildegard's important concept of chastity does not mean that worldly life must be rejected. Chastity is not acquired by rejecting the material world, as the Cathars urged. The angel's last exhortation supports this view: "Go into the wicked by journey . . . by running your clear works . . . helping, breathing in, and showing a good example just as his incarnation showed you."⁴ Instead, what Hildegard most wanted was God's direct help and grace. God's help and grace, not rejecting the material world, are the prerequisites for pursuing chastity.

⁴ "Sed ite in sceleri itinere . . . occurrendo in claris operibus vestris . . . auxilianem inspirantem et bona exempla ostendentem, scilicet sicut ejus incarnatio vobis demonstravit" (*Expositiones* XIII.I).

Hildegard's creative process of overcoming dualistic factors is best explained in the meaning and role of the stone. The stone itself is an obstacle. It divides the world. It divides the law and the Gospel, human desire and heavenly desire. At the same time, the stone paradoxically becomes the center to inspire God's help and grace. Once the stone is dissolved through God's help, it becomes a major passage to connect the evil world and the pure world, this and that world, and humankind in arrogance and in virginity. In this regard, the stone bridges the worldly life to the heavenly life, namely to newness.

The tomb (*monumentum*) also plays a double symbolic function: to decay and create. The tomb is the sacred place where "the seed must be sown" (*ubi semen est seminandi*), and true virginity remains there. In Hildegard's interpretation, the tomb experiences a reversal of meaning by turning death into the image of a sacred place. Furthermore, the tomb is the earthly model of the heavenly world. Adapting the idea of the creative hermeneutics of the sacred and the profane of M. Eliade, we can say that the tomb itself symbolizes the sacred place in the profane world to expose the sacredness of heaven. The tomb induces the three women to come in, and the tomb shows and transfers the heavenly world into the human world. The three women experience and observe the sacred and the true virginity inside the tomb. It is also inside the tomb where human desire was changed into heavenly desire.

Considering this creative and dynamic combination of binary aspects, we can say that, even though Hildegard accepted the view of orthodox Christianity's opposing tendencies, she tried to creatively overcome and rather melt the dualistic tension within Christianity into her own special language and biblical hermeneutics (Derolez and P. Dronke 1996: xiii-xxxv).⁵

Lastly, Hildegard's interpretation of the role and place of Jesus attracts our attention. The redemptive role of Jesus himself is diminished in both versions. Although the angel speaks to the women about the sacrificial role of Jesus, God's help and grace plays a more important role in the redemption story. To some extent the angel appears to have played an important role, especially as a model who has true chastity and the brightness of virginity. In XIII.II the angel is also the central figure who symbolizes heavenly desire. In this sense, we can say that

⁵ Explaining the concepts of *viriditas* and evil in an unpublished paper "Hildegard of Bingen and Gospel Homily 24," which was read at the 33th International Medieval Congress, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1998, Fay Martineau argues that Hildegard displayed orthodox Christianity's own dualistic tendencies.

Hildegard's redemption story in both homilies is more theocentric than Christocentric.

HILDEGARD AND GREGORY THE GREAT

As an attempt to find a plausible origin of Hildegard's biblical interpretation, Gregory the Great (540-604) could be a good example for a comparative study. The fact that Hildegard mentions Gregory the Great in Homily XXI, which was delivered in *Dominica IX post Pentecosten*, provides us with a legitimate reason to open a comparative study between them.⁶

Gregory was one of the main figures who laid the foundation for biblical interpretation in the Middle Ages (Smalley 1964:33-4; Ackroyd & Evans 1963:183-96). Gregory uses three stages of interpretation as his point of departure (historical, allegorical, and moral), and eventually develops this into four methods by refining his spiritual method as a distinct stage. Gregory's methods profoundly influenced the medieval monastic interpretation of the Bible. In addition to Gregory's fundamental works demonstrating his exegetical methods, the increasing influence on medieval exegesis of the venerable Bede (673-735), Gregory's English successor, makes even more plausible our effort to trace the origin of Hildegard's biblical interpretation back to the early Middle Ages (CS 111:69-77; CS 110: xi-xxiii).⁷ We have 40 of Gregory's Gospel homilies, preached presumably during the early years of his pontificate (591-92) (PL 76: 1526C-1529D; CS123:1-4, 157-163).

Homily XXI, the first of his second group of homilies, was preached on Easter using the same text as that of Hildegard (PL 76:1526C). Gregory's Easter sermon consists of 7 small sections: salutation, main themes, and exhortation. I tentatively follow the section of Latin text. The English edition does not follow this categorization.

In the opening section, Gregory begins the homily by explaining why he decided to deliver his sermon in person, and not through someone else, as he often had to do because of poor health. Describing the three women's arrival at

⁶ "Quia venient dies in te, videlicet alii in transmutatione et claritate, et circumdabunt te doctores novi testamenti doctrina sua ut Gregorius, Ambrosius, Augustinus, Ieronimus, et alii similes" (*Expositiones*, XXI:2).

⁷ Compared to Gregory's allegorical and tropological interpretation, Bede's homily is more spiritual. Among many examples, Bede's preference for spiritual

the tomb, Gregory urges his listeners to imitate the holy women in the second section of the homily.

He explains why the angel is seated on the right side and why the angel clothed himself in a white robe. In the third section, expounding "Do not be terrified" (*Nolite expavescere*), Gregory says that God is both fearful to sinners and soothing to the righteous (PL 76:1527B). Adding to that, Gregory furthers the allegorical analogy in the story of "pillars of fire and cloud." In the fourth section, he explains why Jesus mentioned the name of Peter. According to Gregory, Peter was called by Jesus so as not to lose hope as a result of Peter's denial of Jesus. In the fifth section, Gregory gives the literal meaning of Galilee (*the passing*).⁸ In the sixth section, Gregory classifies the role of Jesus as that of mediator. Gregory adds that other humans rose together with Jesus in his resurrection so that we could rise up again in the future. In the seventh section, Gregory explains why Jesus endured and suffered on the cross, despite the Jews' deriding him to come down from the cross. Gregory finds allegorical meaning by using the typological interpretation of the redemptive sacrifice of Jesus in the Samson story. Gregory finishes his sermon by exhorting the people to follow Jesus and with a benediction.

The ecclesiastical interpretation, which emphasizes the edification of the church's and the individual's faith, was most apparent in Gregory's homiletic works. In particular, moral/tropological instructions and the spiritual/allegorical interpretations by use of typological methods comprise most of his homilies.

interpretation can be seen in his Easter homily: "we will learn the more pleasing fruit of the spiritual meaning contained in its literal sense" (Bede the Venerable, *Homilies on the Gospels*, vol. II, trans. by Martin, Lawrence T., & Hurst David OSB, Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1991, (Cistercian Studies Series, 111), 69. From here I refer these series as CS. Bede used a different biblical text for his Easter sermon, based on Matthew 28:16-20 (CS 111: 69-77). The story of Mark 16:1-7, which Gregory and Hildegard used as a text for the Easter sermon, appears scattered in Homilies II. 7, 8, 9, 10 of Bede's collection (CS 111). For a further compact explanation of Bede's homily, see CS 110: xi-xxiii, (*Homilies on the Gospels*, vol. I, trans. by Lawrence T. Martin, & David Hurst OSB, [Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1991]. For the Latin text of Gregory, see J. P. Migne's *Patrologiae cursus completus series latina*, vol. 76, Parisiis, 1849. Hereafter I will refer to that book as PL.

⁸ Gregory takes this meaning of the Hebrew word, Galilee, from St. Jerome's interpretation of Hebrew names. However, Bede here takes the spiritual interpre-

The preponderance of moral/tropological interpretation in Gregory is attested to in several places in Gregory's works: "We are making a brief examination of these things under the mystical understanding . . . [The task] remains so that we may seek in the moral sense the virtue of the senses."⁹ Smaragdus's later categorization of the four doctors supports this argument: "so Augustine disputes clearly, Jerome explicates elegantly, Ambrose speaks learnedly, and Gregory handles morally" (Ghellinck 1948:23).¹⁰ A catalogue made in the days of Hildegard by a librarian of the Charterhouse at Salvatorberg in the 12th century also convinces us of such an early categorization of Gregory's exegetical methods: "It is appropriate that Jerome sweated continuously in the area of history, Ambrose in the area of allegory, Gregory in the area of tropology" (Lubac 1998:132).

Gregory's moral/tropological remarks begin from the start in homily XXI. He wishes to deliver this homily in person to alert the people. On the arrival of the women, Gregory raises his voice that "their deed points to something that must be done in our holy church. Thus, as we hear of what they did, we must think that our responsibility is to imitate them" (PL 76:1526D).

Gregory interprets Jesus' calling Peter to mean that "God first made him known to himself, and then put him over others, that he might perceive from his own weakness how mercifully he ought to put up with the weaknesses of others" (PL 76:1527A). The last exhortation highlights Gregory's moral/tropological exegesis: "let us hear what the angel said to the women . . . let us hear what the angel adds" (PL 76:1527B). Gregory also finishes his homily by exhorting, "Dearly beloved, let us love wholeheartedly the resurrection of our savior" (PL 76:1529A).

Another major characteristic in Gregory's homilies is his use of types (*typica*) as a basic way to allegorize his interpretation.¹¹ In other places of Gregory's

tation of the name of Galilee: "What the name 'Galilee' connotes in relation to the salvation-bearing mystery is well known from the frequent explanation of the fathers, but it is not irrelevant to repeat quite often what we must keep in our minds. Galilee means 'a crossing over accomplished' or 'revelation'" (CS 111:70).

⁹ "Haec sub intellectu mystico brevi locutione transcurrimus . . . Restat ut . . . virtutem sensuum moraliter inquiramus." *Moralia in Job*, Bk 6 (PL 75:732CD).

¹⁰ " . . . ut Augustinus disputat diserte, Hieronymus explicat eleganter, Ambrosius loquitur scolastice, Gregorius tractat moraliter" (Ghellinck 1948: 23).

¹¹ It is rather difficult how to distinguish among spiritual, allegorical, and ty-

homilies, Gregory's *Homilia prima* based on Luke 21:25-32, we also find the same emphasis on typological interpretation: "because the accomplishment of the following things is clearly an indication for things to come" (PL 76:1436D). The most obvious typological interpretation in homily XXI comes from the Samson story. The Philistines clearly point out (*demonstratur*) the Jews, Gaza indicates [*designat*] the lower world, and Samson foreshadows (*significat*) the Redeemer. Samson's seizure in Gaza symbolizes Jesus in the sepulchre. Samson's carrying of the gates indicates Jesus' destroying the lower world: "Samson not only went out at midnight but even carried off the gates of the city, because our Redeemer, rising before it was light, not only went free from the lower world, but even destroyed its very presence" (PL 76:1529C).

Gregory's typological reading is interwoven into his wider allegorical interpretation. In the second section, "on the left side" (*per sinistram*) means this world, while "on the right side" (*per dextram*) represents eternal life (PL 76:1526D). "A white robe" (*Stola candida*) of the angel means the joy of our festival day (PL 76:1526D). Gregory's interpretation of "do not be terrified" clearly shows how Gregory induces the spiritual meaning from the text. The angel, who caused fear among the women, may frighten the condemned and assure the devout. In the same way, the pillar of fire in Exodus can cause dread of fire for the sinner, and a gentle soothing quality in the cloud for the righteous. "Day" is understood to indicate the life of the righteous, and "night" that of the sinner.

Another major feature in Gregory's homilies, as seen in homily XXI, is his emphasis on the place of Jesus. Gregory intensively expounds the meaning and role of Jesus' death and resurrection throughout the four sections in homily XXI. His interpretation of why Jesus died is clear: "Accordingly, he became a human being and appeared in bodily form, he lowered himself to die of his own freewill; he rose by his own power; he showed by his example what he promised us as a reward" (PL 76:1528D). Gregory again states that "our Redeemer, not only went out free from the lower world, but even destroyed its very defenses" (PL 76:1529C). Such emphasis on Jesus as a redeemer presumably comes from the turbulent situation of Gregory's time. The fact that most of his homilies were focused on specific themes such as the birth of Jesus, disciple-

pological method in Gregory's day. Since Origen, however, typological method has been a very popular exegetical tool (Origen 1973:184-8).

ship, eschatology, the kingdom of God, and the death and resurrection of Jesus supports my hypothesis.

The comparison of biblical interpretation between Gregory and Hildegard begins from the question of how we classify the genre of homily and sermon. The definition of J. E. Cross seems pertinent to this argument: "a homily follows the sequential structure of the pericope while the sermon elaborates . . . on its dominant topic." Gregory's homilies are different from Hildegard's at least in external forms. The fact that homily and sermon were used interchangeably until quite late in the Middle Ages, however, increases the difficulty of differentiating them. Those two terms are often used synonymously. Hoping for further study on this topic, nevertheless, I want to classify both Gregory's and Hildegard's homilies as homily-style writings.¹²

Hildegard and Gregory differ greatly in their methods of exegesis. Gregory's homilies do not focus upon one specific topic which flows through the whole piece like Hildegard's. This is supported by Gregory's own statement, in Gregory's *Homilia XXIII* based on Luke 24:13-35: "I have determined to examine the meaning of the Gospel reading summarily and not through word by word analysis, lest an overlong explanation be a burden upon your kindness" (PL 76:1538B). Gregory thus picks up several key words and events to expound each specific section. On the contrary, each of Hildegard's homilies is a beautifully and finely threaded piece of drama. Hildegard reveals, or rather prophesies her own spirituality through her performative narration in each homily.

Such a question of genre is partially caused by Hildegard's far more excellent use of allegory. Gregory and Hildegard share in their allegorical interpretation of the Bible. In spite of the crude and unrefined nature of its usage, Gregory's homilies are full of allegorical interpretations. However, Gregory's allegory usually follows the historical/literal interpretation, adding anagogical interpretation, and finally proceeds toward the moral/tropological interpretation. The appropriate combination of three or four methods of traditional exegetical methods dominates Gregory's homilies. In Hildegard's homilies, however, allegorical interpretation becomes her most outstanding characteristic. Historical/literal and anagogical interpretations hardly appear in her homilies.

¹² This does not mean that Hildegard developed sermon-style writing. While following the homily style, Hildegard pursued to elaborate the prevailing subject. Further study is needed regarding how we can apply the terms of "homily" and "sermon" to her writings. We can also define Gregory's homily as "the homily in the form of exegetical commentary" (Kienzle 1999).

Hildegard's allegory does not at all follow historical meaning in order. The two homilies reveal macrocosmic and microcosmic allegorical interpretation. In the first homily, the text is interpreted from a macrocosmic allegorical perspective, linking the text to cosmological events by using various allegorical images. The second homily is seen from a microcosmic allegorical point of view, interpreting the given text psychologically by creating a microcosmic world inside the human being. In addition, each word contains profound allegorical meaning in Hildegard's homilies. Her frequent use of filler words such as *scilicet*, *videlicet*, *id est* shows how freely Hildegard moves between each word and its allegorical meaning.

Usually she does not provide the literal meaning of the words. She rushes directly into an allegorical exegesis. Such a word by word allegorical interpretation, moreover, is skillfully interwoven into the cosmological and psychological interpretations of her homilies. To understand Hildegard's homilies, acknowledging this kind of double-layered allegorical interpretation is an imperative.

Gregory's and Hildegard's ways of understanding human beings and human reality provide another good reason for a comparative study between them. The difficult situations in which Gregory and Hildegard found themselves demanded that they furnish a theological understanding of this world and of the way to seek God. Gregory confronts immense religious-political tumults inside and outside Italy. Hildegard realizes and prophesies about the tremendous harm of a new heresy, that of the Cathars. However, neither of them retreated into the solitude of the monastery. They did not reject either faith or society. Both of them attempted to interpret the right meaning of the Bible grounded on traditional doctrinal formulation. However, in approaching God, they adapted quite different ways. One of the easiest ways for Gregory was to contemplate God. The purpose of Gregory's contemplation was to achieve a mystical, intuitive, experimental perception of the divine. But the means to achieving that goal is the contemplation of biblical teaching. He constantly exhorts his audiences to take heed to the biblical meaning. Gregory's frequent use of certain language demonstrates this: "dearly beloved"; "therefore, think of God"; "consider, my friends"; "do not"; "let's" and so forth. Contrary to Gregory, Hildegard focuses on understanding the interiority of human beings. Hildegard finds in the human mind and soul the cosmological meaning of the Bible. She raises up human interiority beyond the visible cosmic world. Human soul and cosmic nature produce a beautiful harmony through the human mind.

EPILOGUE

Hildegard's homilies deserve to be called her masterpieces, because she shows very comprehensively her unique exegetical originality and creativity by using various themes and methods in them. The study of Hildegard will also provide a very useful view of how female Christians in the High Middle Ages understood their lives and worlds through the Bible. Also the recent revival of Hildegard studies, specifically concerning her biblical interpretation, piety, and faith, could suggest a prophetic insight for twentieth-century spirituality. Such a fusion of horizons between Hildegard's times and the twentieth century will prompt us to approach a precious legacy of the High Middle Ages from a very fresh perspective. Hildegard's homiletic works could be the best tool to link these two different worlds.

However, much further study of her homiletic works still remains to be done. First of all, a comparative study with the homiletic works of her contemporary, for example those of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, is desirable. St. Bernard and Hildegard are the major windows through which we can see the depth and breath of twelfth-century Christian spirituality. At the same time, broad inter-textual studies of her corpus should be undertaken. Further attempts to locate the origin of Hildegard's exegetical methods should also be done. In particular, a profound study of the exegetical genealogy through the four Latin doctors, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, will enable us to situate Hildegard's exegesis within the wider historical context of medieval biblical interpretation. This paper is meant as a stepping stone to that great project.

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Becoming a Church *for* the Poor: Toward a Reformed Spirituality of Liberation

RUBÉN ROSARIO RODRÍGUEZ

INTRODUCTION

THIS ESSAY SEEKS TO CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN REFORMED AND liberation theologies in order to identify what sort of spirituality predominates in mainline Protestantism and to suggest steps toward developing a Reformed spirituality of liberation. Mark Taylor, in an article entitled “Immanent and Prophetic: Shaping Reformed Theology for Late Twentieth-Century Struggle,” argues that the Calvinist Reformed tradition has all too often embraced “the cultural practices of ordered middle- to upper-class life, and in spite of all our announced concern and effort, U.S. Presbyterians tend to exclude from their midst the real presence of those who live within the lower ranges of economic and cultural life” (Taylor 1995: 166). Here Taylor expounds upon a thesis by Nicholas Wolterstorff that the Calvinist Reformed tradition suffers from two major failings: (1) a conception of a just social order that barely tolerates opposing viewpoints; and (2) a “recurrent triumphalism” that leads to imposing its world-view upon others. While acknowledging that twentieth-century political theologies, theologies of hope, and liberation theologies have criticized the Reformed tradition’s emphasis on the transcendence of God as “world-repressive,” I will argue for the possibility of articulating a Reformed spirituality of liberation in which believers experience God’s transforming grace in the act of loving one’s neighbor (Lk 10:25-37).

The Reformed tradition, a diverse body emerging from the sixteenth-century union between Zwinglians and Calvinists, has long embraced the public aspect of theology, as evidenced by the work of its chief theologian John Calvin

(1509-64). In Calvin's Geneva, Christ's call to minister to the poor, the sick, the orphan, the widow, the refugee, and the prisoner, was purposefully integrated into the life of the church and legislated by civil law. Accordingly, liberation theology affirms the Reformed tradition's commitment to socially-transformative praxis. However, recognizing all theology as contextual—that is, inevitably intertwined with the interests and desires of a particular culture, ethnic group, or social class—liberation theologians also caution that the Calvinist Reformed tradition has often used its theology to legitimate oppression. Thus the need to practice a “hermeneutics of suspicion” as a check upon the tendency of ideology and tradition to distort truth.

There is a crisis of spirituality within mainline Protestantism characterized by a privatization of faith. One troubling consequence of reducing Christian spirituality to the domain of private religious experience is the uncritical acceptance of capitalism in which the values of consumerism are equated with the Gospel. In spite of a veneer of unprecedented prosperity during the 1990s, the United States is experiencing an ever-increasing gap between the haves and have-nots, a permanent underclass of the undereducated and underemployed, and other disturbing signs of social decay, including a burgeoning prison population and increased racial tensions.¹ A new *conscientization*² is needed that gives equal attention to social justice and economic growth while avoiding the elevation of any one economic theory to the status of idol. Gustavo Gutiérrez, in *We Drink From Our Own Wells*, evaluates spirituality on its ability to integrate worship and prayer with social and public responsibility, consigning as inauthentic those Christian practices that make spirituality the exclusive domain of a select few or encourage a highly individualistic and privatized faith. Reformed theology can learn much from the church *of* the poor in Latin America about becoming a church *for* the poor in North America.

¹On the issue of the underside of the American economy see Chuck Collins, Betsy Leondar-Wright, and Holly Sklar, *Shifting Fortunes: The Perils of the Growing American Wage Gap* (Boston: United for a Fair Economy, 1999); on race in America see Cornel West, *Race Matters* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); on the state of American prisons see Mark Taylor, “The Executed God: The Way of the Cross in Lockdown America,” *The Princeton Seminary Bulletin* 21: 301-23. Fortress Press will publish a longer version of this article under the same title in 2001. Taylor cites the 1996 report of the National Criminal Justice Commission which states that the prison population has tripled since 1980 to 1.8 million.

²A process by which the oppressed link theory with praxis in order to develop a “critical awareness” of their social reality and commit themselves to the trans-

Taylor's effort at reconstructing Reformed theology as liberative praxis is attractive because it acknowledges a plurality of voices within the Reformed tradition by emphasizing three major points: (1) a commitment to ecumenicity, (2) the doctrine of God, and (3) the need for constant theological critique of both church and society. By reclaiming the theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Taylor revises Reformed theology as a prophetic critique "rooted in a profoundly immanent understanding of God" (Taylor 1995: 150). While agreeing with Taylor's critique that Reformed theology's emphasis on divine transcendence often leads to a form of ethical quietism, this investigation argues that Karl Barth's Trinitarian formulations prove a better resource than Schleiermacher for recovering a more immanent conception of God's action in human history, and with it a more public spirituality.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN LIBERATION THEOLOGY

While the Reformed churches have never formed a single confessional body—or even shared an official corpus of confessional writings³—catholicity has always been a central locus of Reformed theology. In the contemporary context catholicity most often manifests itself in the area of church missions since, by "responding to the challenges presented by contemporary struggles for social justice and liberation from oppression, conflicting parties within the churches find themselves in solidarity with like-minded others" (de Gruchy 1999: 104). Latin American liberation theology, by linking the church's mission to the struggle for a just and sustainable world, challenges the Reformed tradition to move beyond its confessional walls.

The liberation theology movement began in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with parallel African-American liberation movements in the United States, soon followed by the articulation of feminist liberation theologies and other Third World theologies. No single event marks the birth of lib-

formation of society. This concept originates in the 1970 work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, rev. ed. (New York: Continuum Publishing Company), 68-105.

³See Jan Rohls, *Reformed Confessions: Theology from Zurich to Barmen*, trans. John Hoffmeyer (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 3-5.

eration theology; however, the Second Vatican Council (which met in four separate sessions between October 1962 and December 1965) stands as an important contributing factor. The theological statements emerging from Vatican II challenged the church to integrate doctrine with pastoral practice in order to bring its mission to bear upon the harsh realities in much of the world. This challenge was then taken up at the Second General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate in 1968 at Medellín, Colombia. The central themes of Medellín were the Latin American reality of absolute poverty, the struggle for peace and justice under regimes of institutionalized violence, and the political dimension of faith.

At this point, however, it is important to acknowledge that liberation theology had its genesis in the pastoral practice and theological reflection of various Christian communities, most often in a context of ecumenical cooperation. In fact, Enrique Dussel credits Rubem Alves, a Brazilian Presbyterian, with naming this new theology *liberation* theology in his 1968 Ph.D. dissertation for Princeton Theological Seminary, *Toward a Theology of Liberation*, two years before Gutiérrez published *A Theology of Liberation* (Dussel 1993:87).⁴ So while Latin American liberation theology is most often linked with post-Vatican II Roman Catholic theology, equally important Protestant sources for liberation theology cannot be ignored. These include the first three Latin American Protestant Conferences (CELA—Conferencia Evangélica Latinoamericana) of 1949, 1961, and 1965, the Union of Protestant Youth Leagues (ULAJE—Unión de Ligas Juveniles Evangélicas), and the 1966 Geneva Conference of the World Council of Churches, where the Latin American delegation played an important role. Protestant theological critiques of bourgeois capitalism began to appear voicing explicit sympathy for democratic socialism, and in 1960 the leadership of the Church and Society movement (ISAL—Iglesia y Sociedad en América Latina) called for active participation by the church in social and political liberation.

This theological development within Latin American Protestantism was influenced by such figures as John A. Mackay, whose 1953 Carnahan Lectures given in Buenos Aires contributed to the proliferation of Karl Barth's theology in Latin America (specifically the theology of *Romans II*), Richard Shaull, who became professor of Ecumenics at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1962 after many years of missionary work in Colombia and Brazil, and Paul

⁴Subsequently published as *A Theology of Human Hope* (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1969).

Lehmann, who (along with Shaull) helped disseminate the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Latin America.⁵ Their students included such pivotal Latin American theologians as Rubem Alves, Julio de Santa Ana, and José Míguez Bonino.

Following the publication of Gustavo Gutiérrez's seminal work, *A Theology of Liberation*, in 1971, liberation theology experienced an eight year period of rapid growth. During this phase the programmatic elements outlined by Gutiérrez were elaborated and expounded by theologians like Juan Luis Segundo, Hugo Assman, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, Jon Sobrino, and Ignacio Ellacuría in conversation (not always friendly) with European and North American theologians like Jürgen Moltmann, Johannes B. Metz, Robert McAfee Brown, and Harvey Cox. Perhaps the most significant event of this period for the worldwide growth of liberation theology was the foundation of the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) in 1976, bringing together the best theologians of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to meet and share perspectives. However, 1979 proved the highpoint for Latin American liberation theology with the convening of the Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate in Puebla de los Angeles, Mexico. Pope John Paul II, in his first papal visit, opened the Puebla Conference on January 28, 1979, and in March 1979 approved its Final Document, which presents a critical evaluation of liberation theology under four major rubrics: (1) the church's commitment to undertake scientific analysis of social, economic, and political reality; (2) the church's mission defined as liberative evangelization; (3) the church's commitment to a program of liberation for the construction of a just society; and (4) doctrinal reflection on the church's preferential option for the poor.

If the 1970s were a decade of rapid growth for Latin American liberation theology, the 1980s proved a decade of reaction against these advances, best illustrated by 1984's *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 'Theology of Liberation'* written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and approved by Pope John Paul II, which contains the unjust accusation that the preferential option for the poor is nothing more than Marxist class struggle—that is, humankind's self-redemption—and thus “a perversion of the Christian message as God entrusted it to his church” (Hennelly 1990: 405). The 1990s, in turn, can be characterized as a time of self-criticism and revision, as exemplified by the systematic presenta-

⁵See Beatriz Melano, “The Influence of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Lehmann, and Richard Shaull in Latin America,” *Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (pp. 64-84).

tion of liberation themes, *Mysterium Liberationis*, edited by Jon Sobrino (completing the project after his colleague, Ignacio Ellacuría, was martyred in El Salvador). An apologetic tone resonates throughout many of these essays, perhaps in response to Cardinal Ratzinger, so while acknowledging that Marxism provided liberation theology with tools for analyzing the historical situation in Latin America, Ellacuría also argues that Marxism played a subordinate role to the Gospel, a role that has diminished over the years:

We are speaking of a universal liberation. It is an integral liberation expressed not only in terms of economic or political problems, but also a universal liberation. The poor must be liberated from their poverty, but the rich must also be liberated from their wealth; the oppressed must be liberated from their condition of domination, and the oppressors from their dominant condition (1993: 284).

Liberation and salvation for *both* the oppressed *and* the oppressor lies at the heart of a spirituality of liberation, a valuable lesson for any church that finds itself “captive to bourgeois norms and resistant toward just and liberating social change” (de Gruchy 1999: 105).

The position of the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church on theologies of liberation, found in two instructional “letters”—the aforementioned *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the ‘Theology of Liberation’* (August 6, 1984) and the *Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation* (March 22, 1986)—is neither a blanket rejection of liberation theology nor a full endorsement. However, several theologians conclude that the church’s position is nevertheless tantamount to a judgment of heterodoxy.⁶ Juan José Tamayo, in *Presente y Futuro de la Teología de la Liberación*, argues that the underlying conflicts between the theology of the magisterium of the church and liberation theology are not matters of doctrinal orthodoxy but result from the different cultural and socioeconomic contexts shaping each theology.

⁶See Juan Luis Segundo, *Theology and the Church: A Response to Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church* (Minneapolis: Seabury-Winston, 1985). Segundo takes a brave stance, concluding that Ratzinger’s letter contradicts the spirit and intent of Vatican II. Responses from First World Christianity include a statement by the editorial board of the journal *Concilium* and Karl Rahner’s letter to Cardinal Juan Landíuri Ricketts, archbishop of Lima, defending the orthodoxy of LT. See *Liberation Theology: A Documentary History*, ed. Alfred T. Hennelly, 390-92, 351-52.

Christians in Latin America (and the rest of the Third World) are, for the most part, poor—struggling for basic subsistence. Christians in the First World, even those considered among the poor, have access to the basic necessities for sustaining life. The churches of the First World, in general, are well established, financially endowed, resistant to change, and they minister to the needs of the middle-class. They are so integrated into the dominant socioeconomic system they rarely take a stance against it except when the rights of the church are threatened (Tamayo 1994: 176). These churches “Se mueven en el mundo de la Ilustración y se muestran especialmente preocupadas por armonizar fe y razón, por mostrar la racionalidad de la experiencia religiosa y por fundamentar con solidez las afirmaciones teológicas” (ibid.).⁷ In contrast, the prophetic urgency within Third World churches is directly linked to the daily struggle for survival. Accordingly, liberation theology is more interested in harmonizing faith and justice, spirituality and liberation. This theology is not a passing fad, and as the theology of liberation continues to mature and integrate itself within the mainstream church, it will become more apparent to First World Christianity that the oldest most persistent challenge to the church has always been (to paraphrase Gustavo Gutiérrez): “How to tell the poor of this world that God loves them.”

Sadly, the First World church remains well insulated from the cry of the poor. According to critics like Richard J. Neuhaus and Michael Novak, liberation theology began life as one of the most promising theological movements of the twentieth century but ended the 1990s with something of a whimper. Upon the demise of the Soviet sphere of influence, Michael Novak led the eulogizing:

As an economic idea socialism is now widely regarded as a mistake based on bad nineteenth-century economics. As a political idea, socialism is now widely regarded as too centralized and monolithic to secure basic human liberties. This leaves liberation theology's social theory in embarrassingly threadbare condition (1991: 10).

Novak's reductionist argument hinges on the contention that liberation theologians spent the better part of two decades defending Marxist social analysis

⁷“move within the world of the Enlightenment and are preoccupied with harmonizing faith and reason, proving the rationality of religious experience, and establishing rational foundations for their theological affirmations.”

and methods of political liberation only to rewrite history by making spirituality the new *locus theologicus* of liberation theology. He suggests that, “chagrined over recent developments, liberation theologians have indeed moved from radical social reconstruction to Christian spirituality. If so, that is a development to be warmly welcomed. But in that case, one wonders what if anything remains of the original substance of the movement known as liberation theology” (Novak 1991: 13).

Novak’s indictment of liberation theology’s *recent* interest in spirituality rings false. From the very beginning Gustavo Gutiérrez grounded the Latin American revolutionary process in a distinctly Christian spirituality:

A spirituality is a concrete manner, inspired by the Spirit, of living the Gospel; it is a definitive way of living “before the Lord,” in solidarity with all human beings, “with the Lord,” and before human beings. It arises from an intense spiritual experience, which is later explicated and witnessed to (1988: 117).

In fact, at the core of liberationist praxis lies a radical conversion experience: “Evangelical conversion is indeed the touchstone of all spirituality. Conversion means a radical transformation of ourselves; it means thinking, feeling, and living as Christ—present in exploited and alienated persons” (Gutiérrez 1988: 118). Without wavering on their commitment to transformative praxis, liberation theologians like Gustavo Gutiérrez realize that political liberation cannot be divorced from spiritual salvation. Gutiérrez, in *A Theology of Liberation*, articulates a point consonant with Reformed theology: “A spirituality of liberation must be filled with a living sense of *gratuitousness*” (ibid.). This point is developed further in *We Drink From Our Own Wells*:

The experience and idea of the gratuitousness of God’s love are fundamental and of central importance in the Christian life. The gratuitous initiative of the Lord is a dominant theme in Pauline theology (“The free gift in the grace of that one man Jesus Christ abounded for many” [Rom 5:15]), as also later in Augustinian theology. “God first loved us” (1 Jn 4:19). Everything starts from there (1984: 109).

In the words of St. Paul, “No longer present your members to sin as instruments of wickedness, but present yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life, and present your members to God as instruments of righ-

teousness. For sin will have no dominion over you, since you are not under law but under grace” (Rom 6:13-14).

This brief analysis of the development of Latin American liberation theology demonstrates how its influence has extended beyond the Third World, motivating responses from First World theologians and in the process decisively changing the ecclesial, theological, and cultural discourse in Europe and North America, as evidenced by doctrinal statements like the Confession of 1967 and the Brief Statement of Faith of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (Migliore 1983: 33-42). The issues and concerns raised by liberation theology pose a great theological challenge to all Christian traditions—not to the exclusion of doctrinal or philosophical problems raised by post-Enlightenment thought—but because the victims of poverty, racism, and sexism will no longer be silenced. Efforts to critically engage and to integrate the insights of liberation theology allow Reformed theology to rediscover its heritage and commitment to the social transformation of a sinful world,⁸ a trait which “is in critical solidarity with contemporary forms of liberation theology, and in some respects is their prototype” (de Gruchy 1999:106).

IMMANENCE OR TRANSCENDENCE?

Liberation spirituality begins with a profound sense of gratitude in response to God’s saving grace while remaining critical of traditional spiritualities that cannot translate this subjective “religious” experience of gratitude into objective (historical) love of neighbor. Thus, emphasizing God’s transcendence need not lead to an escapist spirituality that avoids the responsibility of political and socioeconomic transformation. Spirituality, understood as a concrete manner of living the Gospel, means a reordering of our individual and communal life as guided by the Holy Spirit. Liberation spirituality implies solidarity with the oppressed and marginalized in socially transformative praxis. In contrast, the dominant spirituality among Reformed churches in North America emphasizes the transcendence of God and preeminence of grace to such a degree that—in

⁸See John W. de Gruchy, *Liberating Reformed Theology: A South African Contribution to an Ecumenical Debate* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1991); Richard Shaull, *The Reformation and Liberation Theology* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991); Daniel L. Migliore, *Called to Freedom: Liberation Theology and the Future of Christian Doctrine* (Philadelphia, PA: The

spite of a strong tradition of social transformation—it suffers from a politically stifling privatization of faith. Given this world-view, how is the conscientization of mainline Protestantism achieved?

Mark Taylor commends the “healthy sense of transcendence that we in the Reformed tradition have often received from theologians Calvin, Barth, and others,” yet attributes many of the world-repressive elements of the tradition to this very emphasis on transcendence (1995: 157). Instead, Taylor suggests that we “recast God’s sovereignty so that we envision divine transcendence as less a matter of God coming ‘down on’ or ‘to’ society, nature, and history in order to work redemption, and more a matter of God ‘arising from’ and ‘within’ society, nature, and history” (*ibid.*, italics omitted). Preserving the sense of God’s otherness is necessary but “does not mean pointing *away from* or *outside* our social and historical life,” for the “cost of thinking this way is that this logic reinforces the very dualism that a theology of God incarnate in Jesus Christ is meant to overcome” (Taylor 1995: 158–59). Therefore, Taylor suggests a new reading of Reformed theologian and pastor Friedrich Schleiermacher—one differentiated from Barth’s portrayal of him “as the divinizer of human self, community, and religious life”—which argues that divine transcendence is manifested (incarnated) *in* history and nature and thus radically “immanent” (1995: 162). Unfortunately, Karl Barth’s strong criticism of Schleiermacher colors contemporary efforts at revisioning Reformed theology in more immanent terms since it raises the specter that human subjectivity might become normative for theological construction. Karl Barth is one of the most important Reformed theological voices of the twentieth century. However, we must not allow the continuing relevance of his theology overshadow the fact his theology developed in polemical opposition to nineteenth century liberal Protestantism (specifically the theology of Schleiermacher). Accordingly, Barth’s radically transcendent conception of God as “Wholly Other” in the second edition of the *Romans* commentary should be placed in its proper historical context.

Immanuel Kant’s transcendental critique understands human experience and knowledge to be mere appearances (phenomena), implying that how things are in themselves (noumena) is unknowable, thereby reducing all knowl-

Westminster Press, 1980) and *Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1991); and Salatiel Palomino López, “Toward Reformed-Liberating Hermeneutics: A New Reading of Reformed Theology in the Latin American Context” (dissertation for Princeton Theological Seminary, 1993).

edge to the contents of human subjectivity. Kant distinguishes between pure reason, which organizes the data of sense experience (and is thus limited to material objects), and practical reason, which postulates reasons to account for certain human common experiences (such as belief in freedom and in God), in order to allow for the possibility of a “rational” basis for religion. Against the background of Kantian epistemology, Schleiermacher explores the possibility of understanding that which is by definition beyond all human experience: the transcendental God. Schleiermacher, in *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, argues that religion is not a form of knowing and therefore not in conflict with science. At the same time, he is not content with the way Kant collapses the distinction between religion and morality by distinguishing pure reason from practical reason, so instead Schleiermacher places religion in the realm of feeling not reason. Theology, as Schleiermacher develops it in *The Christian Faith*, consists of reflection upon the contents of religious self-consciousness, specifically consciousness of “our feeling of absolute dependence” and “being in relation with God” (1976: 17). Thus, while distancing himself from Enlightenment efforts to establish knowledge of God by reason alone, Schleiermacher nonetheless embraces the modern turn to the subject.

Buried deep within the *Church Dogmatics*, in one of Barth’s many small print excursions, one finds a piece of theological autobiography important for understanding his strong reaction to this Protestant form of natural theology. He writes:

Under the impression made by the first world war and its compromising both of those who held the Socialist expectation and also of those who again taught an uneschatological inwardness of “personal life,” many of us tried to make a fresh start at what we saw to be the original point of departure of the elder Blumhardt. We did not wish to return either to the older secularised piety or with Johannes Müller and others to its modern form. We believed that what we found in the teaching of Schleiermacher was the theological kernel of a Christianity-of-the-present compatible neither with the Bible nor the real world. We were convinced that we must oppose this (*CD II/1*: 634).

The existential crisis leading to Barth’s loud “No!” against nineteenth-century liberal theology was the publication of a manifesto by ninety-three German intellectuals supporting the Kaiser’s war policy, among them many of Barth’s theology professors: “This theological support for the war finally signaled for

Barth the bankruptcy of the liberal theology he had learned. Looking back to see where theology went astray, he came to fix upon Schleiermacher" (Green 1991: 15).

Karl Barth is radically critical of liberal theology, arguing that it: (1) abandoned the concept of God's transcendence, thereby erasing any differences between God and our human conceptions of God, and (2) ignored the limitations placed upon human understanding by our sinfulness. Even in his later theological development, Barth acknowledges an "infinite qualitative difference" between the Creator and the creature, arguing that only through God's act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ can humankind have knowledge of God. In contrast, Schleiermacher centers theological reflection on the experience of the believing subject, specifically the universal "feeling of absolute dependence" that gives us an awareness of the existence of God independent of, and prior to, revelation (1976: 131-41). While from a cognitive perspective Schleiermacher's God appears radically transcendent, by grounding theological reflection in self-consciousness he constructs a profoundly immanent God who is encountered in the very depths of our humanity.

According to Barth, the danger in beginning theological reflection from human subjectivity and working toward "objective" knowledge of God is the all-too-real possibility of turning human talk about God into an ideology and thus into a false idol, a question that,

became a burning one at the moment when the Evangelical Church in Germany was unambiguously and consistently confronted by a definite and new form of natural theology, namely, by the demand to recognise in the political events of the year 1933, and especially in the form of the God-sent Adolf Hitler, a source of specific new revelation of God, which, demanding obedience and trust, took its place beside the revelation attested in Holy Scripture, claiming that it should be acknowledged by Christian proclamation and theology as equally binding and obligatory (CD II/1: 173).

Hence, we must interpret Barth's emphasis on God's transcendence as an act of liberative resistance to totalitarian and hegemonic oppression, with the understanding that the possibility of human liberation originates in divine action: "While emphasizing the sovereignty and prevenience of the grace of the triune God in creation, reconciliation, and redemption, he [Barth] underscores the fact

that the activity of this God does not destroy but establishes human freedom” (Migliore 1999: 503).

Mark Taylor’s suggested direction, reclaiming the theology of Schleiermacher for the Reformed tradition, is an attractive proposition but unlikely to overcome the strong bias against an immanent understanding of God. Taylor himself acknowledges the risk involved and suggests one “doesn’t need a Schleiermacher in order to urge the church along toward the insight that the Christ of God dwells immanently in ministries to and for those in radical need” (1995: 164). This investigation proposes moving beyond the dichotomy of “immanence versus transcendence” toward a new theological vocabulary rooted in the spiritual conversion experience. Perhaps a deeper exploration of *mysterium trinitatis* in the theology of Karl Barth can steer contemporary Reformed theology toward the prophetic critique desired by Mark Taylor and other liberationist voices within the Reformed tradition.

Barth’s reinterpretation of classical Trinitarian doctrine eschews all approaches that derive their content from an analysis of human subjectivity. For Barth, dogmatics must “pay heed to Scripture, not allow itself to take its problems from anything else but Scripture” (CD I/1: 295). Consequently, “it is only—but very truly—by observing the unity and the differentiation of God in His biblically attested revelation that we are set before the problem of the doctrine of the Trinity” (CD I/1: 299). Barth’s exploration of the doctrine of the Trinity begins with the New Testament confession, “Jesus is Lord,” and the Christological concerns raised when Jesus is called *kyrios* (the Greek translation of the Old Testament name for God, *YHWH*). God is known through God’s act of self-revelation in Jesus Christ—“No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made him known” (Jn 1:18)—and “no one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except by the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor 12:3). What does it mean to confess, “Jesus is Lord?” It means that since no one can reveal God except God, and since Jesus Christ reveals the Father, Jesus must be truly God. However, because of our fallen condition, we can confess “Jesus is Lord” only through the miraculous operation of the Holy Spirit.

While there is no explicit doctrine of the Trinity in the biblical witness, it is clear that the self-revelation of God is Trinitarian in form. According to Barth, theological statements are possible because God reveals God’s self. More to the point, God not only reveals Godself, God is the content of that revelation and the (only) means by which humans can know said content. Thus, “the doctrine of the Trinity is what basically distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God as Christian, and therefore what already distinguishes the Christian concept of

revelation as Christian, in contrast to all other possible doctrines of God or concepts of revelation" (CD I/1: 301). Barth is a good Kantian insofar as he rejects metaphysics but breaks with Kant by asserting that the *hidden* God is "knowable" (albeit never fully comprehensible). Accepting Immanuel Kant's account of the limitations of pure reason, Barth asserts that no human epistemological criteria can provide knowledge of God since we have neither direct sensory experience of God, nor an irrefutable *a priori* conception of God's essential being. Furthermore, Barth develops a doctrine of revelation in clear contrast to natural theology, i.e., the belief that knowledge of God is available to human consciousness independent of God's actions in Jesus Christ. For Barth, God is revealed in the economy of salvation, so we can only speak about the immanent Trinity (God's being) on the basis of what is revealed in the economic Trinity (God's action). Thus, knowledge of God begins with the veiled but nonetheless objective event of revelation in Jesus Christ. To make this claim, however, is not to reduce or exhaust its mystery: "On all sides good care is thus taken to see that the *mysterium trinitatis* remains a mystery. . . . Theology means rational wrestling with the mystery. But all rational wrestling with this mystery, the more serious it is, can lead only to its fresh and authentic interpretation and manifestation as mystery" (CD I/1: 368).

In discussing the doctrine of the Trinity Barth identifies two dominant (and erroneous) positions concerning the knowledge of God which are corrected by his doctrine of revelation: (1) the aforementioned natural theology, in which God is reduced to a mere "object" of human reason; and (2) the emphasis on God's transcendence and unknowability where God is "a being which exists and remains in and for itself in its own kind and order" (CD I/1: 384). It follows, then, that Barth is critical of positions that emphasize either the immanent Trinity or the economic Trinity to the detriment of the other, since there can be no separation between the two without falling into the aforementioned errors. Interpreting the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed of 381 concerning the full deity of the Son and Spirit (while maintaining the unity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), Barth preserves the triunity of God by linking God's eternal being with God's historical revelation. I read Barth's trinitarian language as a move away from the traditional abstract language of "being" into the language of personality and ethical character—God's self-revelation is a mystery, but it is made known in Jesus's *act* of obedient self-sacrifice for others—and therefore very much rooted in personal and social transformation.

Liberation theologians share Barth's concern to preserve human freedom and criticize radically transcendent formulations of the doctrine of God. Some

feminist liberation theologians charge that traditional Trinitarian conceptions of God support patriarchal attitudes and structures that perpetuate relationships of domination. Black liberation theology denounces universal claims by traditional theology, arguing that all theology “is *interested* language and thus is always a reflection of the goals and aspirations of a particular people in a definite social setting” (Cone 1977: 36). While agreeing with Barth that theological claims can easily become ideological distortions of the Gospel, James Cone takes Barth to task for not always elucidating with sufficient clarity the political and social implications of the divine-human encounter described by Barth:

His concern for the transcendent quality of God’s presence obscured the obvious political import of his analysis, even though Barth himself never viewed his theology as separate from his political involvement in the world. . . . For to affirm that human beings are free only when that freedom is derived from divine revelation has concrete political consequences. If we are created for God, then any other allegiance is a denial of freedom, and we must struggle against those who attempt to enslave us (1977: 133-4).

Brazilian Protestant theologian Rubem Alves shares James Cone’s critique that Karl Barth—in order to preserve God’s freedom—emphasizes divine transcendence to the detriment of human ethical response:

We thus find our hope in a meta-historical reality announced by the word and tangential to the world: it does not offer the critical tools for the task of creating a new tomorrow. Humanization is a function of the right hearing of the word and not of the critical transformation of history. We should ask if this paradigm for humanization does not function as the opiate of the people! (Alves 1969: 49)

Alves evaluates the theology of Karl Barth for its possible contribution to the political project of human liberation and concludes that for Barth “transcendence does not penetrate into history but stands over against it” and is thus not conducive to liberation (1969: 46). In response to the primacy given to God’s electing grace in Barth’s theology, Alves asks the question: “What is left for [the human] to do?” Reformed theology since Barth has been concerned with preserving the integrity of God’s freedom; however, God’s free decision for human salvation also implies a human decision (albeit through the work of the

Holy Spirit) to obey God. Concerned that “docetic transcendence” in Barth’s doctrine of God results in a sense of futility over the possibility of human action, Rubem Alves frames future discussion by inquiring about humanity’s work and creativity in God’s plan for human liberation.

KARL BARTH AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY

Latin American liberation theology interprets the Scriptures from the perspective of the poor and marginalized because Christ himself *chooses* solidarity with the poor. Critics of liberation theology, however, dismiss the “preferential option for the poor” for failing to differentiate between salvation and liberation thereby reducing soteriological concerns to mere human action for liberation. In a challenging and insightful comparison of the theologies of Karl Barth and Gustavo Gutiérrez, George Hunsinger concludes that the “controlling passion of Barth’s theology can be seen as a passion to love God and fear God above all else, whereas that of Gutiérrez’s theology can be read as a passion to love one’s neighbor as oneself” (2000: 54). Hunsinger’s primary concern is with liberation theology’s tendency to define love of God almost exclusively in terms of love of neighbor while neglecting the spiritual dimensions of Christian discipleship and worship: “by failing adequately to distinguish God’s redemptive activity from liberation praxis—by tending to conflate them—doesn’t liberation theology tend to deify history or humanity?” (2000: 59) Hunsinger suggests that liberation theology be grounded in a theology of grace in order to avoid the trap of nineteenth-century liberal theology—“deifying” humanity by ignoring the radical nature of human sinfulness and “placing divine prerogatives into human hands” (*ibid.*).

While acknowledging Barth’s social justice concerns align him with liberation theologians like Gutiérrez, Hunsinger expresses concern that liberation theology’s monistic emphasis on human action for liberation “displaces the centrality that belongs to Jesus Christ alone as the Savior of the world” (2000: 59). However, anthropomonism is not the only possible error for theology. As Mark Taylor has demonstrated, theomonism is the prevalent error of Reformed theology—a tendency towards emphasizing God’s prevenient grace to such a degree that human action (in response to God’s grace) becomes superfluous. A theological method that embraces both the sovereignty of God and human praxis without separating the two seems more in keeping with Barth’s trinitarian formulations. Any theology that values humility and spiritual transformation

must be willing to accept that no *one* theology can claim to have a monopoly on the Word of God, and accordingly must develop modes of discourse that respect the plurality of voices within the Christian tradition.

John Webster characterizes Barth's dogmatics as an intrinsically *ethical* dogmatics which "consciously and consistently turns its attention to the realm of human action as a primary theme in theological reflection upon the covenant of grace" (1995: 214). Timothy Gorringe recognizes Barth as something of a proto-liberation theologian who, while asserting that only God's grace brings liberation, seeks to understand the political consequences of grace by committing himself to a radical critique of ideology (1999: 268-90). Gustavo Gutiérrez, perhaps the most influential Latin American liberation theologian, credits Karl Barth with a great sensitivity to the poor throughout his entire career—not only during his younger years as a socialist pastor (1983: 203). George Hunsinger places Barth alongside liberation theologians in condemning "capitalism as a system of disorder which the Christian community must oppose" (2000: 47). However, while Barth shares many of the same goals as Latin American liberation theologians, the influence of his theology in Latin America does not lend itself to a simple narrative.

Comparing the theologies of Karl Barth and Gustavo Gutiérrez, Hunsinger asserts that the controlling passion of Barth's theology "is to give unqualified precedence to the sovereign Word of God" whereas the controlling passion of liberation theology "is to bring liberation to the oppressed" (2000: 48). Such a broad generalization warrants further investigation, especially given Gutiérrez's more nuanced evaluation of Karl Barth's contributions to liberation theology:

The one who starts with heaven [Barth] is sensitive to those who live in the hell of this earth; whereas the one who begins with earth [Bultmann] is blind to the situation of exploitation upon which the earth is built. Many will find this paradoxical. But the paradox is only apparent. It rests ultimately on a false, but common interpretation of the categories at play here. For an authentic, deep sense of God is not only not opposed to a sensitivity to the poor and their social world, but is ultimately lived only in those persons and that world. The spiritual, as we say, is not opposed to the social. The real opposition is between bourgeois individualism and the spiritual in the spiritual sense (Gutiérrez 1983: 203).

Has Gutiérrez, like Barth, entered the strange new world in the Bible? If so, what he has discovered within is God's preferential option for the poor.

Certain themes predominate liberation theology: (1) the perspective and experience of oppressed and marginalized people is given priority in interpreting Scriptures, (2) theology is understood as critical reflection on the church's praxis, and (3) this hermeneutical method yields transforming critiques of both society and the church. While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to present a thorough comparison and contrast of the theologies of Gustavo Gutiérrez and Karl Barth, it is easily demonstrable that Barth shares common ground with Gutiérrez on these three thematic points.

While, as Gutiérrez himself points out, Barth begins theological reflection with the saving work of the transcendent God in Jesus Christ, this starting point inevitably leads him to side with the poor and powerless against the strong and powerful:

The poor, the socially and economically weak and threatened, will always be the object of its primary and particular concern, and it will always insist on the State's special responsibility for those weaker members of society. . . . The Church must stand for social justice in the political sphere. And in choosing between the various socialistic possibilities (social-liberalism? co-operativism? syndicalism? free trade? moderate or radical Marxism?) it will always choose the movement from which it can expect the greatest measure of social justice (Barth 1968: 173).

Gutiérrez defines the task of theology as "critical reflection on Christian praxis in the light of the Word" (1988: 11), while Barth defines theology as the scientific self-examination of the church's "distinctive talk about God" (CD I/1: 3). However, for Barth the church's confession includes both speech *and* act (i.e., Christian praxis):

The Church confesses God as it talks about God. It does so first by its existence in the action of each individual believer. And it does so secondly by its specific action as a fellowship, in proclamation by preaching and the administration of the sacraments, in worship, in its internal and external mission including works of love amongst the sick, the weak and those in jeopardy (ibid.).

Finally, according to Gutiérrez, we cannot hear God's Word to the church concerning the poor without coming to terms with the inadequacy of existing church and social structures to address contemporary political realities.

Gutiérrez asks, “Should the Church put its social weight behind social transformation in Latin America?” Without denying the great risk involved, he answers that “the social influence of the Church is a fact. Not to exercise this influence in favor of the oppressed of Latin America is really to exercise it against them” (Gutiérrez 1988: 76). The *Church Dogmatics* resonates with similar prophetic calls for ecclesial and social transformation. For Barth, the command of God “is self-evidently and in all circumstances a call for counter-movements on behalf of humanity and against its denial in any form, and therefore a call for the championing of the weak against every encroachment on the part of the strong” (CD III/4: 544).

Karl Barth is an attractive conversation partner for liberation theology because of a shared concern for society’s weakest members. A passage from the *Church Dogmatics* surfaces again and again in the literature of Latin American liberation theology, one which underscores Barth’s influence on liberation theology, and serves as an important resource within Reformed theology for developing a spirituality of liberation grounded in God’s preferential option for the poor:

For this reason the human righteousness required by God and established in obedience—the righteousness which according to Amos 5:24 should pour down as a mighty stream—has necessarily the character of a vindication of right in favour of the threatened innocent, the oppressed poor, widows, orphans and aliens. For this reason, in the relations and events in the life of His people, God always takes His stand unconditionally and passionately on this side and this side alone: against the lofty and on behalf of the lowly; against those who already enjoy right and privilege and on behalf of those who are denied and deprived of it. What does all this mean? It is not really to be explained by talking *in abstracto* of the political tendency and especially the forensic character of the Old Testament and the biblical message generally. It does in fact have this character and we cannot hear it and believe it without feeling a sense of responsibility in the direction indicated (CD II/1: 386).

The failure of liberal democratic developmental policies to bring relief to the “famished face of the vast majorities” created a crisis moment for Latin American Protestantism (Bonino 1997: 20). For many Protestant theologians of the 1950s and 1960s the theology of Karl Barth became a liberating force against the theologies of dependency perpetuated by North American missionary ef-

forts that spread a gospel of North American cultural hegemony. Many in Latin American saw similarities between their historical situation and that of the German Confessing Church, and by bringing together Karl Barth's "theology of crisis" with Marxist social analysis, discovered a way past the failure of liberal Protestantism.

In *Faces of Latin American Protestantism*, José Míguez Bonino provides a brief history of Latin American Protestantism in which he introduces three useful descriptive categories: the Liberal, Evangelical, and Pentecostal faces of Latin American Protestantism. Locating himself somewhere between the Liberal and Evangelical faces, Bonino describes himself in very Barthian terms: "What I truly am belongs to the grace of God. At least an *evangélico* (evangelical) is what I have always wanted to be" (1997: viii). An incident in the life of Dr. Luis N. Rivera-Pagán—the 1999-2000 Mackay professor at Princeton Theological Seminary—recounted in Bonino's book, *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation*, illustrates Barth's vital role in liberating Protestant theology from its Neocolonial roots:

A young Puerto Rican professor of theology spent some time in prison for political reasons—demonstration against U.S. military experiments in his land. As he was trying to explain to other (non-Christian) fellow prisoners how his participation in this action was anchored in his Christian faith, one of them cut him short: "Listen, your faith does not mean a thing, because you can justify your political course of action and the man who put you in prison can do the same, appealing to the same truth" (Bonino 1975: 87-8).

Bonino's reply to this objection has a decidedly Barthian flavor, "There is an absolute Christian truth . . . somehow enshrined in Scripture and/or the pronouncements of the Church. But then, there are more or less imperfect *applications* of that truth" (1975: 88).

Still, in spite of having much in common with a prominent First World theologian like Karl Barth, liberation theology has not gained universal acceptance. Its reception has generated varying degrees of criticism and acceptance, ranging from total rejection to creative appropriation. One example of creative appropriation is the work of Spanish priest, Juan José Tamayo, a First World advocate of liberation theology whose efforts at developing a European theology of liberation provide useful insights for articulating a North American spirituality of liberation. Tamayo suggests a new conscientization—a radical con-

version to the plight of those marginalized within developed societies—will advance the possibility of a First World theology of liberation:

Creo que puede hablarse—aunque con todas las cautelas—de la posibilidad y necesidad, entre nosotros, de una TL que no repita ni reproduzca la elaborada en América Latina, pero que retome y haga suyos los problemas afrontados por la TL latinoamericana en cuanto problemas que afectan a toda la humanidad, que responda de manera original y creativa a los desafíos procedentes de la cultura de la marginación del primer mundo (Tamayo 1994: 180).⁹

Liberation theology's greatest contribution is the concept of contextualization, especially its stress on the importance of social location in theological construction.¹⁰ Since Latin American liberation theology began as a popular movement among the poor masses of the Third World, it is appropriate to ask: *What would an analogous movement look like in a country where the poor are a numerical and political minority?*

TEOLOGÍA EN CONJUNTO¹¹

The “preferential option for the poor” encourages and enables the oppressed and marginalized to become acting “subjects” in human history; their experience becomes the *locus theologicus* for liberation theology. Giving preference to the experience of the marginalized “nos ayudará a dar un paso hacia adelante

⁹“I believe one can speak—although with great caution—about the possibility and necessity, among us [the First World], of a theology of liberation that does not repeat nor reproduce that elaborated in Latin America, but which adopts and appropriates the problems confronted by Latin American liberation theology insofar as these problems affect all humanity; a theology that responds creatively to the challenges originating in the marginalized cultures of the First World.”

¹⁰See Stephen B. Bevans, *Models of Contextual Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), in which the author identifies five basic models of contextualization and critiques the possibility of articulating a single “universal” theology. Also Robert J. Schreiter, *Constructing Local Theologies* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985).

¹¹A particular method of doing theology characteristic of Hispanic-American church communities whereby theologians, pastors, and lay people (often in an

en la respuesta a la pregunta por las posibilidades de una TL entre nosotros” (Tamayo 1994: 180).¹² In the Third World, large masses live in such desperate conditions that community organization in political solidarity is necessary for basic survival; in a First World context the voices of the poor are marginalized and isolated so that political organization becomes extremely difficult. Juan José Tamayo argues that a new social class has arisen in the developed and industrialized First World, which he calls the “Fourth World”—consisting of those falling through the cracks of the existing social structures and living in concentrated pockets of extreme poverty. The Fourth World is “un mundo sin sujeto. Las personas no existen; sus rostros están tan desfigurados que no parecen seres humanos, sino, como mucho, aproximaciones deformadas a lo que es un ser humano” (Tamayo 1994: 182).¹³ Before solidarity can materialize among the marginalized of the Fourth World, these nameless, faceless souls must become “subjects” of their own history. Accordingly, a North American spirituality of liberation must locate itself within the concrete situation of marginalized peoples in North America.

With varying degrees of success, oppressed and marginalized communities in the First World have established their “subjectivity,” as evidenced by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and succeeding struggles for human liberation in the United States, such as the feminist liberation movement and the struggle to unionize migrant workers. However, these advances have, at best, led to the creation of a small “ethnic” middle class while the majority of African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Native Americans continue living in the political and socioeconomic periphery. In reality, successful integration into mainstream U.S. culture often entails sacrificing ethnic and cultural identity,

ecumenical context) gather together to reflect on the beliefs and practices of the people they serve, constructing a theology that truly belongs to, and is validated by, the faith community. This movement resulted from the collaborative efforts of Latino/a theologians in professional organizations like La Comunidad of Hispanic American Scholars of Theology and Religion and the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians of the United States (ACHTUS); *teología de conjunto* was the theme of a major conference in June 1990 at Emory University sponsored by ACHTUS called *Somos un Pueblo* (We Are A People).

¹²“will help us take a step forward on the question of the possibility of a (First World) theology of liberation.”

¹³“a world without subjects. These people do not exist; their faces are so disfigured they do not appear human, instead deformed approximations of what it means to be a human being.”

and—given the nation’s continuing history of racism—this option is not always feasible for those with yellow, red, brown, or black skin.

In this context, the theological voices of U.S. Hispanics—grounded in the pioneering work of Latin American liberation theology—provide a critical corrective to the North American “melting pot” myth that glosses over racial and ethnic differences in favor of cultural assimilation. U.S. Hispanics share a common language but reflect a diversity of religious beliefs, cultural experiences, economic realities, and national backgrounds. Accordingly, over the last three decades U.S. Hispanic theologians have intentionally articulated a collaborative, ecumenical (Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, Pentecostal), and multi-cultural theology. This movement, called *teología en conjunto*, views itself as an alternative to dominant academic and ecclesial structures by modeling a manner of doing theology that belongs to the community.¹⁴ Since it springs from the social reality of an oppressed and marginalized group within North American culture, *teología en conjunto* embraces liberation theology in developing a prophetic critique of the dominant culture: “this is a voice with a clear sense of mission: to serve as a reminder that no one culture represents the sole and superior embodiment of the Christian tradition and to affirm the richness that cultural diversity represents for church and academy alike” (Segovia 1996: 16).

Local or contextual theologies are often criticized for their inability to develop trans-contextual critiques. Do they merely reflect the community’s self-affirmation, or do they offer a theological critique capable of bringing conscientization to all (or many) church communities? Critical engagement with classical theological traditions will further acceptance of U.S. Hispanic theologies as authentic articulations of the catholic Christian tradition and, continuing to make inroads in the church and the academy, will bring the concerns

¹⁴See the collection of essays edited by Orlando Espín and Miguel H. Díaz, *From the Heart of Our People: Latino/a Explorations in Catholic Systematic Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999); also José David Rodríguez and Loida I. Martell-Otero, *Teología en Conjunto: A Collaborative Hispanic Protestant Theology* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997); and *Hispanic/Latino Theology*, ed. Ada María Isasi-Díaz and Fernando F. Segovia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996). U.S. Hispanic theology, as a distinct theological voice in North America, is still in its nascent stages but these essays display the wealth of its creativity and insight. Most recently, Eduardo C. Fernández has published a history and analysis of U.S. Hispanic theologies entitled *La Cosecha: Harvesting Con-*

of liberationists to the forefront of theological discourse. However, a reexamination of the beliefs and practices of the Hispanic church is also needed that connects Latino/a sociopolitical struggles with those of other marginalized groups within the United States. The possibility of a North American theology of liberation depends upon the conscientization of the church in solidarity with marginalized voices against hegemonic powers that deny full subjectivity to the “invisible” Fourth World in our midst (as identified by Tamayo).

As a Hispanic-American minister in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) I have worked to nurture such conscientization by supporting increased denominational efforts in racial-ethnic church development, antiracism education, peace-making, and homeless advocacy. Such efforts are vital for the Presbyterian church because, like all mainline denominations, it faces a dual challenge: (1) the continuing decline in church membership, and (2) the task of evangelizing a society characterized by increased cultural and racial diversity. Recent studies like *The Presbyterian Presence: The Twentieth-Century Experience*, a multivolume examination of American Presbyterianism, and *Claiming the Center: Churches and Conflicting Worldviews*, attribute the present crisis within Presbyterianism to the church’s failure in adapting to this pluralist and multicultural reality.

Yet, in spite of such efforts, the lack of racial-ethnic diversity in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) is appalling for ethnic minorities comprise only 6.8% of the denomination, especially when considering recent demographic shifts in the United States (Sniffen 1998: 5). While most Hispanics come from Roman Catholic backgrounds, recent research suggests that 25-33% of U.S. Hispanics identify themselves as Protestant. The fastest growing minority population, Hispanic Americans, now represent an estimated 11.8% of the general population¹⁵ but only a mere 0.9% of Presbyterians.¹⁶ Unfortunately, attempts at integration by mainline Protestantism have often marginalized Hispanic (and

temporary United States Hispanic Theology (1972-1998) (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2000).

¹⁵ “Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term Projection to June 1, 2000,” U.S. Census Bureau, June 1, 2000. <http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/nation3.html>

¹⁶ Deborah A. Bruce, “Racial-Ethnic Members of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),” Research Services data, A Ministry of the General Assembly Council,

other minority) theological perspectives. A cautionary note from Justo L. González is in order:

The new theology, being done by those who are aware of their traditional voicelessness, is acutely aware of the manner in which the dominant is confused with the universal. North Atlantic male theology is taken to be basic, normative, universal theology, to which then women, other minorities, and people from the younger churches may add their footnotes. What is said in Manila is very relevant for the Philippines. What is said in Tübingen, Oxford, or Yale is relevant for the entire church (1990: 52).

Until those who are voiceless are empowered to speak—until they are allowed to develop their own subjectivity—the dominant perspective will be erroneously assumed to be universal.

As Mark Taylor suggests, prophetic voices might arise within the mainstream church but they rarely lead to systemic change. Still, he commends the Reformed tradition's commitment to social transformation, while warning against its potentially "world-repressive" tendencies, often manifested as a "recurrent triumphalism." The church's role as "midwife"—aiding the quickening to subjectivity of these silenced perspectives—begins with the liberation of its own theology. Daniel Migliore, in discussing the evolution of Karl Barth's teachings on baptism, underscores the importance of *always* remaining open to new reconstructions of Christian doctrine (especially when tradition impinges upon God-given freedom), for "only a theology liberated again and again from captivities in its own patterns of thought and practice will be able to contribute to the liberating and renewing mission of the church in the world" (Migliore 1999: 494).

Spirituality has always been a vital concern in the works of liberationists like Gustavo Gutiérrez, Jon Sobrino, and Ignacio Ellacuría, yet liberation theology continues to defend itself from accusations that commitment to historical liberation is a politicization of the Gospel that neglects spirituality. As far back as 1971 Gutiérrez sought to ground historical liberation in an evangelical spirituality, but the stereotype persists—in great part because many critics have equated liberation theology with nineteenth-century liberal theology. Libera-

tion theology affirms both the transcendence and immanence of God, so care must be taken not to confuse liberation theology's "preferential option" with Schleiermacher's "turn to the subject." While it appears both methods privilege subjective experience, liberal theology (as exemplified by Schleiermacher) grounds knowledge of God in human consciousness whereas liberation theology grounds knowledge of God in the radical transformation of the self enacted by grace. In fact, only God's grace produces the spiritual "conversion to the neighbor" that makes liberation a historical possibility in the first place.

Still, the well-founded fear remains that liberation theology, by linking its spirituality to particular political agendas, devalues the eschatological dimension of salvation. However, granting that "it is God who absolutely precedes and humanity which can only follow" (CD IV/3.1: 63), need not negate human agency in God's plan for salvation and liberation. Clodovis Boff responds to this criticism by insisting that theology should always strive to maintain the tension between liberation and salvation: "Even when theology is done on behalf of the poor, all dimensions of faith must always be addressed: personal, social, and eschatological. Christianity is not only social *transformation*, it is individual *conversion*, and it is *resurrection* of the dead, as well" (Boff 1993: 66).

Gustavo Gutiérrez never limits spirituality to a specific political ideology. Rather, he evaluates a spirituality's authenticity by its ability to integrate worship and prayer with social and public responsibility. Far from "politicizing" spirituality, Gutiérrez continues a long spiritual tradition within Western Christendom that seeks to balance contemplation with action (specifically Ignatian spirituality), emphasizing the communal nature of the life of discipleship. *We Drink From Our Own Wells* is an insightful addition to the canon of Western spiritual theology which, with the proper contextualization, can serve as a road-map for articulating a North American Reformed spirituality of liberation that accepts prevenient grace without neglecting human action. Especially useful is the author's discussion of the five marks of the spiritual journey: *conversion*, *gratuitousness*, *joy*, *spiritual childhood*, and *community*.

Conversion is initiated by God and is experienced as a radical break with the past and the beginning of a new life. *Gratuitousness* is the awareness that God's gracious love is the source of all things, that our own ability to love flows from God, and that our way to God is also our way to the neighbor. *Joy* is the realization that through the death and resurrection of Christ God has defeated suffering, sin, oppression, and death. Gutiérrez does not minimize the reality of human suffering in describing the profound joy that comes with martyrdom:

The opposite of joy is not suffering, but sadness . . . This joy is not easily attained but it is real. It is not the superficial kind of rejoicing that springs from unawareness or resignation, but the joy born of the conviction that unjust mistreatment and suffering will be overcome. This is a paschal joy proper to a time of martyrdom.

The believing poor have never lost their capacity for having a good time and celebrating, despite the harsh conditions in which they live: today this capacity is being expanded by hope. The result of this for the Christian groups most committed to the suffering and oppressed poor is a deeper understanding of what it means to live the Easter message (1984: 115).

By *spiritual childhood* Gutiérrez means the humility that comes from being poor in spirit—"the ready disposition of one who hopes for everything from the Lord (1984: 127). Last comes *community*, which is the intentional choice by the convert to live in solidarity with the poor, an indispensable component of liberation spirituality.

The question remains, however, if liberation spirituality shares so much in common with more traditional articulations of Christian spirituality, why is there so much resistance to it? Is it, as suggested by Juan José Tamayo, because First World Christianity is irrevocably implicated in existing patterns of economic and political domination? Or perhaps it is the case that certain theological perspectives dominate mainline Protestantism which give rise to a highly privatized and politically impotent spirituality? If we reject the former explanation we must confront the obstacles posed by the latter. Exegeting the parable of the good Samaritan, Gustavo Gutiérrez provides valuable advice for developing a liberative spirituality. It is by going out of his way, by taking a personal risk, and by sacrificing his own wealth and comfort that the Samaritan acts as a neighbor to the injured man:

The neighbor was the Samaritan who *approached* the wounded man and *made him his neighbor*. The neighbor, as has been said, is not the one whom I find in my path, but rather the one in whose path I place myself, the one whom I approach and actively seek (Gutiérrez 1988: 113).

In developing a Reformed spirituality of liberation we must seek genuine discourse with previously silenced or marginalized theological perspectives and also possess the humility to allow these voices to serve as correctives for oppressive tendencies in our tradition.

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Synkrinesis as Following in Faith: Interpretation for a Kerygmatic Homiletic

TIMOTHY MATTHEW SLEMMONS

INTRODUCTION

THIS ESSAY SEEKS TO DISCERN A PARTICULAR MODE OF BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION for kerygmatic preaching which is evident to a degree in each of two general hermeneutical commitments, namely, the commitment to *intratextuality* and the commitment to *intertextuality*. Though considered divergent, these two commitments, traditionally termed Yale School and Chicago School hermeneutics, share at least one thing in common: a determination to depart from traditional propositionalist modes of interpretation.

In order to identify the most promising aspect of the former (Yale) commitment, Part One will briefly survey the expressions of the interpretive approach to the biblical narrative which adheres to the limits of canon. This hermeneutical approach is what I understand by the terms *intratextuality* and *intracanonicity* as they figure in George Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic" model of the nature of doctrine and in the writings of Lindbeck's like-minded contemporaries. It is not ultimately an attempt to mine and convey meaning out of the text. Rather, it seeks to convey the faithful as a community into the alternative, narrative reality of the Word of God, which reality appears, to employ a popular figure, "in front of the text." Part One will proceed in a manner informed by the hermeneutical principles advanced in this vein, to which end the internal logic of Deuteronomy 8 will serve as a rough kerygmatic guide. While space

does not permit the much needed critical examination of the regulative function which Yale attributes to the faith community in matters of interpretation, this essay *does* advocate faithfully entering and remaining within the Reformed canon, particularly as this loyalty takes the form of faithfulness to the biblical idiom. The interpretive benefits of this faithfulness are what I hope to demonstrate in Part Two.

Specifically, Part Two will seek to identify the “spiritual logic” by which biblical metaphor undergoes numerous transformations, exhibiting the vitality which is peculiar to *intertextuality*. Toward this end, I will venture an *intertextual* consideration of the much-discussed Parable of the Sower (Mk 4) in comparison with literary readings of the same by John Dominic Crossan, Frank Kermode, and Paul Ricoeur. While intertextuality has a wide variety of meanings, from the general sense in which any text can speak to any text, to a more specific form, say, the conversation between the Bible and secular literature, this essay is exclusively interested in the conversation between biblical texts and other biblical texts. Among the three readings which we will critique, Ricoeur’s “restricted intertextuality” appears to represent a rare instance in which a representative of the Chicago School offers a reading according to the restrictions advocated by Yale, insofar as it fully respects the prior commitment to remain within the strictures of the canon. This instance, I will argue, offers an example of how faithful attention to the conversation between various biblical texts places the interpreter in the best position to discover the spiritual logic, the life of the text, so to speak, and provokes interpretation which is most faithful to the preacher’s task of proclamation.

The spiritually logical interpretation which I seek to identify for preaching, in Part Two, I will term: *synkrinesis*. By virtue of the biblical context in which it is described in verbal form (1Cor 2:1-14), I suggest that *synkrinesis* be defined by (1) its essential faith commitment, (2) its essentially *kerygmatic* purpose, (3) its generativity of meaning, and (4) its qualitative difference from hermeneutics of both biblicist and syncretistic orientations. It is a type of logic which is *spiritual* in the sense that all speech “about the spiritual is essentially metaphorical [*overført*, carried over] speech,” that is, carried over from the mundane, sensate domain of meaning into the domain in which spiritually awakened discernment is operative while nevertheless continuing to use the same words (Kierkegaard 1995:209). It is *logical* in the sense that biblical metaphors can change while their spiritual meaning remains the same, that is, they retain the synonymous, associative ability to function in a revelatory manner which is unique to the biblical setting. *Synkrinesis* describes the metaphorical *vitality*

which results from restricting the practice of *intertextuality* to the bounds of the canon, indeed, by demonstrating that this vitality corresponds to the “spiritual logic” which is unique to scriptural interpretation as it is understood, even *fideistically*, in the service of proclamation. By its very nature, I will argue, this “spiritual logic” demands to be followed faithfully rather than curtailed or dissipated outside the canon.

PART ONE: INTRATEXTUAL LOYALTY

Faithful to the Word That Does Not Fail

This entire commandment that I command you today you must diligently observe, so that you may live and increase, and go in and occupy the land that the LORD promised on oath to your ancestors. *Remember the long way that the LORD your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, in order to humble you*, testing you to know what was in your heart, whether or not you would keep his commandments. *He humbled you by letting you hunger, . . . then by feeding you with manna . . . in order to make you understand* that one does not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth of the LORD (Deut 8:1-3).

Deuteronomy 8:1-3 recalls a deliberate and calculated deprivation imposed by Yahweh on the people of Israel as they sojourned in the wilderness of the Sinai. These verses refer to a process of humbling and testing, so that the LORD might know what was in their (collective and singular) *heart* (v. 2). Food and water, the most basic necessities for life, were put at stake in order to draw the people closer to the true and eternal nourishment of the Word of God, by which (or Whom) manna falls from heaven and water springs from desert rocks. The pericope continues with reference to a testing of the people’s trust in, fear of, and loyalty to God. The imperative is to walk in the ways of the LORD, to keep God’s commandments, and to know “that as a parent disciplines a child so the LORD your God disciplines you” (Deut 8:4-6).

George Lindbeck (1984) has called for a hermeneutic of interpretive faithfulness. Lindbeck is concerned that certain unquestioned assumptions have led to the prevailing psychosocial and expressivist methods of reading communally normative texts, and theologians have thereby, in Deuteronomical terms, neglected to keep or *keep to* God’s commandments. In short, we have

wandered from the (narrative) ways of God, wandered from the way of reading the Bible (i.e. the commandments) from within the narrative itself. In doing so, we have lost touch with God's providential benefits: manna from heaven, streams in the desert, every word that comes from the mouth of God. We were to immerse ourselves in the Word of God, to "diligently observe" the LORD's entire commandment, to "live and increase, and go in and occupy the land", and instead the mainline Church finds itself high and dry, its numbers diminished, its body dying, unable to identify the strange land in which it is lost and languishing (Brueggemann 1997:1-14). "Whether it will be possible to regain a specifically biblical understanding of providence depends in part on the possibility of theologically reading Scripture once again in literary rather than non-literary ways" (Lindbeck 1984:119). What Lindbeck terms "intratextuality" is an act of faithfulness. Intratextuality begins with loyalty to a particular canon, but is also inescapably literary in its hermeneutical mien.¹ According to Lindbeck, the legacy of liberal hermeneutics is that typology

collapsed under the combined onslaughts of rationalistic, pietistic, and historical critical developments. ... The primarily literary approaches of the past with their affinities to informal ways of reading the classics in their own terms were replaced by fundamentalist, historical-critical, and expressivist preoccupations with facticity or experience. The intratextual meanings of Scripture continue informally to shape the imagination of the West ... but theologians do not make these meanings methodologically primary (119).

Lindbeck credits the work of Hans Frei with shaping his understanding of the present interpretive milieu. Frei, for his part, traces the break down of the normativity of "literal-realistic" and "figurative" (typological) means of interpretation and their succession by historical criticism and biblical theology, respectively, over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1974). Frei identifies the increasing tendency of interpreters of this period to ignore what the biblical narrative claims on its own terms (attention to which is an essentially literary discipline) and to seek instead a meaning behind, beneath, or otherwise apart from the text itself (8-9). For Lindbeck, as well as Frei, however, literary context is not merely an essential interpretive consideration, but quite

¹For the purposes of this paper, I will use the terms *intratextual* and *intracanonical* interchangeably.

literally the world in which faithful interpretation is done. "Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text" (Lindbeck 1984:118). Intratextuality renders interpretation an essentially "positional" rather than a propositional task. *Where* is the interpreter in the act of encountering the narrative: in the literary world of scripture looking out, or outside the text looking in?

One might employ Lindbeck's recommended "cultural-linguistic" model of doctrinal discourse, for example, to one problem that has been particularly pertinent to the topic of biblical hermeneutics *ergo* to preaching. The doctrine of scriptural inerrancy, as popularly understood, asserts that Scripture, when considered objectively, contains no errors or mistakes, a view that historical criticism has shown to be utterly simplistic. Viewed from *within* the narrative world of the Biblical text, however, taken on its own terms, one discerns the true meaning of the doctrine of scriptural inerrancy: it is not that "scripture" as object, viewed from without, contains no discrepancies, but that, by living thoroughly *within* the framework of the biblical narrative, "Scripture" will not fail the faithful one, that is, will not let him or her down. The question is who fails whom? Does the Bible fail the interpreter or does the interpreter fail the Bible?² All of this begs the question: What is involved in the process of "entering" the narrative world of the biblical text?

"Taken In" - The Transportation of the Faithful

The question is one of appropriation, what Lindbeck terms *interiorization* of the communal narrative. Lindbeck's choice of the term, however, works against him. Interiorization implies that the narrative is to be appropriated or taken into the lives of the individual and the narrative-based community. But, as has already been suggested, the metaphor of interiorization, stated as such, views things the wrong way around. Israel does not mysteriously take the promised land into themselves or transport its wealth and fertility to some prior place called "home." The Israel of the Torah is literally homeless. Their test is to be led into and interiorized by the land of promise.

²Lindbeck himself applies this cultural-linguistic model to other difficult doctrines, including that of papal infallibility (91-104, esp. 98-104).

“For the LORD your God is *bringing you into* a good land, . . . a land where you may eat bread without scarcity, where you will lack nothing . . . You shall eat your fill and bless the LORD your God for the good land that he has given you” (Deut 8:7-10). Likewise, those who are to appropriate or interiorize the biblical narrative do not so much take scripture’s meaning and apply it to their lives. Rather, they are to allow themselves to be taken into the world of Scriptural reality.

Frei contends that the development of the dominant hermeneutic of experiential induction is the product of over three centuries of disintegrative liberal theology, “the seeds of (which) disintegration” were sown in the seventeenth century (4). Those who have advocated Frei’s “postliberal” agenda refer to this disintegration as the “great reversal” (Campbell 1997:165). Clearly such dominant paradigms do not shift overnight. Neither are counter-reversals to be undertaken lightly. If a righting of hermeneutical perspective is warranted, can Yale expect those who are plunged into the narrative world of the Bible *not* to give expression in experiential terms? How do we discern between the knight of faith and the Epicurean? The issue is the old one of the hermeneutical circle, the question of where, or indeed, *whether* one begins.

George Stroup has described the process as a “collision” of personal narrative with the witness of scripture, which collision forces a reinterpretation of one’s prior chronicle through the lens of the Christian narrative. For Stroup, the Word of God “refers to those moments in which Christian narrative becomes disclosive, those moments when Christian narrative ceases to be merely an object for historical curiosity, when its horizon collides with that of the reader and hearer, when the process of understanding commences, and acknowledgement, recognition, and confession become a possibility, when the human words of Christian narrative witness to Jesus Christ” (241). Stroup’s metaphor of collision is apt, because it implies a process of disorientation and reorientation, an inevitable consequence of shifting interpretive paradigms. Stroup, writing after Frei and before Lindbeck, also calls for a radical repositioning of the reader/interpreter.

Stanley Hauerwas is concerned neither with the “collision” of narratives nor even with teaching the communal language of the Biblical narrative to initiates. He is interested in the effect of that narrative on characters formed within a “story-formed community” which remains “open to the stranger” (Hauerwas 1981:26). While Hauerwas and William Willimon (1992) hail the development of “peculiar speech” within the faith community, they have largely skirted the phenomenon of narrative “collision” by advocating a “resident alien” model for

the Christian community, in which the “primary social task of the church is to be itself” (10).³ This necessitates a willingness on the part of the church to be “content to live ‘out of control’” (11). For Hauerwas, appropriation is neither a matter of proselytizing nor collision, but simply a matter of leaving the door open and the light on for those who would enter by whatever means.

Walter Brueggemann (12) has cautiously offered the metaphor of the church in a modern “circumstance of exile” and suggests that “every man, woman, and child (be) invited to a zone of freedom that the dominant culture cannot erode.” Brueggemann also denies that this “faith model” can be seen as a “sectarian withdrawal” (13), dismisses similar accusations of withdrawal which have been directed at Hauerwas and Willimon.

Charles L. Campbell (44) has understood Frei as attempting to reclaim (1) the descriptive aim of theology (as opposed to the apologetic), (2) an ascriptive, Christocentric content, and (3) a “faith seeking understanding” model of biblical hermeneutics. In summarizing Frei’s “alternative to liberalism,” Campbell points back beyond Frei and Karl Barth to the towering figure of Anselm (51), who began Chapter I of his *Proslogion* with a remarkable string of imperatives, and who turns and returns, in nearly every subsequent chapter, to the God whose existence is beyond all doubt. Oddly enough, however, Anselm, with whom so many contemporary commentators find a home, actually begins by *urging* a form of retreat or withdrawal from the world, albeit a temporary one, and into contemplation of and conversation with God.

Up now, slight man! flee, for a little while, thy occupations; hide thyself, for a time, from thy disturbing thoughts. Cast aside, now, thy burdensome cares, and put away thy toilsome business. Yield room for some little time to God; and rest for a little time in him. Enter the inner chamber of thy mind; shut out all thoughts save that of God, and such as can aid thee in seeking him; close thy door and seek him. Speak now, my whole heart! speak now to God, saying, I seek thy face; thy face, Lord, will I seek (Ps 27:8) (49).

Without advocating a wholesale espousal of the Yale School program, with its over-emphasis on communally-regulated interpretation and socialization,

³Hauerwas continues, “The fact that the first task of the church is to be itself is not a rejection of the world or a withdrawal ethic, but a reminder that Christians must serve the world on their own terms.”

I offer this survey of its articulations of the need for a faith commitment to the biblical canon by way of stating that preaching must recognize such a commitment to canonical loyalty as an essential and an essentially *fideistic* move. To offer an apologetic argument for doing so would go directly counter to this claim. "The Church can only confirm or establish (the Canon) as something which has already been formed and given. And it can do so only to the best of its knowledge and judgment, *in the venture and obedience of faith*, but also in all the relativity of a human knowledge of the truth which God has opened up to (humanity)" (Barth 1956:473; italics mine). Despite its possible flaws, the value of the postliberal contribution, as I understand it, is its urging that this "venture and obedience" be made *in faith*. It understands that the promise of faithful interpretation is quickly dissipated when preachers engage the text strictly objectively, as one text among many.

We began this brief survey of how those associated with Yale School hermeneutics have expressed the importance of intracanonial faithfulness. According to this view, theological hermeneutics has been overly concerned with the ways in which one "interiorizes" scripture or "takes it in." Rather, the faithful are "taken in," neither deceptively nor passively, but in the sense of being escorted, ushered, conveyed into a vast, freely-imagined, alternative realm which delivers on the biblical promise of a radically different reality. We have noted that this vein of narrative appropriation claims affinities with Anselm's principle of "faith seeking understanding," that is, the sense in which one gains the interior, so to speak, by faith, a movement which is rewarded by a process of discovery. The metaphors used to express this movement are myriad, varying in voice from the violent activity of collision (Stroup) to the open passivity of being (Hauerwas) with invitation into a "zone of freedom" (Brueggemann) staking out the middle ground. We might reasonably conclude that the full range of voices and moods, from the vocative to the evocative, from the ascriptive to the descriptive, remain at the preacher's disposal in the essentially metaphorical task of preaching, *particularly* as it adheres to the strictures of the canon.

Manifest in each of these approaches is the fact that metaphor, as "carried over" speech, is operative in the second-order language of rules of doctrine (Lindbeck), in the first-order language of testimony (the *Credo*), and at the ground zero of the Bible (Frei). *Metaphor* literally means *transport* or *conveyance*, and where faithfulness to intracanonial loyalty is ventured in the interpretive enterprise, metaphor, in a certain sense, draws the interpreter, the preacher, and the hearer into the interior.

I have suggested a comparison between the *intratextual* imperative and the ways in which the Deuteronomist urged Israel to keep the commandments once they had crossed over *into* the promised land of Canaan. I have distinguished between, on the one hand, the sense in which the faithful are conveyed into the biblical world, and on the other hand, the ways in which meaning is discovered therein. The latter occurs, I would argue, only once the requisite entry is made *in faith*. But when and *only* when this faith-move is made, something happens to the biblical metaphors themselves, something that I suggest is *not hermeneutically*, but *spiritually* discerned (1Cor 2:12-16), precisely by virtue of faith. In other words, biblical metaphor conforms to a “spiritual logic,” which I will term *synkrinesis*. We will now venture a reading that seeks to avail itself of the vitality that emerges, the spiritual logic with which biblical metaphor behaves, when it is followed in faith with the canonical strictures.

PART TWO: INTERTEXTUAL VITALITY

Extending the Extended Metaphor: Proclamation as an Association of the Living Word

If we give the intracanonial commitment of Yale School hermeneutics its due, that is, if preaching is to remain faithfully within the bounds of the canon, how is biblical metaphor experienced within this Scriptural world? The interpretive enterprise as broached from the perspective of human experience traces its modern roots back to Schleiermacher through the so-called Chicago School (Ricouer 1991:53-74; Jeanrond 1991:44-78), commonly seen in tension with Yale School postliberalism and its forebear, neo-orthodoxy. Both schools, however, demand attention to metaphorical and literary concerns. To the extent that postliberalism has employed the full range of metaphors to urge conveyance into the text and loyalty to the biblical idiom, we must expect that those who undergo such a conveyance will seek to express their experiences (Frei 1992:30-34). Preaching must attend to how biblical metaphor behaves within the canon beyond its capacity to simply “build character” (Hauerwas) according to communally regulated interpretive norms (Lindbeck). Faithful preaching need not be content with socialization alone, but has every right and reason to hope for human transformation by “the logic of the spirit” (Loder 1998).

Therefore, we will now venture a reading of the one distinctive form of biblical metaphor, namely, the parable (often described as an “extended metaphor”), which has thoroughly occupied the New Hermeneutic and those of the “experiential-expressivist” perspective, that is, those with affinities to the Chicago School. Our investigation will focus on that which Jesus himself declares the master key to understanding *all* parables, the Parable of the Sower. “Do you not understand this parable? Then how will you understand all the parables?” (Mk 4:13) Following this section, in which I offer some preliminary exegetical observations, I will briefly summarize and critique three other readings of this parable by John Dominic Crossan, Frank Kermode, and Paul Ricoeur, noting where each critic diverges from the simultaneous commitment to intracanonical loyalty and intertextual vitality. Ricoeur’s reading is unique among the three as he alone adheres to this double commitment by means of what he calls “restricted intertextuality.” We shall see, however, that he does so by virtue of adopting precisely the restriction which Lindbeck has called for.

According to Ricoeur, Mk 4:13 indicates how his “semiotic analysis differs from historical-critical exegesis, which deliberately severs the explication that follows the parable from the parabolic narrative properly speaking, with the idea of isolating an original kernel that eventually would constitute the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus and risks ascribing the added explication to the redactors” and the ecclesial community from which they stem (Ricoeur 1995:144-166).⁴ Methodologically speaking, it is *precisely* such a severance that our reading seeks to avoid. Ricoeur limits himself in his essay to considering the first of what he sees as three ways in which intertextuality “dynamizes the text, makes meaning move, and gives rise to extensions and transgressions” and “makes the text work” (148). His first step involves dealing strictly with parables. While we will focus on the same parable, we will be operating on what he calls the “higher” levels at which “restricted intertextuality” “invites the reader to continue, on his or her own account, the Bible’s itineraries of meaning” (148-9).

⁴Ricoeur’s essay originally appeared in *The Bible as a Document of the University* (!), ed. Hans Dieter Betz (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 41-75. Issued in part as a corrective to his now classic book-length article, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” in *Semeia* 4 (1975:29-148), Ricoeur, confesses to having previously overlooked “that the narrative-parables are narratives within a narrative, more precisely narratives recounted by the principal personage of an encompassing narrative.” He credits Ivan Almeida, *L’Opérativité sémantique des récits paraboles: Sémiotique narrative et textuelle: Herméneutique du discours religieux* (Louvain: Peeters, 1978), with alerting him to the fact that “the structure embedding one narrative in another narra-

The first step in our exegesis of this parable is to claim the “intertextual” license which allows us to trace it back to its literary, if not necessarily its historical, roots in Mk 4. We do this despite the historical likelihood that the prologue of the Gospel of John is primarily responsible for the later development of a Christology of the Word. In short, we allow Mark and John to inform each other. The question of whether Johannine sources reflect a dependence upon, or an independent yet harmonious, affinity with Mark does not hinder us. We simply name their literary associations, noting among other things, that at the center of Mk 4, which is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the word, there stands the image of a light which will not be hidden under a bushel basket (4:21-22; cf. Jn 1:4-9). Do we need John’s prologue to identify Jesus with the *logos*? The question itself only leads back into the increasingly barren exercise of severing the connecting tissue in the body of scripture. We posit neither an autonomy of sources nor a priority of one over another, but we make full use of our intertextual freedom within the zone of intracanonicity, working for a harvest of meaning which grows we “know not how” (Mk 4:27), but which promises to bear the full head of grain (2:23ff; 4:28). This too is an unapologetically *fideistic* move by which we do not terminate the metaphor’s extension prematurely in the name of historical-critical demands. The interpreter comes to the text as a believer, expressing not only a *credo* of canonical loyalty, but faithful attention and dogged perseverance.

Thus the full freight of John’s prologue informs that of Mark, which begins with proclamation. The proclamation is the good news concerning, belonging to, and issued by Jesus. Mark’s string of genitives permits the broadest possible interpretation, inclusive of genitive aim, relation, and departure (1:1). The word written by the prophet, the message sent by the messenger (1:2), the voice calling in the wilderness (1:3), all deal with *proclamation*. John appears “proclaiming a baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins” (1:4); he proclaims that one more powerful than he is coming (1:7); and finally, Jesus himself comes

tive is the fundamental framework for metaphorical transfer guided by the enigma-expression ‘kingdom of God.’” Mk 4:13 functions as part of such a structure. Ricouer identifies “two errors to avoid in the interpretation of a narrative-parable: first, to consider only the primary narrative, neglecting its anchorage in another narrative; ... Second, to reduce the parable to the speech-act of the personage whose story is recounted in the accompanying narrative without taking into account the transforming action exercised by the primary narrative on the encompassing narrative.”

preaching (1:14-15). Mark's emphasis on the centrality and continuity of the proclamation is such that the preaching of Jesus is introduced in the same verse as the report of John's arrest. It is a relatively short verse to contain two such momentous events, yet compact enough to permit no lull in the preaching!

The opening chapter of Mark is so dominated by the activity of preaching (*kherussein*) (1:4, 7, 14, 38, 39, 45), that the development of this central theme in the early chapters of this gospel warrants the sustained attention of all who are called to preach. Especially important is the development which arises after Jesus' commissioning of the twelve (3:14), the development in which Jesus associates the content of the preaching, the word (*logos*) (2:2; 4:14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 33), with what is sown (*speirein*) (4:3, 4, 14, 31, 32). Oddly enough, the word *kherussein* does not appear in Mk 4 at all, which is nevertheless its dominant theme. It is *only* by means of Jesus' association of the word with the seed, *ergo* with the content of the proclamation, that we can begin to faithfully *follow* his logic with a view to preaching. The association of the word with the seed and the untruncated extension of this metaphor will drive us to the heart of the eucharist and the sense in which the sacrament itself is a proclamation by those gathered in their association with the word (1Cor 11:26).⁵ All of this begins, however, with this germinal association (4:13), which refuses reduction to a one-to-one correspondence that is often routinely dismissed as allegorical.

In light of Mk 4:13, the Parable of the Sower is clearly the initial and definitive parable of parables. Introductory in nature, thoroughly conscious of itself, its subject is parable itself, the guise of the word. Furthermore, Jesus' explanation of the parable (4:13-20) is a veritable sermon about sermons, containing a remarkable string of seven occurrences of *logos* in as many verses and portraying preaching as a scattering, a dissemination. The desired result, an abundant yield, requires the death of the word like the "death" of a seed, if the metaphor is to be fully spent. But parable simultaneously makes the word impenetrable to some and plain to others. A veil still covers the potentially fertile ground, the minds (2Cor 3:14) of those whose "mental hearts" are yet uncircumcised (Deut 10:16; 30:6; Rom 2:29). Parable preserves a primal confusion, but lays bare the hearts of those in whom the word is dying to live, so to speak.

Mk 4:12 prepares the ground for parabolic preaching with an explanation of all parables by alluding to the call of the prophet Isaiah. This association in

⁵It is worth recalling Barth's definition of proclamation as including both preaching and the sacraments (1975:58).

turn confronts the preacher with (1) the holy presence of God (Is 6:1-4); (2) with the unclean lips of the prophet and the people (6:5-7); (3) the total breakdown of sensory perception and comprehension (6:9-10); and (4) the stump, the holy seed (6:13), which Jesus associates with the word, and which the *intertextual*, *intracanonial* (Christian) interpreter associates with Jesus. The sower sows the *logos*, Jesus explains. Jesus is the *logos*, says John. Yet it must be remembered that this parable, though it be the first in Mark, is offered and explained only *after* the initial commissioning of the disciples to preach (Mk 3:14). Clearly the preacher is *also* commissioned to sow, and in a sense, be sown, not as a substitute for or a supplanting of the content of the message, the *logos*, but as an associate of and witness to Jesus, seeking to fulfill a co-mission, indeed, to travel the same itinerary as Jesus: the word, the gospel, the preaching, the *kerygma*.

The Parable of the Sower calls the preacher to accompany the word to the scene of his or her own critical death, which becomes the locus of revelation: "No, the word is very near to you" (Deut 30:14). Is parable itself an active agent? Only if John is not silenced, who tells us that Jesus is the *logos*; only if Jesus' association of the seed with the word in Mark is *taken on faith*, if we "follow" his spiritual logic; only if Jesus the Word is allowed to become Jesus the Parable without diminishing his paradoxical divine and human personhood.

Crossan's Dark Epilogue: "The Parabler Becomes the Parable"

John Dominic Crossan's seminal work, *The Dark Interval*, subtitled *Towards a Theology of Story*, ends with a hasty epilogue in which he too alludes to Jesus "the parabler" becoming "the Parable" of the primitive church. Crossan's project, however, takes an unanticipated poetic turn when the time comes to draw some helpful conclusions from his study, especially where it impinges on the role of the preacher.

After the promising observation that "the parabler" becomes "the Parable," Crossan identifies (all in the space of less than two pages) "Jesus as the Christ, the Parable of God" (102), "the Cross itself" as "the Great Parable of God," and the risen Jesus as "the Parable." In addition, he also cites Paul identifying "Christ crucified" (1 Cor 1:21) as the content (*kerygma*) of their preaching (*kherussomen*). What or who exactly is this "Parable"? The crucified Jesus? Not quite. Crossan says, "Jesus dies as parabler," but "rose as Parable." How then, if the risen Jesus is "the Parable," can he say "the Cross itself was not the rejection

but was itself the great Parable of God”? (103) Unfortunately, Crossan ends by blurring the distinctions between the (1) the mortal Jesus, (2) the cross on which he died, (3) the tomb in which he was buried and which he later vacated, and (4) the risen Christ, combining them into one sublime “Parable.” But let us follow Crossan’s reading and seek to identify precisely where his reading departs from what I call “spiritual logic.”

The basis for Crossan’s epilogue is unquestionably the Parable of the Sower (Mk 4:1-20; Mt 13:1-23; Lk 8:1-15). Nevertheless, Crossan does not engage this “Parable of Parables” in *The Dark Interval*, presumably due to his having done so previously in *Cliffs of Fall* some eight years earlier. The parable itself, however, which is endlessly reflecting on itself, is not one that yields much at a single hearing. Rather, it demands a process of continual return. Crossan distinguishes it as a “mirror rather than a window parable” (1980:54). The narcissistic *ego* cannot get beyond it. Neither should one try to, says Jesus, as a segue to his explanation, until one “knows” this parable (he uses both *oida* and *ginosko* in Mk 4:13). For unless we equate the various soil types with people who *consistently* respond with the same receptivity (or lack of it) every time, the parable is about multiple hearings, many Sundays in the pew, perhaps. Experientially, one *is* each of the soil types at various times, or perhaps simultaneously. One must therefore return to this “metaparable” (50) again and again, not because one should hope to “get it” finally, but because the more often one attends to it, the more frequently one’s “good soil” receives the sower’s seed. It is both a matter of odds and attention.

As in *The Dark Interval*, Crossan’s text-critical insights are less helpful in *Cliffs of Fall* than his conclusions, which do not necessarily derive from his attempt to peer behind the sources. The Parable of the Sower is about, first, the self-negation of the parabler; second, “the normal inevitability of losses and gains, ... of the plural possibilities of both” (the “polyvalence” of the Kingdom); and third, the interpretation of the parables themselves, including the Parable of the Sower (50-1). Helpful, but finally limited, are the literary critical terms with which he characterizes the parable. It is *dialectical* rather than *rhetorical*, says Crossan, using Stanley Fish’s categories (59-62). The sown word is not the *rhema*, but the *logos*. Dialectic tends to humiliate the reader/hearer. It diminishes the writer/speaker, in a manner consistent with the disappearance of the sower in the parable and the focus on the seed/word.

Crossan’s reading, however, sets up a false contrast, or at best, an incomplete comparison between similar “seed” texts in Paul and John. His text from the Gospel of John is 12:24: “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls

into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit." He then observes, "Jesus is now no longer sower but a seed" (53). Against this he contrasts Paul's shift from the "polyvalent" seed metaphor to the "univalent" foundation metaphor (1 Cor 3:5-11). "I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth" (v. 6) leads to "like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation and someone else is building on it" (v. 10). He sees this as a marked contrast between John and Paul, implying Paul's "univalence" is "totalitarian" (56). Yet this reading fails to take account of the full spiritual meaning of the seed metaphor in the Corinthian correspondence, specifically, in 1 Cor 15.

Fool! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. And as for what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare seed (*kokkon*), perhaps of wheat or of some other grain. But God gives it a body as he has chosen, and to each kind of seed (*spermaton*) its own body. ... So it is with the resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body (1 Cor 15:36-38, 42-44).

John and Paul are not as far afield as Crossan would seem to suggest. Both are concerned with a radical qualitative difference in the bodily form (spiritual vs. physical) that results from the transformation of dying and rising. If anything, Paul makes John look stingy on this point, if 1 Cor 15 is allowed a voice. Crossan's reading unfortunately severs this vital, spiritually logical connection by narrowing his choice of seed texts unfairly and consequently his means of transport quickly exhausts itself.

Kermode On the Trail of Obscurity

In *The Genesis of Secrecy*, Frank Kermode focuses on what the Parable of the Sower seems to say about interpretation. He also sees the Parable as defying interpretation, despite the "very dubious" (28), the "unacceptable priestly" gloss (33), offered by the redactor Mark (as distinguished from Jesus) in 4:14ff. Kermode discusses the differences between the Greek conjunctions *'oti*, *because*, and *'ina*, *in order that*, in the citation of Is 6:9-10, which serves as a sort of interlude between the parable itself and the interpretation offered by Mark's Jesus

(Mk 4:11-13). Kermode rightly insists on the more difficult reading. "The sense of the parable ... must be this: being an insider is only a more elaborate way of being kept outside" (27). The matter is not an issue for text criticism, however, as there is no justification for the assumption that Mark intended to write *oti* and simply made a mistake. Rather, it demonstrates Kermode's attempt to reconcile what seems to be a frontal assault on logical sense.

In granting primary importance to hermeneutical issues, however, both critics lose sight of something. What *happens* to the sower? "The Sower Parable is the great crux" (34), to be sure. From this crux, however, Crossan and Kermode continue *solely* in literary critical terms. Crossan's polyvalence means that one seed produces manifold dialectical interpretations, while univalence is rhetorical and totalitarian. What of faith, Christology, ecclesiology, eschatology? Neither critic pushes the seed metaphor beyond its implications for literary theory. The result is hermeneutics for its own sake. The "riddle remains dark; so does the gospel" (47).

I would suggest a spiritually logical line of inquiry of vital importance for the understanding of this parable: What happens to the good seeds? They die and produce manifold seeds in a head of grain. And what happens to grain when it is harvested and put to use? It is ground into meal and made into bread. And what is the other occasion of the disciples' confusion? Bread! Two accounts of miraculous feedings of the multitudes (Mk 6:30-44; 8:1-10), each prominently featuring the disciples' misunderstanding (6:51-52; 8:14-21), simply await the spiritually logical connection of the sown word with its resulting transformation into bread. Ironically, Kermode concludes his chapter, subtitled "Why are Narratives Obscure?", with Jesus' rebuke of his disciples in 8:14-21. The path he follows, however, is not by way of the grain-bread connection, the logical extension of the extended metaphor, but by way of the idea of obscurity in Mark. Kermode arrives at his destination, but only by sheer luck.

I would suggest that in his cautioning the disciples against Pharisaical yeast, Jesus is more concerned with the bread that they *are* than with the bread they might eat. "Do you not see that whatever goes into a person from outside cannot defile, since it enters, not the heart but the stomach, and goes out into the sewer? ... It is what comes out of a person that defiles" (Mk 7:18b-20). The yeast of the Pharisees is capable of tainting *them*, not their bread, and not merely because Pharisaical yeast is a type of sin, say, pride that "puffs up," but because they themselves and their preaching are the meal. Preaching the yeast of the Pharisees will defile them and their hearers. Their lives, their *ethos*, as well as the *logos* they preach, are grist for the mills of those who hear them preach. Their

actions speak at least as loud as their words, and they, like all preachers, must unite word and act. Jesus decries the disciples' failure to make the metaphoric move from concerning themselves with eating (8:16b) to feeding others (6:37a) by word and deed! It is a shift from consuming, to producing, to becoming a consumable product, in a sense, a conveyance from outside to inside the bread/word.

This metaphorical transformation runs through the various meanings of the "body of Christ" metaphor: (1) Jesus the Parabler's physical *soma*, (2) the bread (*artos*), (3) the Church (*ekklesia*), (4) the temple (*naon*), (5) the *corpus* of Scripture (Deut 8:3). Appropriately enough, Kermode's essay begins: "A parable is, first, a similitude" (23). This list of similitudes can be further extended, of course, to include the whole list of ingredients: (6) the seed (*kokkos* and *sperma*), (7) the preaching (*kerygma*), (8) the word (*logos*), (9) the gospel (*euangelion*), (10) the parable (*parabole*), etc. Paul's use of the seed as a metaphor for the body in 1Cor 15 is not at all an obscure reach, but a spiritually logical synonym. Further, to briefly resume consideration of the text which guided us through Part One, we discover the same synonymy at work where Israel is warned not to forget God. The preposition *le-*, translated by (Deut 8:11-20), indicates the form that Israel's amnesia will likely take: not keeping God's commandments (*mitsvotayv*), ordinances (*mishpatayv*), and statutes (*khuqqotayv*), all "word" words, like *torah* and *dabar*, which seek a preacher to en flesh them in proclamation.

Insofar as we focus on the polyvalence (Crossan) or the enigma (Kermode) of interpretation suggested by the Parable of the Sower, a fixation on hermeneutics itself develops which ends up actually *limiting* the possibility of discovering meaning in the parables, since such interpretation resists these associations in the name of *pre*-cision, of severing spiritually logical connections prematurely in the name of "play" (Juel 1994:28).⁶ For Crossan, the "play" of polyvalence, though presumably endless, and for Kermode, "disappointment" (126, 146), become ends in themselves. Plainly neither Crossan nor Kermode can be considered strict adherents to an *intracanon*ical imperative. "Part of the difficulty in conversing with Kermode is that he offers no sustained interpretation of Mark, because that is not his purpose" (Juel 1994:118). Crossan's quest for a pre-critical tradition is well documented, while Kermode is at least as committed to the interpretation of secular literature as he is to scripture. Such herme-

⁶Juel rightly warns, following George Steiner, that "fascination with interpretation can become narcissistic" (!).

neutics, however, in the Deuteronomistic sense, “forgets God” and never make the leap of faith which is required to transcend the sphere of esthetics.

Han Urs von Balthasar has offered a helpful description of the transformation of metaphor which I have sought to identify above.

Scripture . . . has recognizable and circumscribed meaning which, in its fixed, written form, can only contain a small particle of reality, which - in the Incarnation of the Word of God - will flatten all the barriers of meaning, empowering us ‘to comprehend what is the breadth and length and height and depth’ of ‘the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge’ (Eph 3:18f.). Whenever, in the New Testament, anything is said about this fullness - orally or in written word - it is always an expression of the fullness itself. The christological paradox, that is, that ‘the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily’ in the individual man, Christ (Col 2:9; cf. 1:19), also governs the shape of the new Scripture, with the result that it cannot be compared to any other book. This fact, that the New Testament is governed by Christology, moved Origen to designate Scripture as *one* mode of the enfleshing of the Logos (in addition to the enfleshing in his physical body and in his eucharistic-ecclesial Body). *This way of speaking can be approved provided that we keep in mind that one form of the Body is able to pass over into another, that is, if we maintain the integration of all aspects of the incarnational form* (111-112; italics of final sentence mine).

The powerful spirit of this biblical logic, which von Balthasar, the proponent of *theological* esthetics, describes so well, must be enlisted in service of the word as it seeks *enfleshment* in *proclamation*. Functioning much like the synonymy of the Hebrew parallelism, this spiritual logic manifestly surges through the canon of Scripture far beyond the limits of what conventional poetry and esthetics are capable of observing or expressing. But preaching misses this spiritual logic as long as it relies on a hermeneutics which understands its aim in strictly literary, poetic, and esthetic terms, as long as hermeneutics ventures no faith in Scripture as *holy*, as that which “cannot be compared to any other book.”

Ricouer’s “Restricted Intertextuality”

Others have affirmed Crossan’s observation of the disappearance of the sower by drawing this crucial conclusion: “the dissemination of the word is the crucifixion of the individual self” (Taylor 1984:120). This is what the Johannine Jesus

adds on the heels of the seed metaphor in Jn 12:24-25 and what Paul drives at in the epistles (Gal. 2:19-20a; 1 Cor 15:31a). Clearly for Paul, John, Mark, and all of Jesus' preachers-in-training, the dissemination of the word is something that is not simply humiliating in the intellectual sense, disconcerting like dialectic, but ultimately costly. The whole self is to be *spent*, not simply shared, in proclamation, so that as the preached word becomes scattered seed, as parabler becomes parable, the ego is emptied of self (and vice versa), indeed, some form of the body is left to die in the dust. Body (*soma*) ventures becoming corpse (*ptoma*), and breathlessly awaits the Spirit which gives life (2 Cor 3:6).

None of this is lost on Paul Ricoeur (1995), with reference to whom we began our investigation of spiritual logic. By comparing the Parable of the Sower to that of the Wicked Husbandmen (Mk 12:1-12), that is, "in showing that intertextuality is indeed the operation that assures the metaphorization of the simple narrative in the case of the parables" (148), Ricoeur takes quite another course than we have in order to arrive at the association of the body with the word, or more specifically, the association of the *body* of the vineyard owner's murdered son with the *logos* of the sower parable. "It is this whole interplay, which is narrative and symbolic at the same time, that allows us to say that the word in the narrative-parable of the sower holds the same place as does the body in the narrative-parable of the wicked husbandmen. ... May we not say then that if the word is to increase, the body must decrease? This would be the great metaphor encompassing these two parables" (159). "This advance of the word is paralleled by a decline of the body" (162). "The encompassing narrative and the embedded narratives seem to say together that the life of the word occurs through the death of the body" (163). Ricoeur makes the needed connection between the body and the word. In other words, he has reached beyond the seed-word connection (Mk 4:13), which can no longer be treated as mere allegory.

Neither does Ricoeur ignore the natural grain-bread connection. On the contrary, his juxtaposition of these two parables renders a reading with highly eucharistic overtones (163). Allow him to restate his methodology: "We are accompanying *the interpretive dynamism of the text itself*. The text interprets before having been interpreted" (161). Only Ricoeur, of our three critics, perhaps by temporarily suspending his general hermeneutic, arrives (with von Balthasar) at an interpretation that is clearly in service of proclamation, of preaching and the sacraments.

To expositors of scripture, Barth once issued a similar admonition. "Let us be careful not to snap the thread of the text and intrude something alien to it!

We must accept throughout the lordship of the text and thus be on guard against anything we might import into it" (1991:121). When Barth wrote his "Rules for Handling the (Biblical) Text," he was insisting on the sovereignty and the inviolability of the word. But he certainly did *not* intend to bar *the reader* from entering the world of the text! On the contrary, not many sentences later, Barth states in the same rules: "The true exegete will face the text like an astonished child in a wonderful garden, not like an advocate of God who has seen all his files" (128). The venture of faith places us into a wondrous interior space wherein faith is *further* expressed by rapt attention.

This process of faithfully following the text's inner spiritual (pneumatic, figurative, metaphorical, typological) logic promises an abundant interpretive harvest, one in which "one form of the Body is able to pass over into another" (von Balthasar 1990:112), in which parabolic similitudes blossom and open out into fullness at every level, rather than narrow in on precise meaning or fade into obscurity. Here the believing interpreter, the preacher, the sower, the minister of the word and sacrament, is free and must be prepared to move from scripture to word to bread to body to Church to temple to incarnation to crucifixion to resurrection and so on, ever negotiating the flux between these various forms of the "body of Christ." There is incalculable room for play, yes, but play that "has recognizable and circumscribed meaning" (111).

Synkrinesis as Following Spiritual Logic

Dare we lump and risk losing this fruitful means of interpretation under the increasingly vague rubric of a general hermeneutic? I would argue that this combination of *intracanon*ical loyalty and doggedly faithful attention to the lively *intertextual* conversation going on between biblical texts *within* the canon results in a qualitatively different type of interpretation for which "hermeneutics" is, by its credal ambivalence, an inadequate designation, and by its derivation, a mythological one. Barthians may protest: "There is no such thing as a special biblical hermeneutics" (Barth 1956:466). But Barth himself followed that statement with this one: "But we *have* to learn that hermeneutics which is alone and generally valid *by means of the Bible* as the witness of revelation. We therefore arrive at the suggested rule, *not from a general anthropology, but from the Bible*, and obviously, as the rule which is alone and generally valid, we must apply it *first* to the Bible" (466; italics mine). I contend, however, that hermeneutics has departed so far from what Barth had in mind that it has outlived its

usefulness for Christian proclamation. The New Testament itself, if we allow Scripture to speak *definitively*, uses *hermeneuein* and *hermeneia* to connote something much more akin to simple translation than interpretation (Jn 1:38, 42; 9:7; 1Cor 12:10; 14:46; Hb 7:2). In light of such texts, which attribute little more than a lexical function to hermeneutics (a lexical function which I suggest should be radically subordinated to that of Scripture), homiletics would be wise to ask: *Whence this esthetic fixation on hermeneutics?* Preaching is served by an altogether *different* type of interpretation, the comparative, associative interpretation (*synkrinein*) described in 1Cor 2:13, which has little to do with the translation of tongues or proper names, but everything to do with proclaiming Christ crucified (1Cor 2:1-16). Preaching requires *spiritually logical discernment*, not a hermeneutics which is unable to distinguish between faith and the type of esthetics which Kierkegaard exposed as essentially paganism devoid of kerygmatic content.

Synkrinesis, to coin a possibly useful (but easily misinterpreted) nounal form, is “co-discernment,” evaluation, interpretation by means of comparing “spiritual things with spiritual things.” *Synkrinesis* even “expounds” upon spiritual things, as preaching must, and in a certain sense “unites” them, similar to (but not identical with) the way we have seen metaphors pass from one form to another. The latter unifying sense, however, *must in no way be confused with syncretism*, which, though it shares an etymological relation, has come to mean the dubious attempt to combine or reconcile differing religious or philosophical beliefs. If *synkrinesis* bears any resemblance at all to the English word *syncretism*, it is *only* to its secondary, linguistic sense, that is, only to syncretism as a fusion, a unification, of two or more originally different inflectional forms. *Synkrinesis* as we have observed it, however, is *not* a fusion, but a *transformation* in which prior meanings are left behind. The seed *dies*. It is not fused with the head of grain it produces. The grain is *transformed* into bread, not unified with it. Even linguistic syncretism has no truck with *synkrinesis*, which, if we are faithful to Paul’s usage in the Corinthian correspondence, cannot be understood apart from a total commitment to the Christian *kerygma*. As soon as this faith commitment disappears, *synkrinesis becomes syncretism*.

Synkrinesis is a term with enough creative ambiguity to lend ample generative space to the interpretive process, but it is contextually grounded in such a way that this interpretation can *only* be understood as (1) seeking “truths revealed by the Spirit” (Kittel 1985:475), and (2) serving the proclamation of Christ crucified. It manifests the unique, incomparable capacity of the word to “live” by means of endless “spiritually logical” associations. It functions *interpretively* as

parable functions *narratively*, that is, by means of comparison, by throwing one thing alongside another. *Synkrinesis* has the inexhaustible capacity to draw out its own images on its own terms from Scripture's storehouse of old and new treasures (Mt 13:52). But the slightest possibility of its being confused with or erroneously advocating either religious or linguistic syncretism makes the movement of *faith* absolutely imperative. Faithful *synkrinesis* will not be severed from *anacrisis* (1 Cor 2:15-16), spiritual *inquiry* or *discernment* with "the mind of Christ."

Understood in this way, biblical interpretation in service of proclamation begins fideistically, matures when it is respected as entrance and discovery rather than imposition or intrusion, and bears fruit only when interpreters come under "the lordship of the text" as faithful followers, taking care not to sever or leave untraced the metaphorical veins, the connective tissue of the text. Faithful biblical interpreters are followers of the word within the canon. They enter thoroughly into the generativity within its storehouse, tracing etymological roots, synonymous branches, spiritually logical synapses. Like the "totalitarian" Paul, followers of the Word and preachers of the *kerygma*, are not shy about shifting metaphors from sowing multiple seeds to building on a single foundation (1 Cor 3:10; cf. Mt 7:24-27). In deference to the canon, they claim of metaphorical polyvalence and plurivocality an essential univalence and univocality attributable to the Word, "Christ himself, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. 2:2-3), "the image of the invisible God ... in whom all things hold together" (Col 1:15a, 17).

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this essay has been to advance a model of biblical interpretation for preaching which takes its cue from an essentially biblical description of spiritual discernment. In doing so, I have identified aspects of this model in two seemingly divergent hermeneutical commitments. I have sought to claim the necessity and the legitimacy of the intracanonical imperative, namely, that preachers in their biblical interpretation return faithfully to the unique storehouse of Scripture. I have also tried to identify the spiritual logic of *intertextuality*, showing how, on the one hand, it is frustrated when connections are prematurely severed or missed entirely, and on the other, it gives rise to various metaphorical transformations when exercised faithfully *within* the canon. I have called this latter form of interpretation *synkrinesis* or "spiritual logic,"

and suggested that this associative means of interpretation is a more faithful interpretive partner for homiletics than hermeneutics. I have argued that the former is unabashedly *fideistic* and inherently *kerygmatic* by virtue of its setting in 1 Cor 2:13, while the latter has become too ambivalent in its faith commitments, too reticent for kerygmatic proclamation, and essentially an esthetic enterprise. Biblical usage of *hermeneia* indicates that hermeneutics should be no more and no less useful than the preacher's Greek and Hebrew lexicons.

Where postliberalism urges us to "stay in the text" and understands preaching as rendering, shaping, and inviting listeners into the narratively rendered world, experiential-expressivism clearly revels in the life of the text. The apparent dichotomy between biblicism and vitality, between *either* the authority of scripture *or* that of human experience, is brought into serious question when interpretation is animated by *synkrinesis*, the spiritual logic of God, the vital partnership of Word and Spirit. This is because, as the One who is followed through the text is understood to inhabit the world in front of the text and aid the preacher in interpretation, the authority question is resolved in the One whom the preacher follows. Keeping faithfully to the Word is obedience, obedience *becomes* the interpreter's experience, and the experience of the benefits of obedience ultimately carries the same authority as the One who commanded it in the first place. In short, human experience is authoritative for interpretation insofar and *only* insofar as it is brought under and is faithfully obedient to the divine authority of the Word and Spirit.

The intersection of this double hermeneutical commitment to *intratextuality* and to *intertextuality* is admittedly a narrow gate, so narrow, in fact, that it must not be confused with a general hermeneutical theory, such as Ricouer seeks to develop in his broader work. Long before Anselm, Augustine confessed the uniqueness of Scripture and the faith required to enter. "[T]he way in is low and humble, but inside the vault is high and veiled in mysteries" (Augustine 1963:57). Helpful as is his reading according to the principle of "restricted intertextuality," I cannot agree with Ricouer that this phenomenon, which I have termed *synkrinesis*, is "an operation that the French structuralist school of text semiotics has brought to light" (Ricouer 1995:148), unless by that he means Jean Calvin! Whether we term it *intratextuality*, "restricted intertextuality," or *synkrinesis*, the Reformers knew it as *scriptura sui ipsius interpres*, "scripture interpreting scripture" (Lindbeck 1984:118). This is homiletics' true and faithful interpretive partner, which, when faith is not ventured, is quickly lost in the esthetic swamp of hermeneutics. Preaching would perhaps

do well to consider, in *this* life, the vow of Hans Frei who swore to “eschew” the term hermeneutics in the next life (Campbell 1997:1).

“You search the scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that testify on my behalf” (Jn 5:39). The Johannine Jesus does not deny the need to search the scriptures, but he does say, “Don’t miss the object of faith. I am the *kerygma*! Don’t forget the word that I *am* the Word which you are to preach!” His peripatetic “Follow me!” instructs not merely the feet and body, but the logic of the mind and heart of the preacher as well. It is a quickening word to the spirit, quickened by the Spirit, summoning preachers out of the ruins of an esthetic, but “unfollowable world” (Kermode 1979:125-45), to reap and share with the faithful the harvest of truth which arises we “know not how” from the followable Living Word (Deut 30:11-15; Rom 10:6-8).

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A New Trend in the Jesuit Studies

A REVIEW ESSAY BY HARUKO N. WARD

The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773. Edited by John W. O'Malley, S.J.; Gauvin Alexander Bailey; Steven J. Harris; and T. Frank Kennedy, S.J. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. xv and 772 pages.

Art on the Jesuit Missions in Asia and Latin America, 1542-1773. By Gauvin Alexander Bailey. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. 310 pages.

St. Francis Xavier: An Apostle of the East, vol. 1: The Encounter Between Europe and Asia During the Period of the Great Navigations. Edited by the Executive Committee 450th Anniversary of the Arrival of St. Francis Xavier in Japan. Sophia University Press, 1999. 284, 267 pages.

There seems to be a new surge of interest in Jesuit studies on a global level. The shift from controversial to more serious historical inquiry has resulted in numerous scholarly studies, gatherings and exchanges. At least three volumes came out in 1999. *The Jesuits* and *St. Francis Xavier: An Apostle of the East* are collections of papers delivered at international conferences in Boston and Tokyo, respectively. *Art on the Jesuit Missions* is a companion volume to *The Jesuits*.

BOSTON CONFERENCE

The watershed event was the conference "The Jesuits: Culture, Learning, and the Arts, 1540-1773," held in May 1997 at Boston College. The Jesuits of the early modern period got involved in various controversies, which led to their suppression in different nations and eventually by the pope in 1773. According to John W. O'Malley's key essay, "The Historiography of the Society of Jesus: Where Does It Stand Today?" in *The Jesuits* (pp. 3-37), until the middle of the twentieth-century, works on the Society of Jesus were mostly "polemical or apologetic." Often the enemies bashed the Jesuits while the Jesuits praised themselves. However, "[m]ost recently, . . . scholars from diverse disciplines have turned to the Jesuits, and . . . approached the Jesuits with new methods and per-

spectives.” These new approaches have posed new questions on the Jesuit identity. What was the place of the Society of Jesus in “Early Modern Catholicism”? What differentiated the Jesuits from other orders of the Catholic Reformation? How does one define the “negotiations” which took place between the Jesuits and the papacy, their patrons, and their missionary subjects? In other words, was there a distinct Jesuit “way of proceeding”?

O’Malley’s principle question became the backbone of the international conference, which was otherwise a dazzling array of colorful individual studies without a central focus. The Old Society Jesuits (before the suppressions) were “polymaths,” i.e. encyclopedic rhetoricians. The Jesuits were active in diverse cultural and geographical areas. Thus “a multi-perspectival approach” is most appropriate. The four members of the steering committee became the editors of the 35 papers by scholars, representing diverse fields, institutions, cultures, generations and religious commitment. Religious and social historians of the early modern period, mission historians, historians of science and the arts, linguists and literary critics, all have something interesting to say about the early modern Jesuit phenomena.

The “Arts” category includes music, architecture, devotional objects, and performance arts. There are a variety of studies, for example, on the polymath, Athanasius Kircher, including his music history by Margaret Murata. There is a paper on the “Innovation and Assimilation” of Jesuit architecture in Portuguese Goa by David M. Kowal. Other titles are “The Use of Music by the Jesuits in the Conversion of the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil” by Paulo Castagna, and “Jesuit Thesis Prints and the Festive Academic Defense at the Collegio Romano” by Louise Rice. The papers on the “Sciences” are just as wide-ranged. Florence Hsia writes on the Jesuits who went on the “Expeditions” of the Paris Académie Royale des Sciences and reported their geographical and astronomical observations from such areas as Cape Verde, Beijing and Siam in the seventeenth century. In contrast, Marcus Hellyer focused on the “Jesuit Physics in Eighteenth-Century Germany.”

Missiologists have recently turned their attention to the Jesuits as the prototype of the “accommodationists” in their approach to certain cultures. The cultures of the European Jesuits mingled with other cultures whether their mission was in Europe (Rome, France, Poland, Bavaria, and England), or in the New World (New France, Río de la Plata Region, New Spain, and Brazil), or in East India (China, Mughal India, South India, and Philippines). How and to what extent were the Jesuits adopting their European way to different cultures? Highly in some places. For example, Andrew Ross’s plenary address, “Alessandro

Valignano: *The Jesuits and Culture in the East*," begins with the criticism of David Bosch's well-known *Transforming Mission* that it did not even mention Valignano, "architect of the Society's dramatically successful work [of accommodation] in Japan and China" (p. 337). Accommodation did not occur in other contexts. Dominique Deslandres finds that the Jesuits considered the people to be "poor" and "ignorant" in Brittany as well as in New France (p. 261). Among many negotiations that took place in the la Plata region, Magnus Mörner points out that the "Indians of the missions were subjected to a new, European concept of time.... Labour, military service, and Christian indoctrination operated according to a previously advanced stage of acculturation, and required the Indians to leave their old ways behind" (p. 309).

Most of the studies still concentrate on the Jesuit mission concept, policy and praxis. To see a fuller picture, the Jesuit missiologists must begin to hear the voices of the "Indians" in the different mission contexts. One extremely interesting study at the conference, which did not make it into the book, was Christal Whelan's documentary film "Otaiya," about the perishing elders of the crypto-Christians on remote islands of Japan. Another interesting event at the conference which did not appear in the book was a performance of an opera, "San Ignacio de Loyola," written for the missions of the Province of Paraguay and recently rediscovered by Bernardo Illari.

So, what was the Jesuit way of proceeding? O'Malley argues that the crucial Jesuit identity should be studied in their use of the *Spiritual Exercises*, *Constitutions*, and their "immense global network" of schools (pp. 27-8). I would suggest that the letters to and from the missions also need to be studied. Another crucial factor is the Jesuit use of rhetoric. Mark Fumaroli eloquently explains how Renaissance humanism and rhetoric shaped the Jesuit world view and praxis (pp. 90-106). Alexander Bailey, art historian, suggests that the Jesuit way or "corporate strategy" was "a complex and fluid mixture of experimentation and creativity, combined with a willingness to adapt and learn from the surrounding cultural landscape, whether Neapolitan or Moxos" (p. 73).

Luce Giard's "Reflection" summarizes the conference's successes and shortcomings well. The most significant contribution of the conference was to provide a large stage where otherwise isolated scholars were able to see their work in a global context. One of Giard's criticisms was that there was very little study on the "hard core" of Jesuit identity, or "Ignatian spirituality" (p. 711). I would add that a serious study of the Ignatian "theology" in praxis was wanting. The Jesuit way of theologizing on God, creation, anthropology, soteriology, ecclesiology and eschatology certainly conditioned their interaction with

women and men. Nonetheless the conference and this publication lays a solid foundation for future research by the Jesuit scholars in diverse locales and discipline.

ART, ACCOMMODATION AND MISSION

Gauvin Alexander Bailey, one of the members of the steering committee and a stellar presenter at the Boston conference, published *Art on the Jesuit Missions*, which expands his global approach to Jesuit art. The Jesuits not only brought art from Europe but produced it in different mission and cultural contexts (p. 9). Bailey aims at “the first interpretation of hybrid art to encompass the diversity of cultures that came into contact with Europe [through the Jesuit missions] in the early modern period” (p. 13). By looking at both the European prototypes and the accommodated and sometimes transformed variants in missions, Bailey avoids writing just another institutional art history of the Jesuits. His main source is the Jesuit reports as well as non-European primary sources. Bailey’s other aim is “to find out what attracted non-Europeans” to the European art which the Jesuits brought and “how they reacted to it.” He is successful in showing “how the Mughal and Chinese emperors and the Japanese daimyos harnessed Catholic devotional art to glorify their own reigns, and how the Guaraní of Paraguay indigenized Christianity by bringing its art close to their own canons.”

Bailey’s re-conceptualization of the different Jesuit missions in “inner” and “outer” circles is useful. The inner-circles were closely tied to the Iberian royal patronage system and their colonial control. The Jesuit mission in Mesoamerica, the Andean region, coastal areas of Brazil, Goa, Macao, and metropolitan areas of the Philippines belong to the inner-circle (p. 14). In contrast, the peripheral missions in the outer-circle were not subject to colonial control. The missions in Momoyama Japan, Ming and Qing China, Mughal and Madurai India, Vietnam, the missions to Sonora, Moxos, Chiquitos, the Orinoco valley, Southern Chile, and the Argentine Pampas and Guaraní ‘republic’ of Paraguay belonged to this category (p. 15). Bailey’s chapters “concentrate on the four outer-circle missions that involved the most flourishing and creative artistic exchanges” but had not been previously studied extensively (p. 15). These chapters are the Jesuit Mission to Japan (1549-1622), to China (1561-1773), to Mughal India (1580-1773), and the Guaraní mission (1609-1768). Here I will introduce only two chapters of this well-researched book. Jesuit scholars in

other areas would benefit from the remaining chapters as well. (Unfortunately the colorful figures are all reproduced in black and white illustrations.)

Each chapter includes an excellent summary of the particular context in which the missions began. Bailey skillfully covers a remarkably vast array of secondary material to do so. The discussion of the arts follows a chronological outline of the development of each mission. The Japanese situation is the most challenging to art historians because the actual mission art products were mostly wiped out by persecution and the ban of Christianity in the country. Bailey utilizes the Jesuit textual sources widely. The Jesuits began “the largest mission art academy ever founded in Asia,” a “‘seminary’ of painters . . . known to scholars fancifully—and erroneously—as the ‘Academy of St. Luke’” in 1583 under the direction of Valignano (p. 66). Brother Giovanni Niccolò trained Japanese lay brother painters as well as European brothers. “The academy’s output was substantial enough to supply the churches and confraternities in Japan, and the missions of China and India, as well as providing temporary art for processions and festivities such as the lavish festival of the Holy sacrament held in Nagasaki in 1606” (p. 71).

Bailey finds that the “finest of the Japanese Christian paintings show . . . an even synthesis between the two cultural traditions” (p. 75). The most interesting image to historians of religions would be the image of Salvator Mundi. The artist, in modeling his work after Zen painting, tries to “fit his image of a Christian holy man into a tradition of depicting Buddhist holy men, many of whom, like Christ, were foreigners.” With the “exaggerated features—large nose and big eyes” Christ the savior of the world looks like Daruma (Bodhidharma) (p. 76, fig. 36). Another “hybrid” occurred in the Jesuit-influenced Japanese mainstream Kan_ school of painting. This school produced “a series of monumental genre screens [known as *namban by_bu* (southern barbarian screens)] between 1590-1686 depicting European figures, ships, and buildings, including Jesuits and their churches and colleges” (p. 79). Bailey concludes the chapter by saying, “in an ironic tribute to the Seminary of painters, the images produced by the Jesuit missions themselves became the symbolic focus of the persecutions of the Tokugawa bakufu government,” namely *fumi-e*, which was the central image of Endo Shusaku’s novel *Silence* (p. 81).

If the Jesuit Japan mission was the most successful in Asia in terms of conversion and art production, their Mughal mission must be considered the most reciprocal artistic dialogue of any of their world missions” (p. 112). Conducted in three phases till the papal suppression of the Society in 1773, it was “one of the world’s longest-lasting Catholic mission in Muslim territory” (p. 143). The

Muslim emperors Akbar and his son Jahangir embraced scholastic text, gospel books, theatrical liturgy, and European devotional paintings which the Jesuits provided. They used them abundantly in their brotherhood of D_n-Il_h_ (the Divine Faith): “Combining Hindu and Muslim practices with a philosophy based on Illuminist Sufism and Mongol ancestor worship, the group [D_n-Il_h_] practised devotion to the sun, abstinence, and religious debating, and experienced ecstatic visions” (p. 139). This was an imperial ideology, which united the subjects of all religions in devotion to their leader. Catholic devotional images of the Jesuits were considered “neutral” providing a middle ground between the imperial Islam and their subjects’ Hinduism. The Biblical Jesus was in continuum with the Koran and Sufi imagery of Jesus as a sheikh (moral, spiritual leader) and messiah, doubling the image of the emperor. The Biblical and Koranic image of Mary doubled the image of “mythical Mongol proto-mother,” the ancestor of the imperial household (p. 138). The Jesus/Mary motif seems to have also appealed to the “head of the harem” as her “male counterpart, the Emperor” (p. 140). Jahangir even “had *putti* [angels] painted on many of his own portraits” (p. 127). The imperial palace walls were filled with these images, in both European and hybrid style, and were used in the weekly “religious debate” in the imperial hall.

Such religious debates inspired the production of Fr. Jerónimo Xavier’s catechistical work in Persian, *The Truth-Showing Mirror*, of which one chapter is dedicated to the use of images (p. 127ff), covering both Tridentine and Muslim theories. The mission produced only a small number of conversions. However, the Muslim-Catholic hybrid artistic tradition of the Jesuits sank deeply in the Mughal culture long after the Jesuit mission ended there.

TOKYO CONFERENCE

Professor Bailey presented two papers (on Japan and Mughal mission) for the International Symposium at Sophia University in Tokyo, in December 1998. This was the first of two international symposia which Sophia organized in 1998 and 1999, commemorating the arrival of Francis Xavier in Japan in 1549. *St. Francis Xavier: An Apostle of the East, vol. 1* is the proceedings of this symposium in an English-Japanese bilingual edition with a CD. Toshiaki Koso, S.J., the chair of the planning committee who is also director of Kirishitan Bunko library and archives at Sophia, summarizes the aim of the conference in 1998 in five points, re-evaluating the significance of Xavierian mission: 1) “to view the Asian continent as a pluralistic entity”; 2) “to consider the possibility of there

having been a mutual give and take, between Europe and Asia"; 3) to give religion a right place (rather than culture and civilization); 4) to focus on visual art; and 5) to "seek a message geared towards the twenty-first century" (p. 4).

The efforts to see Xavier's mission in Japan in the wider context of Asia is demonstrated by the four papers on the Jesuit mission in India, one on China and five on Japan. Dauril Alden's "West Approaches the East: The Portuguese Advance in Eastern Lands and Seas, 1498-1549," sets the European context of the discussion, namely Portuguese *padroado* (royal patronage of military, economic and Catholic expansion). It is based on his recently published massive work, *The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal, its Empire, and Beyond, 1540-1750* (Stanford University Press, 1996). Two papers reflect the post-colonial criticism of mission. First, a contemporary Jesuit from India, Charles J. Borges, S.J., shows how a majority of the missionaries in India were a "zealous lot and though they tried to come to grips with the cultural and religious world they saw around them, yet their own theological and cultural upbringing impinged itself too strongly on their responses" (p. 89). He evaluates the efforts of Roberto de Nobile and St. João de Brito who "decided to understand Hinduism from within" (p. 88). Second, Egnelbert Jorissen from Japan writes about three Portuguese whose lives intersected in Goa and who gave internal criticism towards "the intolerance of their time by creating texts which must be read" (p. 112) in the context of persecutions and inquisitions of the New-Christians. Many papers highlight the fact that the experience of *reconquista* of the Islamic rule in the Iberian peninsula shaped the Portuguese attitude toward the Islamic population as well as other "infidels" of Asia. However, there is no in-depth analysis of how this *reconquista* mentality affected the Xavieran mission in Japan. No theologian of mission speaks of the Buddhist encounter with Catholicism, either.

Both the Boston and Tokyo conferences were exciting meeting places of international scholars who are interested in the Jesuits. The contemporary Jesuits were very articulate in speaking about opening the study of their history to a population wider than themselves. Thanks to the early Jesuits, who were most diligent chroniclers, reporters and historians of their Society, the Society owns a great amount of historical resources. The Jesuit Roman archives has been open to scholars and has published quite a few critical editions of the archival materials. Yet the atmosphere of Jesuit piety, their devotion to their founding fathers such as Loyola and Xavier, was still conspicuously in the air at these conferences, probably because both were held at Jesuit institutions and the majority of the conference planners were Jesuits themselves.

Midori Wakakuwa, an internationally known Japanese historian of European art of the period, was the only woman presenter at the Tokyo conference. After stating that she was “not a Christian nor a Jesuit” and that she considers herself an atheist, she asked two biting questions: “If the Xaviarian Jesuits were serious about the faith, why was there no serious paper on the faith, theology and religious identity?” and “Why not study responses of the people? There were many women converts in the Jesuit mission. Why not study about them?” My question is this:

What was the Jesuit way of proceeding with women, who were serious about the faith and became actively involved in the mission? Was there an accommodation, contextualization or hybrid? The next Boston conference planned in 2002, or perhaps another conference, may address these issues.

Pentecostalism and the Future of the Christian Churches. By Richard Shaull and Waldo Cesar. William B. Eerdmans, 2000, xiv and 236 pages.

Richard Shaull and Waldo Cesar offer a unique contribution toward understanding the Pentecostal boom in Latin America. Shaull, who worked with the Student Christian movement in Brazil in the fifties and early sixties, is professor emeritus of ecumenics at Princeton Theological Seminary; Cesar, who was the Executive Secretary of the Youth Department of the Evangelical Confederation of Brazil when Shaull was in Brazil, is a Brazilian sociologist at the Institute for the Study of Religion in Rio de Janeiro. Almost forty-five years since they first collaborated (to articulate a Christian response to the suffering of the poor in Brazil), they reunite to study the Pentecostal response to that reality.

This book brings Pentecostalism into open conversation with other Christian traditions. While the focus of the book is Brazilian Pentecostalism, its lessons—as the title suggests—reach far beyond that setting. The book is divided in two main sections: the first is a theologically informed sociological analysis of Pentecostalism in Brazil; the second is a theological reflection informed by an ongoing dialogue with social reality. Perhaps the most important contribution of this book is the analysis of Brazilian Pentecostalism from an interdisciplinary perspective, putting theology and the social sciences side by side.

In the first section, Cesar shows how the growth of Pentecostalism has had an increasing impact on Brazilian society and culture, particularly on politics. He argues that one of the greatest contributions Pentecostalism brings to Brazilian society is the spiritual and social space that it “opens up to those who surrender themselves to the challenge of a faith that removes the mountains of day-to-day problems of the marginalized in society” (p. 12). Cesar begins by pointing out the presence of the Pentecostal churches in people’s daily life, showing how even the design of its temples, with large doors facing the street, makes the sidewalk seem like an extension of the church. Pentecostal churches are described as places of refuge and daily renewal for worshipers; bridges between the sacred and everyday life which allow common people to come to worship anytime and then go back to their daily routine.

Cesar also details how Pentecostalism deals with the antagonism between rich and poor: Pentecostalism, with its orientation toward the transcendent world of faith, develops a spirituality that makes life bearable in the midst of all suffering. It makes religious life and daily life constantly intersect each other by relativizing all distinctions between immanent and transcendent, sacred and profane, thus creating a syncretism that connects inside and outside space. Ac-

According to Cesar, the political engagement of Brazilian Pentecostals is rooted in this particular form of spirituality. Cesar sees Pentecostalism as a popular movement whose emphasis on emotion and intense individual participation is a radical expression of the priesthood of all believers. At the same time, the rapid growth of Pentecostal churches among the poor has made the movement more aware of the church's social responsibilities. Through a strong belief in the intense presence of the Spirit in the day-to-day struggles of the poor, Pentecostalism is uniting the protest of the oppressed with the utopian hope of a new reality.

In the second section, Richard Shaull offers a challenging theological reflection on Brazilian Pentecostalism. He suggests that mainline churches can respond to the suffering of the poor in today's world only if they stay open to new reformations, arguing that the Pentecostal response to the movement of the Spirit is more in line with the biblical witness to God's particular concern for and presence among the poor. Pentecostals have become the church of the poor in our days: their leaders are largely from the ranks of the poor and their practice and worship communicate the message that the poor are as important to God as anyone else. Pentecostal discourse is not about the option for the poor, but is a discourse of the poor refusing to accept poverty. Shaull does not dismiss the discourse of liberation theology, but simply affirms that Pentecostalism, because of its social location, is in a better position than any other Christian tradition today to hear, understand, and respond to God's revelation.

Shaull notices a shift in Pentecostal discourse from salvation to solution. Although Pentecostals still use traditional language to speak about sin and salvation, they are much more concerned with the immediate presence and power of God in everyday life through the work of the Holy Spirit. Their emphasis is on health, material well-being and a new quality of life here and now. Shaull suggests that a new paradigm of salvation is emerging here. Brazilian Pentecostals believe that the reign of God is already breaking into the present. They proclaim the love of a gracious God who wants them to have full life here and now, and who empowers them to cast out demons and operate miracles. It is exactly this message that makes the gospel a dynamic and transformative force in the lives of millions in Brazil. For Shaull, the challenge for mainline churches is to respond to this witness by recovering their biblical heritage.

Pentecostals have rediscovered that through the Spirit, Jesus of Nazareth, risen from the dead, is now present in the world and in their lives, manifesting the same divine power and doing the same things he did in ancient Galilee.

Through His presence and action the reign of God is breaking into our lives and our world, and anyone who receives the Spiritual gifts participates in the movement of the world toward the reign of God. For Shaul the greatest contribution of Pentecostalism is that it demonstrates that when the Christian faith is true to its nature and origins, it has the power to transform and direct life and to pass on that transformative experience from one generation to another.

This book reinforces what has been said before about the potential of Pentecostalism to change the lives of people in Latin America. However, its interdisciplinary approach and its conclusions about how Pentecostals are contributing to social transformation are unique. This book points out elements that have been overlooked by those who still see Pentecostalism as apolitical, individualistic, and standing in clear opposition to liberation theology's base communities. Instead, it shows how liberation theology and Pentecostalism can complement each other.

—RAIMUNDO CESAR BARRETO, JR.
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People. By Nadieszda Kizenko. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, xiii and 376 pages.

Father John Sergiev (1829-1908) is one of the most widely and deeply venerated Russian saints and perhaps one of the three most representative of the Russian Orthodox ideal. The other two are St. Sergius of Radonezh and St. Serafim of Sarov. Although they never met in their lifetime, all three are sometimes depicted on one icon. Unlike most Russian saints, a married priest (although, in accordance with an ancient Christian tradition, remaining virgin in marriage), Fr. John combined perhaps more than any one of them spiritual gifts of clairvoyance and miracle-working prayer with liturgical, social, and missionary activism.

Extracts from Fr. John's diaries, translated into English in his lifetime, became a classic of spirituality. (John of Kronstadt, *My Life in Christ* [London: Cassel, 1897].) Selected for publication by Fr. John himself, they constitute only a small part of the diaries he kept since his ordination in 1856, which are preserved in the archives. Kizenko's is the first study to use this material. On its basis, she traces in her first three chapters Fr. John's "path to holiness as an ever outward dimension of his private spirituality" (p. 13), thus qualifying a traditionalist view of him as a "saint from his mother's womb" (cf. p. 97 n. 1)

The first chapter shows Fr. John's ascetic attitude which is based on a repentant self-analysis that is merciless to his own weaknesses (and, Kizenko claims, detrimental to his relationship with his wife), only a glimpse of which one might get from the published part of his diaries. The second and third chapters move from this "early concentration on restricting his physical appetites," modeled on "the Desert Fathers and hermits" (p. 39), to regarding "sociability as a uniquely useful means of salvation" (p. 41). Kizenko observes that Fr. John "pursued his course alone, with scripture and the immediate experience of God as his only guides. In a path most unusual within the Orthodox tradition, he had no 'abba' or mentor himself" (p. 15) (she might have noted that this had already been the case with the great initiator of Russian hesychast revival, St. Paisius Velichkovskii). Kizenko's perception of Fr. John's social activism as a "sharp departure from the monastic ideal Saint Serafim of Sarov had expressed famously as 'Save yourself, and around you thousands will become saved'" (p. 41), however, seems to be a bit stretched. Firstly, St. Serafim addressed this message not only to monastics, but above all to lay people, like Motovilov. Secondly, in a more known version of it, he speaks not of "saving oneself," but of "acquiring the spirit of peace." (See, e.g., V.N. Il'in, *Prepodobnyi Serafim Sarovskii* (Moskva: Khristianskoe izdatel'stvo, n.d.), 27.]

Contrary to Fr. John's posthumously constructed image, his activism brings him strikingly close to the reforming "liberal" Russian priests of the turn of the century. Whereas unlike them, "it was inconceivable to [him] that he might only do good works and help others . . . : his relation to God was the measure of his outer activity . . ." (p. 20), as a celebrant of the liturgy, he was creative in a way unique for a traditionalist ascetic and political conservative. His "innovations," however, were but a return to ancient Christian practices, a point which Kizenko sometimes fails to mention. For example, a "more regular and thoughtful observance of communion," usually associated with the eucharistic ecclesiology of Fr. Nicholas Afanas'ev (made popular by his "modernizing" student, Fr. Alexander Schmemmann) was "perhaps [Fr. John's] most significant contribution to Russian piety" (p. 59).

Fr. John's ideal of economic order was, no less strikingly, all but leftist. For him "there was no such thing as a 'righteous' profit or a Christian work ethic that did not include immediate re-distribution among the poor" (p. 73). Since Russia "was supposed to be a Christian society, the enormous disparity that existed between its members was actually evil . . ." (p. 71). Even more strikingly, "he was convinced that one had to address the material needs of the poor before (or in order that) one could talk to them about God. . . . A shelter for the

poor . . . [to support which] he initiated a sophisticated program of fund-raising . . . , accordingly, became his first priority" (pp.75-7). Kizenko draws a parallel between Fr. John's "Christian work ethic" and that of Fr. Sergius Bulgakov (p. 301 n. 20). Yet one might add that Bulgakov, a former Marxist, in 1917 found in the account of Christ's temptation in the desert grounds for *renouncing* the idea (championed by him in 1903) that "[o]nly after one's basic needs are satisfied can the higher needs be satisfied in turn."

The miracles "worked" through Fr. John's prayers—which made him nationally famous and next to which "his 'service' aspects, significant as they were, paled" (p.96)—but naturally this is a matter difficult to deal with objectively, as a scholar should. Treating them in her fourth chapter, Kizenko masterfully blazes her trail between the Scylla of credulous hagiography and the Charybdis of criticist iconoclasm, by viewing those miracles through the lens of the letters to Fr. John from (or on behalf of) those who benefited from his prayers. (Fr. John "had the equivalent of a separate postal code..., approximately ten thousand [of the letters to him] survive in Russian archives, a small fraction of the mail received" [p. 8].)

Chapter five shows the development of Fr. John's cult already in his lifetime. His crossing swords with Leo Tolstoy prompted parallels between the Kronstadt priest and another wonder-worker, St. Nicholas, who allegedly slapped Arius in the face at the first council of Nicaea (p. 183). Ironically, "the Iuriev [Dorpat] University chose both [Fr. John and Tolstoy] simultaneously as honorary members" (p. 238), an honor which Father John consequently rejected. Most important for his posthumous image proved to be "the connection biographers made between Father John and Saint Seraphim of Sarov . . . , especially after Serafim's canonization in 1903" (p. 184). Such extreme veneration gave rise, also, to a controversial sect of the "Ioannites," officially condemned by the Holy Synod in 1909 (p. 227 & n. 103), which Kizenko discusses in her chapter six.

Her seventh chapter deals with Fr. John's political involvement and reactions to it. The reasons for the negative representations of him by two great Russian writers, Tolstoy and Leskov, initially were purely religious (p.188f). Politically, however, Fr. John, incongruously with his posthumous reputation of a "reactionary," was sometimes rather close to the "humanists." Thus his reaction to "the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881" (by terrorists, including Lenin's brother) was initially "very similar . . . to that of Tolstoy and others who petitioned Alexander III for the killers' pardon" (p. 235). And, contrary to the image of him as an anti-Semite, an image disseminated by official Soviet press (pp. 7, 273) and still uncritically reproduced in Western scholarship (p. 289 n.

15), it was to Fr. John that Tolstoy pointed as an exemplary reaction to the Kishinev pogrom of 1903. (Both Fr. John and Bishop Antony Khrapovitskii, the future First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, “denounced the ghastly events in no uncertain terms The impact of their condemnation was so great . . . that . . . [it was published as a brochure and] distributed assiduously by the Jewish community” [p. 243].)

A bit later, however, “letters from Kishinev . . . led [Fr. John] to temper his initial unequivocal indignation with an apology to the Christians of Kishinev for his previous ‘one-sidedness’” (p. 243). And “almost immediately after the [tsar’s] assassination, [he] took a more . . . vengeful interpretation” of it (p. 235). As he realized, later, that “the Orthodox establishment could come crushing down around [him], as it [had] almost [done] from 1905 to 1907, . . . [he] . . . began . . . defending the political and religious order and attacking the dangers he saw emanating from Leo Tolstoy and the radical intelligentsia He called for the killing of all revolutionaries, as Moses had done with the rebels at Mount Sinai, accepted honorary membership in a number of monarchist organizations, and blessed the banners of the radical-right Union of the Russian People [the “Black Hundred”]. . . . This symbolic backing of the radical far right branded him for decades, eclipsing the other aspects of his life until the end of the twentieth century” (pp. 3, 233f).

The last chapter deals Fr. John’s posthumous representations, forged, as they were, for the sake of gaining an ideological profit, no less than his last will had been for the sake of gaining a material one (p. 263 & n. 6). In his “unusual double canonization in 1964 by the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, and in 1990 in Russia by the post-perestroika Moscow Patriarchate” (262), Kizenko, if she were writing few years later, might see a striking parallel to the double canonization of the Russian Tsar-martyr Nicholas.

This study is exemplary in its approach to the phenomenon of sanctity and, to my knowledge, the first one of such a scholarly caliber on Russian sanctity in particular. It is a “must read” for anyone who would go beyond Dostoesky’s novels for an understanding of Russian Orthodoxy.

—ARKADI CHOUFRINE
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Handbook of Postmodern Biblical Interpretation. Edited by A. K. M. Adam. Chalice Press, 2000, xii and 322 pages.

Appropriately, this collection of forty short essays never attempts to formulate a single definition of the word “postmodernism,” much less the phrase “postmodern biblical interpretation.” Instead, readers find an extensive *mélange* of pertinent scholarly topics that shed their own distinct light upon postmodern biblical criticism and so, collectively, illustrate the diversity of academic fields, influential thinkers, and hermeneutical issues that make postmodern biblical criticism what it “is.”

The essays appear in the following alphabetical order (with the contributing author in parentheses): “anti-foundationalism” (Barry Harvey), “author” (A. K. M. Adam), “autobiography” (Jeffrey L. Staley), “bakhtin” (Carol A. Newsom), “bataille” (Timothy K. Beal and Tod Linafelt), “blanchot” (S. Brent Plate), “certeau” (Vincent J. Miller), “culture/cultural criticism” (Kenneth Surin), “deconstruction” (David W. Odell-Scott), “deleuze and guattari” (George Aichele), “derrida” (Yvonne Sherwood), “ethics” (Frank M. Yamada), “fantasy” (Tina Pippin), “foucault” (Mark K. George), “gender” (Mary Ann Tolbert), “historiography” (Fred W. Burnett), “identity” (Francisco Lozada, Jr.), “ideology” (Beverly J. Stratton), “intertextuality” (Timothy K. Beal), “irigaray” (Faith Kirkham Hawkins), “jameson” (Roland Boer), “kristeva” (Andrew Wilson), “lacan” (Ilona Rashkow), “levinas” (Gary A. Phillips), “lyotard” (Gina Hens-Piazza), “midrash” (Daniel Boyarin), “politics” (Eric Thurman), “postcolonialism” (Stephen D. Moore), “practice” (Mary McClintoch Fulkerson), “process” (William A. Beardslee), “queer theory” (Laurel C. Schneider), “race” (Shawn Kelley), “rhetoric” (David S. Cunningham), “scholarship” (Burke O. Long), “sexuality” (Ken Stone), “space” (James W. Flanagan), “theory” (Jan Tarlin), “translation” (Susan Brayford), “trauma” (Jay Geller), “truth” (Philip D. Kenneson).

Editor A. K. M. Adam proposes several useful functions for this volume, the primary one being to guide and direct (more or less) unfamiliar readers through new scholarly terrain. According to Adam, “we asked authors to imagine a colleague down the hall who had not yet quite climbed aboard the train, who might want to know what this Derrida fellow was up to” (viii-ix). With this type of scenario in mind, Adam also expresses the hope that the essays will dispel myths and respond to doubts raised by dubious readers. Conversely, for those already somewhat familiar with—but not entirely situated within—postmodern scholarship, this volume offers the opportunity “to branch out [and] learn more about different topics and figures” (ix). Finally, readers most fluent in the language of postmodernism may find it a useful source for “capsule summaries...of prominent features of the postmodern landscape” (ix).

In regard to the second, third and fourth proposed functions, readers will generally be satisfied, if not delighted, with what the book has to offer. Although the connection to “biblical interpretation” is not always as explicit as the book’s title suggests (e.g., Tolbert on “gender”), the “experts” have in fact been provided with a handy collection of short summaries. Likewise, those who consider themselves familiar with only certain areas of postmodern scholarship will have new and interesting branches upon which to climb. Several essays also successfully counter traditional assumptions and criticisms; in particular, Harvey (“anti-postmodernism”), Long (“scholarship”), and Kenneson (“truth”) effectively dismiss the generalized notion of a single, monolithic “thing” known as “postmodernism,” while Yamada’s essay on ethics shows how postmodern thought—far from apathetic politically and morally—stems largely from the strong concern for justice reflected in the works of Derrida and Levinas.

However, for the “colleague down the hall” who has only heard of “this Derrida” fellow, the sheer difficulty of much of the subject matter—coupled with a consonant density in writing—may, in some cases, frustrate the reader before broadening her horizons. Thus, in regard to the first (and most basic) proposed function, the extent to which these essays fulfill such expectations depends in large part upon which essays one considers. For instance, a reader generally familiar with Derrida, ideology, and the “death of the author,” may still come away from the essays on Certeau and Lacan scratching her head, lamenting her insufficient background in urban planning and psychoanalytic theory.

In fact, readers will likely find the essays on specific thinkers more difficult than those on general topics such as “intertextuality,” “politics,” or “rhetoric.” Such a discrepancy should be expected, however, given the often overwhelming diversity of intellectual interests that tends to characterize even a single postmodern thinker. For instance, how can one provide a “capsule summary” of Michel Foucault’s work—which dances between philosophy, sociology, medicine, psychology, psychiatry, prison reform, architecture, geography, and sexuality—that is not difficult in its sheer density? Regardless of whether or not a reader is familiar with *all* of these fields (which would be unlikely, unless one were a Foucault scholar or Foucault himself), the compacting of such a broad range of intellectual interests into a 4-5 page “summary” can guarantee only so much in terms of “*lucid* brevity.”

It is therefore possible (if not unavoidable) that some essays will estrange rather than enlighten the novice reader – at least initially. However, the mere creation of this volume guarantees its overall success in introducing readers to

the vast postmodern terrain. The contents do not exhaust the topic of “postmodern biblical interpretation” (as Adam readily admits), but they certainly draw from “a relatively broad constituency” of scholars to create “a carnival of meanings” (viii). There is no denying, in other words, that these essays introduce “unfamiliar” readers to postmodern biblical interpretation, even if those same readers find the thought of Kristeva and Lyotard a bit impenetrable in places.

To this end, the index to this collection will prove indispensable (to all audiences) in both its depth and breadth. Every essay offers a healthy taste of both primary and secondary literature, so that, even if some readers do not immediately seek further postmodern adventures, they will at least have a helpful bibliographic resource to file away for a later opportunity. After all, one never knows when the question will arise: “what is this Derrida fellow up to anyway?”

—I. BRENT DRIGGERS

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

José de Acosta, S.J. (1540-1600) His Life and Thought. By Claudio M. Burgaleta. S.J. Loyola Press, 1999, xx and 200 pages.

Studies of the early Jesuit mission to Asia and Latin America have received considerable academic attention from church historians and missiologists, but Father Claudio M. Burgaleta’s work on the life and thought of José de Acosta breaks new ground in the area. Acosta’s two major books, *De procuranda Indorum salute* (Tayport: Mac Research, 1995) and *Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.) have already been translated into English, but Burgaleta’s is the first book-length biography of Acosta in English.

The conventional historiography of the Jesuit mission to Latin America classified Acosta’s work as a mere outgrowth of that of Bartolomé de Las Casas who recognized the Indians’ ability to become Christians and advocated a more humanitarian way of evangelization. But Burgaleta views Acosta as a key to understanding late-sixteenth-century mission history, Europe’s cross-cultural encounter with the Peruvian culture, and early Jesuit history in general. The important works in the area, which includes Sabine MacCormack’s *Religions in the Andes*, Kenneth Mills’ *Idolatry and Its Enemies* and Anthony Pagden’s *The Fall of Natural Man*, become more approachable after Burgaleta’s biographical study of Acosta.

The handy book consists of three major parts: Part One contains the biographical narrative; in Part Two, the author interprets Acosta's thought in the light of early Jesuit theological humanism; and a third part includes appendices that briefly introduce several controversies with which Acosta was associated (e.g., the *memorialista* affair). The tables of content of Acosta's trilogy, the *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, the *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, and the *Doctrina Christiana* are also included in the appendices.

Born in Medina del Campo in 1540, Acosta was well educated during the flowering Spanish Renaissance at the Jesuit College of Coimbra (1557-1558) and the University of Alcalá (1559-1567). Ordained in Alcalá in 1566, Acosta petitioned General Francisco de Borja for a missionary position. After arriving in Peru in 1572, Acosta began his teaching mission at the Jesuit College of San Pablo in Lima, and served as the second Provincial of Peru (1576-1581) and theological adviser to the Third Provincial Council of Lima (1582). Under his leadership, the Council produced the *cartilla* (the official Catechism) and the Council's sermons, translated into the Quachua and the Aymara language. Acosta went back to Spain in 1586 and published two important books, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute* (1588), and the *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias* (1590). Acosta was soon involved in the *memorialista* scandal and the clamorous conflict with the Italian General, Aquaviva, in the Fifth General Congregation of the Society of Jesus (1592-1594). After the Congregation, Acosta was appointed to be Superior at Valladolid in 1594 and later became Rector at the Jesuit College of Salamanca in 1597, where he stayed until his death 1600.

In the analytical section of the book (Part Two), one immediately recognizes the influence of distinguished historian, John O'Malley, S.J., on Burgaleta, who portrays Acosta as a champion of late sixteenth century Jesuit "theological humanism." I think "theological humanism" is somewhat problematic term. Scholars have used several terms, including "Christian humanism," "the Roman curial humanism and the latter-day Ciceronianism" (John D'Amico), "rhetorical theology" (Charles Trinkaus), and "Italy-centered Christian humanism" (Aldo Scaglione), to describe the theological dynamics of the late-sixteenth-century Catholicism. As Burgaleta indicates, however, theological education for the clergy after the Council of Trent was dominated by the Aristotelian and Thomistic corpora. A Salamanca Thomist, Acosta employed a sixteenth-century replica of Thomas' hierarchical concept of the human capacity for knowledge of God. Jean Delumeau summarizes Acosta's recapitulation of the Thomistic anthropology:

“At the bottom of the ethnographical ladder he placed the ‘barbarians,’ for whom the ‘*tabula rasa*’ technique – and sometimes the iron hand – was the most appropriate. Next came the peoples of the ancient American empires, to whom the previous methods could not be applied without modification. Lastly, at the top of the ladder, de Acosta placed the Chinese, Japanese and Indians, peoples with the skill of writing and a rich cultural heritage: the most suitable approach here was to act like the first messengers of the Gospel among the Jews, Greeks and Romans.” (John Delumeau, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire: A New View of the Counter-Reformation*, p. 91)

In many ways, Acosta was more Thomist than humanist and thus Burgaleta’s terminology is vulnerable to criticism as is O’Malley’s.

Somewhat disappointing is the lack of historical background for the period in which Acosta lived. For example, the author does not mention the Dominican friar, Domingo de Santo Tomás, who attempted to accommodate the Quechua words for Christian terms such as “soul,” “baptism,” and “confession” in *Grammatica o arte* (1560) and *Léxicon o vocabulario de la lengua general del Perú* (1560). Father Burgaleta is also silent on the Peruvian Indians’ resistance against both Hispanization and Christianization. For instance, José de Arriaga (1564-1622) witnessed in the *Extirpación de la idolatría en el Perú* (1621) that the Indians were removing corpses from the *reducciones* cemetery and reburying them next to their pagan ancestors at *machays*, their own cemeteries. The author might also have elaborated more on Acosta’s influence upon later Peruvian chroniclers’ description of their history, such as Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala (c. 1535-1615) and Garcilaso de la Vega the Inca (1539-1616). But despite several minor weaknesses, Father Burgaleta’s work deserves academic attention from researchers interested in late-sixteenth-century Jesuit missions to the New World. I recommend this book to be added for required readings at seminaries and colleges, where a diversified curriculum includes the Latin American chapter of world Christianity.

—S. K. KIM

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Indigenous Religions: A Companion. Edited by Graham Harvey. Cassell, 2000, xii and 302 pages.

A familiarity with indigenous peoples and their way of life is necessary for scholarly work in a variety of fields. For instance, a postcolonial theorist must be familiar with indigenous peoples since it is they who were and are “colonized.”

Likewise, anyone studying the recent growth of Christianity in the non-Western world needs a familiarity with the indigenous peoples who comprise the bulk of that growth. Any work on indigenous peoples is thus likely to be useful to a variety of readers. Harvey's *Indigenous Religions: A Companion*, a collection of seventeen articles by scholars from around the world, is no exception. Harvey indicates that "respectful listening" is the proper mode of engagement with indigenous peoples (ix). And on the whole, the articles in *Indigenous Religions* demonstrate this approach (ix).

The volume employs a generally accepted definition of "indigenous"—included are Native American, African, Aboriginal Australian, and Southeast Asian peoples—and contains articles on the Nuer, Azande, Bangwa, Karuks, Lohhorung, Maya, Yoruba and Naga peoples, among others. The authors discuss a range of topics such as the Native American spirit world, shamanism, native womanism, ecology and land orientation, rites of passage, witchcraft, spirit possession, healing, music, dance, and art. The articles are grouped under three headings: Persons, Powers, and Gifts.

Chapters in the section entitled "Persons" deal with the roles and functions of important indigenous figures. For examples M. A. Jaimes Guerrero's article, "*Native Womanism: Exemplars of Indigenism in Sacred Traditions of Kinship*" discusses Native American understandings of womanism. Guerrero highlights changes in the status of women brought about by the interaction of indigenous cultures and colonial systems. (Many matrilineal peoples came to be dominated by a patriarchal hierarchy during the colonial period). Another article in this section is Piers Vitebsky's "Shamanism," which discusses various aspects of the almost universal phenomenon of shamanism, particularly initiation, healing, dreaming, and soothsaying. The article highlights the revitalization of shamanism in both non-Western and Western locales.

The second section, "Powers," includes articles on cosmology and the spirit world as understood and experienced by indigenous peoples. In his article on the Maori, "*Mana and Tabu: Sacred Knowledge, Sacred Boundaries*," Peter J. Mataira describes the "complex nature of *tabu* and *mana* in relation to humanity's quest for knowledge and in relation to the Gods existing within the realms of the spirit world" (112).

In the final section on "Gifts" authors discuss the arts, music, and ceremonies through which the indigenous peoples relate and express their relationship. Charlotte E. Hardman's article, "Rites of passage among the Lohorung Rai of East Nepal," is typical of articles in this section. Hardman analyses the importance of rituals such as birth and marriage and concludes that, "rites of passage

are not just about changes in individual status and the dynamics of human society but also about the dynamics of [the Lohorung Rai's] relations with ancestors" (217).

Many of the articles are well researched and add to the treasury of knowledge about indigenous cultures and religions. The article, for instance, by Jan G. Platvoet on spirit possession among the Bono of Ghana is outstanding. Platvoet draws upon primary resources but brings to them the fresh new tools of context analysis and presumed/postulated communication process analysis (87). However, some of the articles were less satisfactory. For instance, "Gifts for the Sky People: Animal Sacrifice, Head Hunting and Power among the Naga of Burma and Assam" by Mark R. Woodward, is rather poorly researched and overly generalizing. Woodward relies heavily on sources from the colonial period and his language reflects the age of his sources. For example, few contemporary scholars would characterize the Nagas as being "of Assam." The author also repeatedly links the Nagas with other indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia. (see, for example, pgs. 220 and 221). There are unquestionably certain commonalities among indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia (e.g. a tradition of headhunting was prevalent among the Naga, the Mizo, the Igorot, and the Amis) but to reduce these diverse peoples to a single entity ignores the differences between them.

In his helpful introduction, Harvey discusses the diversity of indigenous religions and presents his rationale for using the term "indigenous" *vis-à-vis* other terms such as "primal," "primitive," or "traditional." Harvey chooses "indigenous" as a way of indicating that there is continuity between the religions manifest today and those of yesteryear. Indeed, there is continuity, but a great deal of change has visited these religions as a result of colonization, conversions, the onslaught of technology, migrations and immigrations. The religions that exist today must be considered "new" religious movements, connected to but not the same as the religions that existed earlier. The earlier religions must be reconstructed, remembered and recognized.

Additionally, in a sense all religions are indigenous. Even European Christianity has its own indigenous flavor (cf. Hilda Ellis Davidson, *The Lost Beliefs of Northern Europe* [1993], Anton Wessels, *Europe: Was It Ever Really Christian?* [1994], Richard Fletcher, and *The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to Christianity* [1997]). For this reason, it would seem best to use the term "primal" to describe the religions of "indigenous" peoples (see, for example, Andrew F. Walls' 1987 article, "Primal Religious Traditions in Today's World"). Ap-

plying “indigenous” to primal religious traditions alone betrays a certain biased perspective.

Having said this, *Indigenous Religions* is an immensely relevant book and achieves its stated goal of raising the study of primal religions to a level similar to that accorded the larger “World” religions (3). *Indigenous Religions* is a necessary resource for anyone interested in the after-life, rituals, ancestor worship, spirit possession, new religious movements, the interaction of “traditional” and “modern,” cultural studies, ecology, and gender studies.

—ATOLA LONGKUMER
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, Hero: Images of the Reformer, 1520-1620. By Robert Kolb. Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought, Edited by Richard A. Muller. Baker Books and Paternoster Press, 1999, 278 pages.

Working through this book I realized quickly that I had been deceived by its subtitle. Historian Robert Kolb does indeed focus on *Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, Hero*. But his treatment of the subject is not an analysis of images of the Reformer from the early Reformation to the eve of the Thirty Years’ War, whether that image be iconic, literary, or otherwise, and whether that image be conceived by disciple or adversary. Kolb’s focus is rather more limited to the way the image of Luther conceived among his followers (not opponents) was utilized by them in the polemical battles that engulfed Germany especially after Luther’s death in 1546. Kolb’s keenest focus is on the intra-Lutheran battles which pitted Gnesio-Lutherans against crypto-Melanchthonians in the period leading to the partial settlement of this internecine warfare in about 1580 in the promulgation and defense of the Book of Concord.

Those familiar with the late or post-Reformation period in sixteenth-century Germany will immediately recognize Robert Kolb as an historian who has spent his scholarly career working in a vast array of primary sources which had long been neglected: theological polemics among Luther’s followers, church orders, and various Lutheran confessional documents of the mid- to late-sixteenth century. The titles of some of his earlier books—*Nikolaus von Amsdorf (1483-1565): Popular Polemics in the Preservation of Luther’s Legacy* (1978), *Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church, 1530-1580* (1991), and *Luther’s Heirs Define His Legacy: Studies on Lutheran Confessionalization* (collected articles, 1996)—reveal how his life work (so far) has focused on the way

that Luther's followers sought to define and preserve their teacher's agenda as the evangelical-Lutheran churches in Germany became permanently separated from the Roman Catholic Church on the one hand and from international Calvinism on the other. The same interests and extensive knowledge of the primary sources are abundantly clear in the present book as well.

In Part One, Kolb explores the way that the image of Luther as prophet, teacher, and hero was shaped during his life (only the first sixteen pages) but especially after his death. The three titles are distinct but complementary. Viewed by his followers as a prophet of God, Luther held a unique status—and therefore a special authority—among his followers, for he was unlike all others as an (or *the*) authoritative interpreter of God's Word (chapter 2), and as a hero of the German people and nation against the "Baalites" of Rome (chapter 3). Luther's unique authority as a teacher was employed both in controversies among Lutherans, as the theological leadership of the Lutheran churches was discredited by the controversy over the Interim in the late 1540s and 1550s, and in controversies with Calvinists (chapter 4). Chapter five then rounds out the view of Luther's image by a look at popular presentations, notably stage-productions about Luther (the drama "Luther Reborn" in 1593 captured "the whole history of the sacramentarian controversies" [!]) and in sources (sermons, popular literature, etc.) associated with the jubilee celebration of the Reformation in 1617. In this way Kolb moves beyond the parochial theological disputes to offer an important contribution to the broader history of the period, while revealing how pervasive the religious-theological issues were to the society at large. That the theatre could devote itself to the sacramentarian controversies among Protestants shows, for example, that it was not theologians and churchmen alone who were interested in such things.

Part Two is a careful look at Luther's posthumous influence through his published works. Kolb reveals how Luther's legacy was preserved and shaped by his followers not only through several editions of his collected works but also through topical collections and reprints of selected genres of Luther's writings, as well as through *florilegia* whereby Luther's thought was systematized (in a Melanchthonian way, Kolb argues) by his followers, especially by the anti-Melanchthonian Gnesio-Lutherans. Here Kolb's knowledge of some rather obscure sources really shows its depth, and he draws a clear picture which helps to illumine the development of Lutheran theology towards the orthodoxy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Taken as a whole the book unveils a convincing picture of the way Luther's followers shaped and then utilized for various purposes coherent images of the

Reformer. Yet there is a subtheme explored throughout the book which in my view is rather unconvincing, indeed troubling. It is the same theme which I noted when reading and reviewing Kolb's earlier work, *Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church, 1530-1580* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1991), so it appears not to be accidental to the present book but is a running theme in Kolb's research of the late Reformation. This theme is enunciated, among many other places, in the following quotation: "Luther had assumed for [the Mansfeld ministerium] a special status in determining and defining the biblical message. His words could be used as a secondary authority to replace the judgments of popes, councils, and bishops concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures. . . . He had become an adjudicatory authority" [p. 45; see also pp. 70, 72-73, 120].

Perhaps the thorniest issue of the Protestant Reformation is that of ecclesial authority. All the reformers claimed to base their reforms on Scripture; Protestant, papal, and radical reformers all upheld in some way the authority of Scripture. Yet what is often regarded as the tragedy of the Reformation is that, despite this common appeal, the Reformation caused a lasting schism in the Western church, which in turn was a contributing factor to the ugliness of religious intolerance, national and imperial absolutism, and the devastation of the Thirty Years' War.

As Kolb presents Luther's legacy, it would appear that Luther's prophetic authority simply replaced for Lutherans the kind of authority which Roman Catholics had placed in the ecclesiastical offices of popes, councils, and bishops. Later this human authority was more limited for Lutherans, first to Luther's authority as a teacher of pure doctrine and as an interpreter of Holy Scripture, and finally to the authority of confessional documents. Kolb asserts that all Christians have such secondary authorities, and that when Lutherans (and other Protestants) "refused to concede interpretive authority to popes and councils, a new secondary level of authority had to be found. The church needed some means of interpreting passages of Scripture which did not self-evidently interpret themselves" [73]. Thus in Kolb's understanding, it appears that Luther or the Book of Concord function for Lutherans in the same way that popes, councils, and bishops function in Roman Catholicism, namely to adjudicate the interpretation of Scripture. The structure of authorities essentially remained the same even while the identification of those authorities had changed.

This seems to me to be a misreading of the texts that Kolb has analyzed, and of the early development of the Reformation as well. As he made abundantly clear at Worms and during both its prelude and aftermath, Luther did not reject the authority of popes, councils or bishops to interpret the Scriptures. On the

contrary, he grew to reject their infallibility in doing so precisely because in his own case (as also in the case of Huss at Constance, he believed) the Roman authorities had set aside the Scriptures, had not argued from the Scriptures but on the basis of the authority of the Roman church apart from Scripture. Luther's followers, on the other hand—as the texts Kolb engages clearly reveal—utilized Luther's or the Book of Concord's authority not to set aside the Scripture but precisely the opposite, to point to and establish Scripture's unique authority for the teaching and life of the Christian church.

The difference may be fine but the point is not moot: all Christian traditions (even those which renounce all creeds and confessions) will have other authorities which are utilized in defining and expressing their teaching, but precisely how those authorities are related to the Scriptures remains the key question. When Luther in the *Appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* identified the papal claim to unique authority for the interpretation of Scripture as one of the three walls erected by Rome hindering reform in the church, he was challenging the uniqueness and supremacy of that authority, not its existence. The papacy was asserting not secondary but primary authority. But the authority of Luther and of the Confessions has for Lutherans remained a secondary and not a primary authority, and thus it cannot be said, as Kolb states, that either Luther's writings or confessional documents function as “a secondary authority *to replace the judgments of popes, councils, and bishops* concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures” [emphasis added]. The structure of authorities is not only different but is diametrically opposed. The Lutheran *Formula of Concord* makes this absolutely clear in its opening article, Rule and Norm.

Robert Kolb's significant contribution on Luther's authority for the late Reformation introduces a vital topic, of interest not only to the historian of sixteenth-century Germany but also for its continuing relevance for the church 450 years later. In general the book is engaging and revealing. But in the particular point of the Reformation concept of authority, his treatment leaves this reviewer disappointed, not for any lack of knowledge of the sources, but for what appears to be lack of clarity in interpreting them as they pertain to a most significant aspect of the meaning and heritage of the Reformation.

—JOHN ARTHUR MAXFIELD
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Sensing The Spirit: The Holy Spirit In Feminist Perspective. By Rebecca Button Prichard. Chalice Press, 1999, x and 150 pages.

Sensing The Spirit is a serious attempt to bring to the fore a long overlooked issue. Rebecca Button Prichard, a Protestant, woman, pastor, and scholar, takes on the daunting task of developing the first constructive theology of the Spirit from a feminist perspective. She sets out to present a new and creative approach that proposes an “embodied theology” of the Spirit. That is, she attempts to develop a theological discourse that seeks to “sense the Spirit” in a “somatic metaphorical discussion of pneumatology in the created world and in bodily existence” (5-6). In light of this peculiar perspective she introduces the five human senses, i.e., vision, smell, touch, taste, hearing, as the structural framework within which it is possible to understand the work and function of God’s Spirit.

Her intention in using the five senses is to articulate a new and richer vision of the Spirit. Her goal is to move beyond the numinous and impersonal view of the Spirit as present in conventional theology but still remain connected with traditional pictures that portray the Spirit in concrete sensual images. In order to achieve her goal, Prichard permits the interplay between sensual biblical discourse, a critical retrieval of past women’s theological language, and eco-feminist concerns. Consistent with her high view of Scripture, Prichard begins her arguments by analyzing both the Old and New Testament, searching for concrete examples that validate claims pertaining to the important role the senses play in the biblical narrative. Out of this analysis, she concludes that the spirituality of the Hebrew Bible is no more dualistic than the Greek context of the New Testament. Nevertheless, she argues that the intention is not only to uncover the androcentric bias permeating the text, but also to seek for signs of hope within the biblical text that may lead to a more comprehensive theological discourse of the Spirit.

Concerning her appeal to eco-feminism, she weaves together two important elements that make her presentation quite unique. First, concerning her ecological standpoint, she is of the opinion that traditional dualisms (matter/spirit, mind/body) must be overcome and replaced with a more holistic approach that envisages the Spirit as permeating the created order. As such, she depends on a “Romantic Natural Theology” that advocates the interdependence of creatures, that highlights the beauty of nature as a concrete example of the creative originality of the Spirit. Thus, in line with a *panentheistic* theological perspective, she advocates a view that perceives the Spirit as present in the whole of creation. Second, regarding her feminist concerns, she appeals to the hermeneutics of suspicion in unmasking the androcentric elements in previous traditional pneumatological discourses and transforms these with a spiri-

tuality that centers on the experience of women. For her, the purpose is to fill out the “blank pages of women’s history” (20), listening to the rich legacy of women predecessors who read and interpreted the biblical text in order to develop their own pneumatology.

Consistent with this view—her journey of discovering her “usable past” for developing a new view of the Spirit—Prichard depends heavily on the women Mystics of the Middle ages, e.g., Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Teresa of Avila, etc, who challenged the religious establishment by daring to think theologically. She also draws from the historical phenomenon that through the centuries many of these courageous women found a liberative outlet for their Christian spiritual experience in sectarian movements (Quakers, Shakers, Mulkeys, early Pentecostals) which were rejected by mainline denominations of Christianity, to some extent, because of their differing views on women.

Prichard fittingly offers an innovative approach that resists circumscribing the Spirit. She moves toward the view that the liberated Spirit also liberates us by enabling us to see, feel, taste, hear, and smell God’s presence in a new light. All in all, this book is original, creative, and thought-provoking; it raises important theological issues that can only enrich the theological community. Given that the author’s view of life as circular is more consistent with the cyclical patterns of nature, she appropriately raises the need to appreciate the Spirit beautifully at work within natural processes and human existence.

By way of criticism, Prichard seems to set aside the biblical assertion that creation is in need of—and is promised—redemption, which is the work of the Spirit. Along the same line, she seems to undermine the important connection between a pneumatological-spiritual articulation and the prophetic announcement that the liberated Spirit of God is at work on the side of the poor and oppressed. Overall, though, this is a book worth reading.

—NÉSTOR MEDINA

TORONTO SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

A Private Woman in Public Spaces: Barbara Jordan’s Speeches on Ethics, Public Religion, and Law. By Barbara A. Holmes. Trinity Press, 2000, xii and 162 pages.

A Private Woman in Public Spaces offers an instructive and creative analysis of the life and social thought of Barbara Jordan, a public figure whose work has been virtually ignored in the field of Christian social ethics. In this book Barbara Holmes argues that Jordan’s speeches on Ethics, Public Religion and Law embody a constructive resource for constituting a viable notion of commu-

nity. At the intersection of these three themes, Holmes finds the conceptual space for a vision of community that reflects and respects national diversity while at the same time provides a moral framework for national unity. Employing Jordan's notion of a "national community" as her overarching metaphor, Holmes attempts to construct a healthy balance in the tense relationship between individual autonomy and group solidarity; between total nihilism and a totalizing essentialism.

The life and work of Barbara Jordan provides a strategic point of departure for the community building agenda that guides Holmes' project. Jordan, the first African American woman elected to the United States congress from a Southern state, embodied a diversity of perspectives and interests that widened the scope of her public appeal. Having grown up in one of Houston's most economically depressed poverty tracts under the racist Jim Crow system, Jordan was highly sensitive to the problems of racism, poverty and gender injustice. These issues factored significantly in shaping her commitments as an elected official and later as a professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Holmes points out, however, that Jordan's concerns extended beyond the categories of race, class and gender. Politically, Jordan was a "centrist" who was committed "to the civic myths of the dominant culture" (4). The combination of her identification with America's marginalized populations and her allegiance to many of the principles held by the dominant culture earned her the respect and support of diverse sectors of society.

Holmes rejects the notion that Jordan's centrist and patriotic posture reflects an abandonment of her role as an advocate for her race. Rather Holmes views Jordan's rhetoric and convictions as transcending the essentialisms of race, class and/or gender, while at the same time taking seriously the problems posed by these categories. Holmes describes Jordan's capacity to transcend fixed cultural categories in relationship to Victor Turner's "theory of liminality" to show that Jordan's capacity to embrace the interests of diverse and sometimes competing groups does not necessarily suggest a lack of consistency in her thought but rather reflects the "fluid state (of liminality) where oppositional concerns are held in dialectical tension" (18). Jordan's commitment to integrating multiple and sometimes competing interests permeates her social vision as reflected in her speeches on ethics, public religion and law.

At the heart of Jordan's reflections on ethics, Holmes identifies a fundamental drive for a common moral ground. In a 1987 speech Jordan sites four basic values that all humans ought to hold in common. They are truth, toleration, respect and community. The strength in Jordan's thought rests not as much in

the particular values that she prioritizes as it is in the process by which she derives those values. For Jordan, the public sphere acts as a space for seeking the consensus upon which common moral ground may be built. Thus the fundamental moral principles of the nation are not imposed by some dominant force but are discerned through dialogue and debate among diverse people participating in the public realm.

For Barbara Jordan, a practicing Christian and the daughter of a Baptist preacher, religion serves an essential role in the public sphere where moral consensus is formed. Holmes points out that Jordan rejected the pattern of privatizing religion in a way that isolates faith communities from public discourse. According to Jordan, the basic values of the Judeo-Christian faith imply a commitment to seeking balance. This characteristic translates into a capacity for mediating conflicts in a way that promotes the fairness implied by Jordan's notion of balance. Thus public religion serves a crucial role in the process of developing and perpetuating a moral consensus in the nation.

Law, the third theme in Holmes' analysis, provides the final building block in the vision of community that emerges in Jordan's speeches. Where public religion serves as a mediator between competing interests to create balance and fairness, law functions as the "mediating force between the elements of good and evil" (104). Justice, in Jordan's legal vision, is the central principle guiding this mediating activity. At the convergence of these three categories—ethics, public religion and law—emerges the potential for a "national community that synthetically embodies the disparate and conflictual elements of society" (104). Placing Jordan's notion of national community in dialogue with Martin Luther King Jr's "Beloved Community" and Victor Turner's notion of *communitas*, Holmes holds Jordan's vision of community up as a promising paradigm for community building.

This book is significant for many reasons. Its greatest contribution may very well be the fact that *A Private Woman in Public Spaces* uncovers the profound moral vision of a figure whose work has gone largely unnoticed in the fields of theology and religious ethics. In so doing the text breaks fresh ground in the search for relevant ethical and theological resources and invites further exploration of the moral, religious and legal wisdom embodied in Jordan's life and work. Moreover, this text pushes forward the work of constructing a viable public theology that respects and reflects the pluralistic structure of postmodern life.

A glaring oversight on Holmes' part is her failure to relate her project to the themes and concerns found in the work of womanist scholars. Clearly her

analysis of Jordan bears some affinity to the womanist project. Yet Holmes appears intentionally to distance her work from womanist ethics. In fact, at one point she applauds the fact that in her critiques of racism and sexism Barbara Jordan “did not claim womanism or feminism or any other gender-specific social location as a vehicle for her discourse (17).” By ignoring the womanist perspectives Holmes not only overlooks obvious conversation partners for her work—even if those partners are ones with whom she has disagreement—she also diminishes the force of her own critique of womanist thought. In the final analysis, Holmes has indeed done a great work. Her project deserves the serious attention of all who are interested in promoting unity and community in the midst of our great diversity.

—RAY A. OWENS

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Christian Ethics and Human Nature. By Terence Penelhum. Trinity Press International, 1999, xii and 129 pages.

Terence Penelhum’s *Christian Ethics and Human Nature* began as four lectures co-sponsored by the Diocese of British Columbia and the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society at the University of Victoria, Canada. The lectures aimed “to confront the intellectual perplexities to which Christian commitment gives rise” in arguments surrounding several “enormous questions” (p. xii). Those questions are: (1) what is the Christian ethic?; (2) how does this ethic understand human nature?; (3) how is this understanding challenged by the presence of other religions, or pluralism more generally?; and (4) how does this ethic respond to insights gleaned from evolutionary biology and other sciences? The immensity of these queries would warn off even the most confident of scholars. Penelhum, however, takes upon himself the difficult task of discussing them in under one hundred pages and before an audience of both scholars and lay religious people. Unfortunately, the result is too question-begging and narrow to be of use to scholars and too theologically and philosophically problematic to be recommended as an introductory text for interested lay persons.

What is the “Christian ethic”—always in the singular—according to Penelhum? In short, this ethic provides a diagnosis of what ails the human condition (sin) and a prognosis for its cure (internal change, or *metanoia*). Furthermore, it situates the problem and the cure between Jesus Christ’s proclamation of the Kingdom of God and his demand that this *metanoia* occur in preparation. However, this latter aspect of the Christian ethic – its context within the

Christian theological drama – is only of secondary importance for Penelhum. The real heart of the matter is freeing our “true selves” from their bondage to “bad desires,” bondage that all people experience and from which all people desire liberation. Penelhum effectively reduces Christianity to a set of practices and beliefs that aid in what he considers the essential human desire for freedom (which is the proper meaning of salvation on this account). He follows Joseph Butler in identifying a notion of “conscience” in St. Paul’s declaration that pagan Gentiles are a “law unto themselves” (Romans 2:14) and diminishes Christianity to the status of handmaid of the morality that arises autonomously from this conscience. He repeats almost exactly Kant’s demand that even Jesus’ authority be established according to our independent moral principles (p. 8).

While identifying, in good Kantian fashion, individual ethical autonomy as the proper end of the Christian ethic, Penelhum’s account cannot be considered unambiguously Kantian. His minimization of Christianity is done without the philosophical trappings of Kantianism, and he explicitly rejects John Hick’s Neo-Kantian defense of religious pluralism. For Penelhum, the reduction of Christianity to a method of achieving autonomy is not defended as arising from systematic philosophical concerns, but as a response to religious pluralism and evolutionary science. He regards the existence of a plurality of *justified* religious forms of life as forcing Christianity to renounce any claim to exclusivity with regard to salvation. Loosely indebted to the work of Alvin Plantinga, Penelhum’s notion of justified belief entails that beliefs and practices be rationally justified in relation to the other beliefs and historical arrangements that constitute the context of the believer. All the relevant world religions are rationally justified on this account, and it is the job of philosophy to sort among them. That is, according to Penelhum, all positions are rational, “but only one . . . can be true” (p. 73). Philosophy enables one to sort the wheat from the chaff by “comparing traditions with each other and evaluating each of them in the light of the scientific knowledge that . . . none of us has any right to ignore” (p. 74).

This quotation contains the upshot of Penelhum’s argument. In brief, Christianity and all other religions are rationally justified modes of attaining the freedom from arbitrary and immoral inclinations that thwart individual autonomy. Each religion specifies its own peculiar manner of dealing with this issue in the context of our common Nature—always with a capital N—that is known according to the methods of modern science. Penelhum takes two lessons from this situation. First, Christianity, when faced with internal controversies over beliefs and practices, should “adopt the [beliefs or practices] least different from

those of competing faiths" (p. 63). Thus, Penelhum grounds his understanding of the pluralist thesis on the implicit idea that the commonalities between different religions are the elements that correspond most closely to the common Truth in which they all participate. Second, Christian ethics should take "the fact of our evolutionary origin seriously" and be attentive to our place in a common Nature. Penelhum suggests that, assuming these two lessons, the doctrine of Original Sin should be the first traditional Christian belief to be disregarded.

The fundamental weakness of Penelhum's argument in *Christian Ethics and Human Nature* is that he provides very few reasons why someone might want to accept his conclusions. Penelhum neither anticipates objections to his positions nor sufficiently defends his many controversial interpretive moves. Furthermore, he fails entirely to engage the Christian theological tradition. The cake of the "Christian ethic," it seems, is a few quotations from Paul combined with a bit of Joseph Butler and Kant; the rest, from Augustine and Aquinas to Barth, is mere icing. While Penelhum intends only to raise questions, the questions he raises cause his arguments to collapse into ill-defined assertions. If one rejects John Hick's Neo-Kantianism, what makes Penelhum's peculiar suggestion about pluralism sensible? If one understands and appreciates contemporary debates about rationality and justification, how can one maintain without argument the hegemony of scientific discourse and the notion of "Nature"? How can one address the theme of Christian ethics and human nature without any mention of the Christian natural law tradition? This book arises from an outdated and severely problematic form of philosophical reflection on religion. It presents an ahistorical Christianity that quietly awaits a philosopher to determine its essential content.

—HOWARD B. RHODES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

God and Globalization, Volume 1: Religion and the Powers of the Common Life. Edited by Max L. Stackhouse with Peter J. Paris. Trinity Press International, 2000, xiii and 288 pages.

God and Globalization, Volume 2: The Spirit and the Modern Authorities. Edited by Max L. Stackhouse with Don S. Browning. Trinity Press International, 2001, x and 244 pages.

For better or worse, the protesters at the 1999 Seattle trade talks have become the popular face of globalization. We need not agree with their goals or tactics to realize that they have correctly identified the most pressing moral, political

and economic issue of the new century—third-world poverty. While globalization has great potential to relieve the suffering of the world's poor, it can also trample individual liberties on a grand scale in the name of progress. Max L. Stackhouse, general editor of the four volume series *God and Globalization: Theological Ethics and the Spheres of Life*, points out that until now no one has examined the complex social reality called “globalization” from a theological-ethical point of view. If the first two volumes of this series are any indication, the world's religious traditions can and must serve a vital role in interpreting global trends and establishing normative values in spite of predictions “that the future will be increasingly secular” (6), thus providing hope that the future face of globalization need not remain hidden behind a black ski mask.

A project of this magnitude and scope, although primarily of interest to scholars of comparative ethics and cultural theory, has broad interdisciplinary appeal. In fact, these volumes could easily serve as texts for an introductory course in theological ethics or as a resource for clergy in helping faith communities decipher their mission in our ever-changing world. The strength of these two volumes is their ability to integrate many perspectives, not only from the various academic disciplines, but from a diversity of ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. Space does not allow for a summary of every essay in these collections, so I will outline the overall structure and design of the project, identify recurring themes, and then highlight particularly insightful contributions.

In the introductory essay to the first volume, Stackhouse argues for the necessity of developing a public theological ethic in order to properly analyze the formative values operative in any given sociocultural ethos. He identifies three primary tasks of any theological ethics: (1) to analyze and interpret the highly contextualized nature of moral and theological beliefs, describing what values, norms, and convictions prevail in a particular social ethos; (2) to critically and comparatively evaluate and assess the existing values and social practices of particular institutions, cultures, and societies; and (3) to offer prescriptive guidance in order to develop values and practices which, to paraphrase Karl Marx, not just interpret the world but strive to change it—hopefully for the better. Simply put, what *ought* to be done begins with a thorough analysis of what *is*, in order to develop a realistic assessment of what *can* be.

Building upon this general methodological framework, the first volume is organized around five “principalities” constitutive for all societies and institutions—Eros, Mars, the Muses, Mammon, and Religion—while the second volume is organized around the critical engagement of religion with the “authorities” of the contemporary age: Education, Law, Medicine, and Technology. Vol-

ume three of the series promises several case studies of how theological ethics interacts with the forces of globalization, and the final volume will present prescriptive suggestions for a biblical-theological reformation of global civilization. Basic to the overall project is the assumption that theology and ethics are mutually supportive enterprises, and that a theological framework contributes something unique and necessary to public discourse. The reception of these four volumes *outside* the religious sphere will prove crucial in evaluating the latter claim. Nonetheless, this project deserves praise for challenging both, modernist assumptions about the irrelevance of religion, and theology's tendency toward confessional and dogmatic insularity.

The five "principalities" or powers present in every society are: a viable economy (Mammon), the appropriate exercise of political authority (Mars), an ordered way of dealing with human sexuality (Eros), resources and avenues of aesthetic expression (the Muses), and a social praxis which serves as a center of meaning and morality (the Religions). Highlights of the first volume (on the principalities) include Donald Shriver's challenging essay, "The Taming of Mars," in which he explores whether or not there is a religiously legitimate role for the use of violence in preventing or curtailing further violence. David Tracy's engagement with the Muses is another innovative contribution, specifically his attempt to broaden our understanding of human rationality by uncovering rich resources for theological discourse in the fragmentary images of postmodern art and mass media.

The essays in volume two are united in the conviction that Christian theology and theological ethics can critically engage the modern "secular" authorities and provide valuable insights for guiding these powers. However, one limitation of these essays is their failure to come to terms with the fact that theological perspectives are not always welcome in the public arena. For example, Allen Verhey's piece, "The Spirit of God and the Spirit of Medicine," manages to provide a vision of an alternative community of healing in which the alienating and antiseptic treatments of modern technology are counter-balanced with more organic caring ministries. Yet Verhey, in his discussion of the Hippocratic oath and the Christian appropriation of this oath, does not adequately address the almost absolute power given to the medical profession in establishing the ethical norms of medical practices. Thankfully, the second volume concludes with a very strong essay by Peter Paris in which he disputes the trend in ethics begun by Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* (1981) and *Whose Reason? Whose Rationality?* (1988) by developing a common moral discourse in global context. While MacIntyre accurately describes the central role played by tradition in

moral formation, he expresses undue pessimism in asserting that moral agreement is no longer possible in postmodern society. Paris moves beyond MacIntyre by developing a model of ethical discourse that respects contextuality yet makes room for human rights and universal reason.

The term globalization has been applied to diverse realities, ranging from the merely descriptive analysis of international economic integration to the more prescriptive efforts at creating a common global culture, currency, and government. Regardless of how one chooses to define the term, the chaos in Seattle over the World Trade Organization draws attention to the predatory practices of dominant governments and international agencies. This valuable series of books, by interjecting complex interdisciplinary analyses of globalization that are rooted in people's deepest moral and religious commitments, promises a genuinely public theology and global ethic that respects a plurality of perspectives without surrendering to radical pluralism.

—RUBÉN ROSARIO RODRÍGUEZ
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible. Edited by David Noel Freedman, Allen C. Myers, and Astrid B. Beck. Eerdmans, 2000, xxxiii and 1425 pages, XVI plates.

Eminently comprehensive in its coverage of biblical nomenclature, brimming with historical data and exegetical reflection from qualified scholars, the new *Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible* (which replaces the 1987 edition) is the best one-volume dictionary of the Bible available today. Such praise is tempered, of course, by the limitations inherent in any one-volume Bible dictionary. The editor-in-chief, David Noel Freedman of the University of California San Diego, correctly describes the scope of this project as "comprehensive but not exhaustive." As such, this is a valuable, portable reference that may be used as a starting point, but not a replacement, for deeper exploration of a wide variety of topics.

Approximately 600 contributors offer almost 5,000 entries that cover the names, terms, and expressions of the NRSV, including the Apocrypha. All the Bible's people ("Aaron" to "Zurishaddai"), places ("Abaddon to Zuph"), and things ("A" [Codex Alexandrinus] to "Zuzim") appear in this volume. The articles range from the indispensable (e.g., "Covenant" and "Jesus Christ") to the eccentric (e.g., "Do Not Destroy" and "Nuts"). In addition, there are treatments of some terms that, although they do not appear in biblical texts, reflect the history of biblical literature and its analysis (e.g., "Nunc Dimittis," "Pentateuch," and

“Targum”). Therefore, this dictionary will also help readers navigate their study Bibles and introductory textbooks in which such terms appear.

Comparisons between this volume and perhaps its closest “competitor,” *The HarperCollins Bible Dictionary* (1996), are inevitable and revolve primarily around these details: not only is the *HarperCollins* older, but it is more sparing in what it treats in comparison with the more extensive coverage of biblical terminology in the *Eerdmans*. Comprehensiveness is a desirable quality in a single-volume reference, and so the *Eerdmans* gains an advantage. Furthermore, its bibliographies direct readers to the most recent scholarship on significant issues. The *HarperCollins* relies upon about 400 fewer contributors than the *Eerdmans* and so has a higher proportion of articles per contributor. This results in a greater sense of unity of presentation and perspective in the former, but the latter suffers no serious appearance of unevenness or fragmentation in its attempt to include as many experts as possible.

Probably the best way to convey the essence of such a large and diverse reference tool is to offer observations of trends with reference to specific entries. A typical article about a person or place in the *Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible* consists of equal parts historical background and summary of the biblical texts in which the name appears. Sometimes there is a brief exposition of the theological significance or literary portrayal of a character. In cases of characters whose role or nature in certain narratives is ambiguous, the inclusion of such exposition can highlight various options for interpretation (e.g., “Judas Iscariot” and “Samson”). The inclusion of exegetical remarks is sporadic, however, and so the enigmatic or complex functions of some characters remain unaddressed (e.g., “Abimelech” [King of Gerar], “Felix,” and “Festus, Porcius”).

The entries on each of the canonical and apocryphal books follow no fixed format and are of similar length and content to the introductions found in most study Bibles. The discussion in these articles may include reference to a biblical book’s authorship, date, historical context and provenance, genre, sources, structure or outline, purpose, and content. Many also present, from a theological perspective, significant themes and issues of interpretation. The bibliographies accompanying these entries usually list specialized studies reflecting a variety of interests (theological, historical, structural, and the like); some of these bibliographies recommend particular commentaries.

Where there is significant controversy within scholarship concerning a topic under discussion, contributors ordinarily note it. Where a variety of competing hypotheses about a topic exist, a reader finds brief mention of some, perhaps an account of their development, and a bibliography to launch more thor-

ough study (e.g., “Deuteronomistic History”). A contributor may contend for a certain interpretation over another yet also acknowledge viable, significant alternatives (e.g., “Zacchaeus”). As a reminder, however, that a reference work such as this is no substitute for specialized studies and commentaries, on rare occasions an article ignores contested issues that are quite important. For example, the entry “Faith” suggests that Paul understands *pistis* as “a technical term for reaction to gospel preaching” and as involving a close connection to the ethical life. Many New Testament theologians would take issue with such a description, or at least plead for a more detailed explanation that takes into account proposals about the place of Jesus’ faithfulness in Paul’s use of *pistis*.

This is not an encyclopedia of biblical criticism, and so there is little explicit attention to critical methods save a survey article on their development (“Biblical Criticism”) and two that refer to the contributions of newer, literary approaches (“Literature, New Testament as” and “Literature, Old Testament as”). (By contrast, *The HarperCollins Bible Dictionary* has entries with the same three titles, plus separate ones on narrative, rhetorical, and sociological approaches and on feminist and African-American hermeneutics.) Contributors, however, make use of a wide variety of methods in their introductions to biblical books and in other, more specialized entries. For example, the discussion in “Conquest: Biblical Narrative” utilizes a nice blend of redaction criticism and archaeological evidence. The contributions of feminist scholarship and interpretation illuminate the exegetical comments in a number of entries (e.g., “Dinah,” “Junia,” “Lydia,” “Miriam,” and “Phoebe”). The dictionary also includes an article entitled “Women in the Israelite Cult” but lacks a separate discussion of the role of women in the early church.

Those who find their study Bibles too slender and the six-volume *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (1992), also edited by Freedman, too large for their reference needs will be pleased with the *Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible*. It is an excellent reference tool for students and pastors, as well as for specialists who may have forgotten such minutiae as where the month of Iyyar falls in the Hebrew calendar.

—MATTHEW L. SKINNER
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Across the Boundaries of Belief: Contemporary Issues in the Anthropology of Religion. Edited by Morton Klass and Maxine K. Weisgrau. Westview Press, 1999, viii and 416 pages.

The academic disciplines of religious studies and cultural anthropology owe so much to one another historically, their conjunctions and coalescences having from time to time produced such inspiring and seminal thinking in both fields -- from that of Edwin W. Smith, a missionary, born of missionary parents in southern Africa, who became President of the Royal Anthropological Institute, to Clifford Geertz, a self-avowedly "religiously tone-deaf" anthropologist whose scholarly record of contributions to our understanding of religion in human societies needs no rehearsal or advertisement here, to the incomparable Eric Sharpe, who has not only practiced this crossing of disciplines, but even chronicled it -- that one would think that the contacts, cross-over points, and cross-fertilizations between these two areas of social science would be many and fruitful. However, the contrary has, for the most part, alas, been true, as the very first essay in this fine collection of articles, essays, and period pieces avers, and suspicion rather than collaboration has traditionally been the regnant posture between anthropologists and religionists. The Geertzes, the Smiths, the Sharpes, and the S.J. Tambiahs of the academic world have been the exceptions that proved the rule. It was, in fact, not until 1999 and 2000 that a serious movement was launched, initially via e-mail, to provide a formal working group for the study of the Anthropology of Religion at the American Academy of Religion. Should this initiative come to fruition, one could, perhaps, suggest that the Academy is undergoing, however belatedly, a "conversion" to cultural studies.

The metaphor of conversion is particularly apt, since all of the contributions to the volume under review have to do not only with religion *per se*, but with religions and worldviews in contact, cross-fertilization and creative abutment one against the other. While the brief integrative essays introducing each of the book's five sub-sections constitute the only "new," previously unpublished material in this collection, what is here represents a broad geographical and methodological cross-section of some of the best work in the field of religious change from the 1980s and 1990s. The essays collected in this book will be of interest not only to anthropologists and ethnographers, but mission historians and other religionists, as well as others, for together these essays capture a strikingly broad range of possibilities for human societal religious change, including the conversion of established religious traditions to modernity.

The essays in the first sub-section, subtitled "Colonialism and Postcolonial Legacies," deal with the kinds of conflicts, as well as creative quandaries, that have ensued in the confrontation between Christian missionaries and non-Christian religions. The sad record of triumphalist missionaries preaching hellfire and

denigrating non-Western cultures is well known, but it cannot be asserted strongly enough that this is not a monolithic record: there were, and there still are, some "culture-friendly" missionaries. It is, therefore, gratifying to read Shapiro's account of the "conversion of the church" by the indigenous culture of the Tupi-Guarani people of South America (22-41), and, in the selection by Sergei Kan, of the resistance to Euro-American cultural hegemony by defiant modern-day Tlingit Eskimo elders who, while not rejecting the Christianity they have been taught, nevertheless insist that their own ancestors knew and practiced it better than the white Christian missionaries do (42-62).

The second section covers issues of gender and sexuality, and their inevitable relationships to cultural ideas of identity, power, and ownership of selves and traditions. The four selections in this section seek to push back the edges of the regnant male-oriented theories of culture and (homo)sexuality to expose new frameworks of understanding and fields of meaning. Of particular interest is Deborah A. Elliston's ringing critique of a considerable corpus of ethnographic material relating to what has been known as "ritualized homosexuality" in Melanesian *rites de passage*. Elliston proposes substituting the term "semen practices" for "ritualized homosexuality," a concept that was developed, along with an entire surrounding analytical structure for explaining Melanesian rituals, by Western male anthropologists, and, Elliston argues, is thus unsuited to capturing the indigenous meanings of these practices.

The articles in the third section, on healing and altered states of consciousness, point to issues that arise in situations where conflicting paradigms of human health and healing, such as exorcism and psychoanalysis, or the germ theory of disease and beliefs that admit of spells and spirit possession, come into contact. One of these, by Susan M. Kenyon, (227-247) argues, in fascinating and compelling fashion, for a reading of traditional *zar* beliefs and practices of Sudanese women, having to do with spirit possession, in which they can be seen to function as promoting of women's empowerment and as "a forum for women to voice indirect opposition to developments which do not bode well for them." (232) In this, Kenyon mines the rich vein of "modernity of tradition" thought pioneered by Robert N. Bellah and Terence O. Ranger, for, she argues, "*zar* is modernization. For many people in Sennar it facilitates their coping with some of the dramatic changes affecting them as they move from rural community to urban life, with the bewildering array of choices that this presents. . . it also enables people to deal with new situations, new groups, new ideas with a wealth of experience and confidence" (240-241).

The articles in the fourth section, on religion and the state, address situations of secularization, religious tension, persecution, and conversion in venues, such as, for example, Indonesia, Turkey, Taiwan, that remain as fraught with tension, hostility, and potential for calamity today as when these articles were first published. Robert P. Weller's historical review (271-290) of the frustrated attempts by a succession of three Taiwanese state systems (the Qing dynasty, the Japanese colonial government, and Chiang Kai Shek's nationalist government) over the last 150 years to domesticate and manipulate the ghost festivals of local temple religion is a paean to popular resistance and the resilience of inherited belief.

The final section, entitled "Changes and Continuities," is, strangely and somewhat disappointingly, the weakest and least integrated into the overall theme of this collection. After a promising beginning, with articles relating to the persistence of the phenomenon of cargo cults in Irian Jaya and the transnational history of the Rastafarian movement, the book ends with a whimper, the two final entries being devoted to, in the first case, precursors of New Age-ism and cultish movements such as Rajneeshims and the People's Temple, and in the second, the rhetoric of fundamentalist Christian conversion.

The great strength of this collection is its commitment to an observation of religion that is at once cross-cultural and coherent. The selections published in this book embrace not only a broad geographic and cultural diversity, but a wide variety of perspectives and questions pertaining to religion as well. While the brief introductory chapter is helpful, the overall package would have been enhanced by a summarizing chapter written by the editors. That said, however, the wealth of information, theory, and clear thinking on some thorny anthropological issues that is gathered together into one volume here will make *Across the Boundaries of Belief* a standard text for students and scholars of religion and culture for years to come.

—JAMES F. THOMAS

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Ascension and Ecclesia. By Douglas S. Farrow. Eerdmans, 1999, xi and 340 pages.

This book should be read by those interested in current ecclesiological questions as well as the infrequently considered role of ascension in christology. Farrow's careful work covers biblical grounds as well as close examinations of such theologians as Irenaus, Aquinas, Origen, Barth, Augustine, and Schleiermacher. The book mostly covers the history of theology from the point

of view of *christus absens*. Absence and presence usually concern the sacraments but in affecting them, it affects ecclesiology as well. "To grapple with the mystery of the *quodammodo praesens et quodammodo absens* [in a way present and in a way absent] is indeed ecclesiology's constant challenge" (3). Farrow's concluding question in all of this is Where is Jesus? (270ff) This is in response to the usual manner of "looking away from Jesus" as David Strauss suggested (255). It seems to me that Farrow's is the right path to take.

Farrow considers the question of presence and absence to be mutually related and that through neglect of Jesus' absence, theologians wrongly fill that space with the church. Ascension is wrongly used when it is not the ascension of the man Jesus but an action of the "post-incarnate Logos" (98). Augustine errs when he treats the church as a sort of space for the church (121). Indeed, most ecumenical ecclesiology would see the ascension in this light when paired with Pentecost. However, for Farrow, Jesus' ascension means "absence" in a certain sense because it is Jesus going his own way, which must be his and his alone (10).

The modern stretch of history that Farrow considers involves the Copernican factor as well as the comparative moves in Kant and Hume. The question that drives moderns is "Where is Jesus" and Farrow asks this of each since locality cannot easily be "heaven" anymore. His question of Where? is important because it asks "Where is Christ with respect to space and time?" (165) His modern list of authors includes Hegel, Teilhard, and Barth. All of these excepting Barth play a major role in developing ascension as the ascension of something other than the man Jesus.

Barth offers a major correction to these misuses of the ascension because of his fidelity to the "man Jesus" (229). It is the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity which attacks what Farrow calls ecclesial docetism (235). Jesus is absent as well as present. Barth's own answer to the Where? question is actually an imperative: wait and watch! (236). Barth also maintains for Farrow is a crucial distinction, namely that the history of Jesus is not reducible to the history of faith (237).

There is ample consideration of the role ascension plays in the Bible, largely literary structures and patterns. Most useful is the long discussion of Luke-Acts. These are very good and important things to note, but Farrow does not always address his exposition of scripture with the question "Where is Jesus?" nor does he spend much time on the important Psalm 110, which has driven much research into New Testament christology (24ff, 33ff). There have been important

suggestions that link Luke, the master of liturgical festivals, to this ubiquitous Psalm in the New Testament.

The tenor of his engagement with modern cosmology could have had parallels in his other sections if he had also engaged how Aquinas tries to resolve the Eucharistic dilemma by way of an “infinite agent,” since Jesus’ body and blood do not spatially arrive on the altar. This one instance shows how far the question “where” goes; Farrow’s work would improve if it would have done this with more of his interlocutors, particularly Luther who appears only with a doctrine of Christ’s ubiquity, if he ever held such a thing.

In this excellent volume, it is sometimes hard to see what ecclesiological formulations Farrow opposes. When writing in his conclusion on the Spirit’s work infringing on our time, he writes: “That gracious infringement is what the man of the world, and the church which has become worldly, falsify with talk of grasping the divine as it presents itself to us in our time” (257). Ascension for Farrow in the end is that event which, to be sure, signifies the exaltation of humanity eschatologically, but makes sure that Jesus is not confused with us. One might wonder how far that the church does share with Jesus, despite Farrow’s early comments on the Eucharist.

—GREGORY WALTER
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths. By Gerald R. McDermott. Oxford University Press, 2000, xii and 245 pages.

In his 1959 work *The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods*, Frank Manuel explored the development of Enlightenment thinkers’ views on religion and the religions. Gerald McDermott turns to Jonathan Edwards with the same questions. McDermott introduces readers to a “strange, new Edwards” who was fascinated by other religions in which he saw glimpses of divine truth. He demonstrates how Edwards, a man of the Enlightenment, used Enlightenment tools to counter what he saw as the greatest threat to Reformed orthodoxy: the Deism of the radical Enlightenment. This battle against Deism led Edwards to examine revelation in Christianity and other religions. McDermott claims that Edwards’ acknowledgement of religious truth among non-Christian religions laid a theological foundation for the possibility of the salvation of non-Christians.

Part one presents the problem of Deism as Edwards encountered it, emphasizing that it was the Deistic rejection of revelation, not the intramural squabbles of Arminianism, that Edwards considered his greatest theological challenge. McDermott recognizes the elusive nature of Deism and for the sake of simplicity provides a working definition: Deists subordinated revelation to reason and equated religion with morality. Deists decried the Christian “scandal of particularity,” that five-sixths of the world was damned; this exclusivity did not cohere with the Enlightenment ideal of a fair and just God. Though this characterization proves useful for his work, readers should bear in mind McDermott’s caveat that his reification of the term “Deism” is problematic.

Part two describes Edwards’ various strategies for both undermining Deism and making non-Christians essential actors in Christian history. Since Deism exalted a religion of nature based on the light of reason, Edwards scrutinized reason, concluding that it was a noble and God-given faculty; sin, however, blocked reason from imparting the true knowledge of God or the way to reconcile humanity to God. Since “naked reason” as the Deists understood it did not exist in wholesome purity, revelation was necessary. For Edwards, this religion of revelation was dynamic and vital in contrast to the Deists’ view of religion as static and moralistic. Edwards used the tradition of *prisca theologia* to demonstrate that although all peoples had originally received knowledge of true religion, through a process of “religious entropy” revelation was distorted, resulting in superstition and ignorance. Through his typological system, Edwards comprehended non-Christian religions as partly divine images of truth that was more fully realized in Christian revelation.

Part three demonstrates the application of these strategies in Edwards’ deliberations on Judaism, Islam, Greek and Roman religions, Native American religions, and Chinese philosophy. McDermott explores how his agenda against the Deists (as well as other factors) influenced Edwards’ evaluations of non-Christian religions. For example, Edwards joined a long tradition of anti-Islamic rhetoric but with extraordinary fervor. McDermott explains that Edwards’ vitriol against Islam was due to the Deists’ practice of praising Islam over and against Christianity. Edwards felt it necessary to demonstrate that Islam had no inherent truth but only remnants of the truth of original revelation. Islam was not, as the Deists claimed, a confirmation of natural religion but rather evidence of the originality of revealed religion. McDermott concludes that Edwards creatively appropriated Enlightenment assumptions to serve the interests of Reformed theology and in the process reconfigured his own understanding of that theology.

Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods reflects McDermott's years of engagement with Edwards' theology and socio-political thought and demonstrates thorough knowledge of Edwards' published and unpublished works. His emphasis on Edwards as the first colonial American to reflect systematically on religious others places McDermott in the tradition of scholars who exalt Edwards as the American Augustine, as spectacularly unique in the history of American religion.

McDermott succeeds in calling to the attention of scholars a side of Edwards' thought that has been neglected. Edwards' treatment of other religions, predicated upon his concern about Deism and its inadequate notion of reason, demands more attention. This work also invites more sustained engagement with Edwards' actual encounters with non-Christians, especially the Native Americans among whom he worked in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and how these encounters altered the abstract views on non-Christian religions expressed in much of his writings. The reader interested in furthering this research will appreciate McDermott's mining of Edwards' private notebooks and his identification in the bibliography of salient manuscript collections.

Just as Edwards studied non-Christian religions not for their own intrinsic value but with the intent to protect Christianity against the threat of Deism, McDermott also has another goal in recovering Edwards' appreciation of non-Christian religions. He has a pastoral interest in finding useful ways for evangelical Christians to interact with non-Christians, as is evidenced by his most recent work, *Can Evangelicals Learn from World Religions? Jesus, Revelation and the Religions* (2000). McDermott finds Edwards a helpful model and he identifies with Edwards' concerns. Occasionally this identification leads McDermott to present Edwards' opinions as undisputed facts.

This readable, well-written work offers a valuable new lens through which to view Edwards' oeuvre. *Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods* will be appreciated by scholars of Jonathan Edwards and of the Enlightenment in America, as well as by those with an interest in pastoral theology. It will also prove significant for those interested in the history of the study of religion in America, a history that began when a colonial thinker struggled to define religion and the religions at a time when "the gods were ubiquitous."

—JENNIFER WILEY LEGATH
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CUMULATIVE INDEX VOLUMES I-XIII

The following index includes articles and book reviews published in the first twelve volumes of *Koinonia*: Volume I (1989) through Volume XII (2000). Articles appear in alphabetical order, by author; book reviews are listed alphabetically by book author, with review authors listed in parentheses following the book title.

Included within the index are the central papers and responses of *Koinonia*'s Fall Forums, hosted annually at Princeton Theological Seminary. The subject of these Forums varies from year to year. Since the journal's inception, the Fall Forum issues have addressed feminist biblical hermeneutics (1989), evangelicalism and orthodoxy (1990), sin, shame, and the self (1991), hermeneutics of Mark's Gospel (1992), oppression and hope (1993), moral *bricolage* (1994), African-American "guerilla exegesis" (1995), the work of John Boswell (1996), theodicy and Biblical lament (1997), postfoundational rationality (1998), and, most recently, the Million Man March and globalization.

This index shows the breadth of scholarship in religious studies that *Koinonia* has worked to present: from Biblical studies to theology, from church history to theology and ethics, from mission and ecumenics to practical theology. In each of these areas we have sought to include work that fosters interdisciplinary discussion and addresses the resources and issues alive in cultural, scholarly, and religious settings around the world. As we continue in our second decade of publishing, we will seek to bring our readers the best in doctoral-level work in religious studies: work that reflects our continuing commitment to interdisciplinary work, scholarly depth, and careful attention to emerging voices in religious studies.

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